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In the controversy surrounding Hannah Arendt’s coverage of the Eichmann trial in 
Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil the discussion of her work has come to 
recognize that Arendt’s account of the banality of evil is not meant to excuse Adolf Eichmann 
for serving as the SS officer charged with overseeing the logistical arrangements needed to enact 
the Final Solution. This writing will examine three case studies – a discussion of the genocides in 
Rwanda and in Cambodia and a discussion of modern bureaucracy – and consider both to what 
extent Arendt’s notion of the banality of evil contributes to an understanding of the practices of 
genocide and modern bureaucracy, and to what extent does an examination of these practices 
contribute to an understanding of the banality of evil. The argument will be made that Arendt’s 
use of this phrase refers simply to the willingness to perform activities if they are viewed as 
being in compliance with the prevailing moral and/or legal order of the society in which they 
occur. Though this suggests her offering a fairly straightforward message about the “dangers of 
conformity,” or the willingness to thoughtlessly engage in conventional practices to such an 
extreme degree, the thesis will seek to demonstrate the complexity of recognizing that this level 
of conformity is present under these circumstances. 
The examination of the three cases being discussed will centre both on Arendt’s 
discussion of the human faculties as well as the form of sociological investigation developed by 
Alan Blum and Peter McHugh known as Analysis, and the focus of this method upon 
understanding the merits of human activity. The argument seeks to show that by following the 
reflexive turn in Analysis an understanding of what is involved in showing a concern for the 
meaning of human activity is not arrived at “subjectively.” Rather the suggestion will be made 
that even if the resolution of this meaning is without a definitive outcome its importance is 
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demonstrated through a consideration of the cases examined and the concern shown within each 
of them for matters such as friendship, justice, the activity of thinking and the nature of evil. 
Lastly, the argument will use Arendt’s work to suggest that not only the activity of thinking but 
each of the different human faculties can potentially offer a way to appreciate the 
“thoughtlessness” that Arendt suggests is indicative of the banality of evil, and which may be 
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Only our concept of time makes us call the Last Judgment by that name; in fact, it is a 
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Practicality, Household Morality and the Problem of Reconciling “Is” and 
“Ought” 
 In the field of the finite, absolute determinacy remains only a demand, a demand which 
the Understanding has to meet by continually increasing delimitation – a fact of the greatest 
importance – but which continues ad infinitum and which allows only of perennially approximate 
satisfaction.1 
– G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right (Quoted in Edith Wyschogrod, Spirit in Ashes) 
Introduction 
 An often commented upon feature of issues debated in a public forum is the spectacle 
that accompanies subjects that are deemed to be controversial and the way in which this 
spectacle impacts the taste for discussion. The cynical view that controversy attracts opportunism 
and steers away genuine interest may lend support to the suggestion that these issues inevitably 
get overblown. But these reservations about the merits of public discourse do not rule out the 
possibility that through a discussion of a controversial subject an understanding could be 
developed that works out the concerns being addressed. In the case of the controversy 
surrounding Hannah Arendt’s coverage of the Eichmann trial in Eichmann in Jerusalem: A 
Report on the Banality of Evil the discussion of her work has at least come to recognize that 
Arendt’s account of the banality of evil is not meant to excuse Adolf Eichmann for serving as the 
SS officer charged with overseeing the logistical arrangements needed to enact the Final 
Solution. This suggests that her report on Eichmann could be appreciated as being in the tradition 
of Max Weber’s notion of Verstehen with its focus upon understanding the subject of analysis 
without necessarily intending to endorse its orientation to the world. Building from this 
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understanding Arendt departs from the Weberian approach and makes the judgment that 
Eichmann should be hanged for his involvement in the Third Reich on the grounds that his part 
in carrying out a policy that sought the elimination of entire populations makes him the type of 
person no one would want to continue to share the earth with – an assessment that is clearly far 
from either excusing or endorsing what he had done. This writing will examine three case studies 
– a discussion of the genocides in Rwanda and in Cambodia and a discussion of modern 
bureaucracy – and consider both to what extent Arendt’s notion of the banality of evil contributes 
to an understanding of the practices of genocide and modern bureaucracy, and to what extent an 
examination of these practices contributes to an understanding of the banality of evil. The 
argument will be made that the key notion for understanding what is meant by the “banality of 
evil” is that the activities performed are in compliance with the prevailing moral and/or legal 
order of the society in which they occur. On the basis of the understanding that is developed 
through the discussion of these three cases judgment about what is involved with the banality of 
evil and the practice of genocide and modern bureaucracy will also be worked out. 
The Concept of Evil in Arendt’s Work 
 Arendt situates banal evil as a break from previous accounts of the concept of evil 
including her own earlier explanation in the Origins of Totalitarianism that drew upon Kant’s use 
of the phrase of radical evil. Kant had used this phrase to break with the traditional explanation 
of “moral” evil (versus the natural “evils” suffered from flooding and other natural disasters) 
which argues that the performance of evil acts is a matter of ignorance on the part of the doer and 
not something that anyone would willingly choose to commit. Kant’s explanation of the concept 
of radical evil contends that individuals will pursue evil activities out of a narrow-minded sense 
of “self-interest” that shows no concern for the “good” of the moral law. The way Arendt further 
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radicalized this concept is by suggesting that the evil committed by totalitarian regimes is 
deliberately chosen but not for humanly understandable motives such as self-interest. The 
examples she cites in support of this argument include the decision on the part of the Nazis to 
have resources such as the use of trains to deliver supplies and reinforcements badly needed for 
the battle with Russia on the Eastern front diverted towards the effort to enact the Final Solution, 
as if winning the conventional war against the armed forces of a hostile nation was less important 
for securing the safety of Germany than the murder of defenceless civilians. As well, the 
existence of the concentration camps also seems to eschew utilitarian motives considering that as 
work camps they had a negligible benefit in terms of providing productive labour and as death 
camps they prolonged the lives of those slated for extermination. 
 The Eichmann trial convinced Arendt to not only introduce a concept of evil that takes 
shape in a banal form but to also reject the idea of radical evil in both Kant’s version of this 
concept and her own earlier version in the Origins of Totalitarianism. This she explains in a 
relatively well-known passage from a letter to Gershom Scholem: 
It is indeed my opinion now that evil is never “radical,” that it is 
only extreme, and that it possesses neither depth nor any demonic 
dimension. It can overgrow and lay waste the whole world 
precisely because it spreads like a fungus on the surface. It is 
“thought- defying,” as I said, because thought tries to reach some 
depth, to go to the roots, and the moment it concerns itself with 
evil, it is frustrated because there is nothing. That is its “banality.” 
Only the good has depth and can be radical.2 
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The suggestion that evil has width and can become dangerous through its capacity to spread with 
ease seems to account for the willingness to accept the enactment of the Final Solution 
throughout Europe. The more debatable part of Arendt’s statement is the suggestion that evil is 
“never radical” and “possesses neither depth nor any demonic dimension” considering that the 
term that she uses synonymously with the banality of evil is “thoughtlessness.”3 If evil is either 
more or less extreme, and so different by degree but not in kind, then according to this 
explanation Hitler would be extremely thoughtless, Eichmann would also be extremely 
thoughtless but to a lesser degree than Hitler and so on down the chain of command. This may 
seem like a problematic way to characterize Hitler’s intentions as the architect and driving force 
behind a policy of mass murder that deliberately sought to eliminate entire nations of people. 
 Dignee Brandt offers a way to respond to this difficulty by suggesting that a distinction 
can be made between the banal evil of Eichmann’s intentions and the radical evil of the deeds he 
was involved with performing.4 The argument in this writing will also recognize that evil in 
different forms is capable of working towards the same end although with the focus of this 
argument on social order and its endorsement of a policy of mass murder the issue of intentions 
will be considered secondary in importance relative to the activities that are being performed. 
The cover provided by this type of social order creates conditions for motives that may be 
radical, banal or (as will be discussed) criminal, all of which may be compatible with one 
another. The significance of these motives will be considered potentially relevant to examine in 
the cases where they serve as mitigating factors in assessing individual responsibility for 
supporting a policy of mass murder. In terms of understanding the concept of evil the case will 
be made in this writing that evil is different in kind, but even if it is viewed as being different 
only by degree as Arendt proposes in her letter to Scholem – through her suggestion that evil is 
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always banal and just more or less extreme – social order will still be viewed as a key 
consideration for sustaining the practice of genocide. Its endorsement of a policy of mass murder 
would be no less important for ensuring that banal forms of evil can coexist together at varying 
levels of intensity to work towards achieving genocidal ends. 
 What should also be added to these remarks is that, like its counterpart the “good,” no 
claim is being made to know in an absolute sense what is meant by the notion of evil or the 
activities that can be identified as being evil. A central focus of the discussion will be to respond 
to the lack of certainty concerning these notions by working out what relevance, if any, they have 
in relation to understanding the practice of genocide. This focus will be pursued with particular 
attention upon the way Arendt’s unfinished remarks on the faculty of human judgment can be a 
part of developing an understanding of what evil and the “good” involve in these matters. In 
terms of method the argument will seek to work out this understanding with the approach to 
social inquiry presented in the writings of Alan Blum and Peter McHugh known as Analysis. The 
choice of this method will be explained by examining the well-known statement of “just 
following orders” made by Nazi officials at Nuremberg to develop an initial sense of what 
“good” the practice of genocide is considered to have by its practitioners in offering this defence. 
This discussion will also seek to clarify what is meant by the banality of evil and the way in 
which this notion can be said to involve both thoughtlessness and a willingness to comply with a 
social order that endorses a policy of mass murder. 
Social Theory and the Nuremberg Defence 
 The starting point for this discussion of method will be to consider the review that 
Stanley Raffel presents in his article “Revisiting Role Theory: Rules and the Problem of the Self” 
of the different ways the concepts of role and self have been formulated by a number of the most 
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prominent perspectives within social theory. Raffel uses Analysis to examine the different 
perspectives in his review beginning with the Functionalist perspective that is most well-known 
through the work of Talcott Parsons. The objections that Raffel identifies with the notion of 
selfhood that Parsons makes available in his account of role seems to have obvious applicability 
to an actor who claims to be “just following orders”. For instance, Raffel argues that: 
 Even though the Parsonian self is active, in that his or her activity 
is totally a matter of complying with expectations, doesn’t the 
orthodox Parsonian solution, then, really solve the problem of 
order at the cost of robbing actors of selves? ... It seems more a 
case of going along with what others or the whole society expect, 
quite irrespective of what one actually wants. 5 
The apparent aptness of using Raffel’s description to show the compliance of Functionalism with 
the account given by the Nazi defendants is somewhat mitigated by Parsons’ personal opposition 
to the Nazi movement that he voiced by advocating for America’s early entry into the Second 
World War to fight against the Axis powers.6 Parsons’ resistance to the dangers posed by 
oppressive forms of government also included his opposition to the spread of Stalinism in 
Europe after WWII and in his standing up to McCarthyism after being the target of Hoover’s 
investigations.7 He justified this stance theoretically with an explanation given in quasi-
evolutionary terms that suggested that rigid social systems create instability when they are 
unresponsive to the needs of individuals under their domain as these individuals seek to answer 
to the demands of their moral environment.8 Parsons’ explanation seems problematic for what 
response it would recommend individuals should have when they are a part of “unstable” social 
institutions that restrict their moral freedom. If the argument is that they will “naturally” be 
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inclined to do what is moral then this was simply not borne out in the Third Reich where the vast 
majority of individuals showed no evidence that they wished to see the Nazi worldview 
“evolve.” 
 If the most significant shortcoming of Functionalist theory in accounting for selfhood is 
its inability to recognize the dangers associated with a social system that is working well rather 
than suffering from some form of defect, then Conflict Theory might seem to represent a more 
viable alternative to understanding the connection between role and self. Using Ralf 
Dahrendolf’s work to represent this perspective Raffel notes Dahrendorf’s argument that “the 
idea of persons as role-followers ... tends to rob persons of anything like a self” and that this 
indicates that sociology is incapable of accounting for what individuals experience in being part 
of society.9 This would imply that sociology’s explanation of self in terms of role not only 
demonstrates that any attempt to understand the self in society will be inadequate but also that 
these attempts could potentially be deceiving and harmful in their suggesting that selfhood 
amounts to rule-following and nothing more – as illustrated by the “just following orders” 
defence. 
 Raffel then turns to the work of Erving Goffman and recognizes his notion of role 
distance as a sociological concept that offers a glimpse of the self. This is a notion that refers to 
the situations where individuals consciously choose to reject the expectations set by roles and 
thereby show the self to be engaged in more than just the effort to meet these expectations. 
Raffel cites Goffman’s example of a child who only pretends to be thrilled by a ride on a merry-
go-round as the way this child demonstrates how they have grown up and moved past the initial 
stages of enjoying or being frightened by the ride. Raffel then makes reference to Andrew 
Travers’ criticism of Goffman, which argues that role distance offers a version of the self that is 
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only negatively defined in terms of what it rejects.10 Goffman’s notion of role distance could 
perhaps be defended against this criticism if it was likened to Arendt’s account of the activity of 
thinking that she suggests has ability to stop individuals from performing the activities they are 
engaged in, whether or not these activities meet the expectations of society, and consider if their 
performance would shatter their sense of self. Although more will be said about Arendt’s notion 
of thinking in the remaining chapters, her description of this faculty as a highly active state 
would seem to imply that during this activity the self is expressed not “negatively” in terms of 
what it will not do but in terms of the self actively exercising its capacity to consider the options 
it can exercise. 
 Assuming for the moment that this criticism of Goffman’s notion of role distance could 
be answered through a comparison to Arendt’s notion of thinking the more troubling issue with 
the explanation of self in his work is that his dramaturgical model suggests that to meet the 
demands of society selfhood is simply abandoned. Goffman proposes that individuals spend their 
time divided between the front and back stage, where they are preoccupied with managing 
impressions in the case of the former and making the necessary arrangements for this 
performance in the case of the latter, but at no time seeing themselves as the authors of the 
expectations they are seeking to meet. The possibility that the notion of “just following orders” 
could comply with Goffman’s dramaturgical model would then seem to apply, a point also 
affirmed by Arendt’s discussion of the “inner emigration” argument (more on this below). 
 This possibility to recognize individuals as the author of the expectations they strive to 
meet is recognized by Harold Garfinkel through his development of the ethnomethodological 
perspective and its explanation of the concept of reflexivity. This concept, which will be of great 
significance to the development of Analysis, acknowledges that “the actual events of everyday 
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life constitute a complex and ever changing array of contingencies such that no fixed 
expectations could ever be sufficiently detailed to dictate to actors what they should actually do 
to fulfill their roles.”11 This state of affairs calls upon social actors to improvise their script as 
part of their making sense of the world since an approach to convention that makes sense of its 
demands by treating them as a set of rules to be interpreted literally would not allow members to 
competently perform their role in society. The extent to which ethnomethodology recognizes that 
a social actor is the author of the activities they perform concerns the implementation of the 
expectations they are dealing with but without acknowledging the capacity of these actors to set 
these expectations in ways other than those dictated by convention. Raffel notes this by 
suggesting that for the ethnomethodological perspective “the form of activity envisioned is only 
that required for competence, for going along with the conventions, and the weakness of this is 
that it is possible, even easy to imagine an actor who is highly competent at their task and still 
would not really be seen as able to express their self in their role”.12 The description of a “highly 
competent” actor who lacks the ability to recognize themselves in their activities would also 
seem to provide a very fitting description of the Nazi officials in charge of organizing the Final 
Solution who claim to be “just following orders”. 
 Raffel further emphasizes the recognition of the reflexive element of selfhood within 
social theory by noting George Herbert Mead’s conception of the self as an object to itself that 
gives consideration to the significance of its activities. Mead suggests that the self gauges this 
significance with respect to the “generalized other,” which represents the expectations of others 
in society that individuals seek to conform to, rather than “a more direct encounter with rules or 
norms.”13 This way of describing a social actor’s method for assessing the merits of their 
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activities as strictly a matter of what is demanded of their role by society would again seem to 
accept the plausibility of offering a defence of “just following orders.” 
 Raffel argues that the more direct reckoning with the significance of society’s 
expectations is available with Analysis through its discussion of the distinction between rules and 
principles. This distinction grants to social actors the capacity to potentially take into 
consideration not just the way in which to competently perform the activities associated with a 
role but also the rightness of choosing to perform these activities. Raffel discusses the notion of a 
principled actor in relation to the concept of role by using an example from the work of 
Lawrence Blum of a teacher named Herbert Kohl who took on extra duties to assist a struggling 
student. Raffel notes that personal preference did not motivate Kohl’s interest in helping the 
student as he found the student hard to get along with and did not particularly like him 
personally. Kohl was also not simply meeting the expectations of his role as he could have 
competently fulfilled his duties by not taking on the extra work of helping the student. Raffel 
suggests that this shows Kohl to be a committed teacher in the sense of an individual “convinced 
of the worth (rightness) of and not just the obligatory character of”14 the activities associated 
with teaching. The objection might be raised that Kohl was simply looking for other ways to 
meet the expectations of his role and helped the student as a means to an end, such as improving 
his reputation in the community or possibly even trying to earn a promotion. These alternatives 
are possible but do not rule out the possibility identified by Raffel of Kohl’s interest in assisting 
the student being representative of his concern with the merits of the teaching role independent 
of the expectations associated with this role. Another example not cited by Raffel but which 
could also be mentioned as an expression of self in the performance of a role that a concern with 
principle makes possible is McHugh’s own decision to resign from his position as a professor at 
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York University after he felt the expectations of this position prevented him from being a 
committed teacher.15 In each example the way in which Analysis suggests that social actors are 
capable of making a distinction between rule and principle would deny the understanding that 
that individuals can claim to be “just following orders.” This line of defence is denied not on the 
basis of an empirical discovery about the “true” feelings of the defendants hidden away in 
diaries, private conversations or through other forms of historical revelation but by suggesting 
that social actors can always be held accountable for what orders they are “just” choosing to 
follow. 
 In different ways each of the sociological perspectives Raffel examines leading up to his 
discussion of Analysis seem to verify Arendt’s critique that “we have become very much 
accustomed by modern psychology and sociology, not to speak of modern bureaucracy, to 
explaining away the responsibility of the doer for his deed in terms of this or that kind of 
determinism.”16 Structural Functionalism presents a version of a social actor who actively 
performs their role, but Conflict Theory, by focusing on the expectations these roles contain, 
suggests that the way the notion of role is understood prevents individuals from realizing a sense 
of self in these roles, and Goffman proposes that by default individuals are engaged in not being 
themselves through the roles they perform. Ethnomethodology identifies the reflexive capacity of 
social actors who acknowledge their responsibility in how they meet what is expected of them in 
the roles they play but whether the expectations of these roles should be met is not part of what 
the self takes into consideration, while Mead recognizes the importance of considering the 
significance of the roles being played but this significance is determined by the self in relation to 
meeting the expectation that others have of these roles. The way in which Analysis develops the 
notion of reflexivity presents a version of a social actor who does not necessarily accept the 
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notion that they are “just following orders” in the roles they play by holding the self responsible 
for being concerned with what is “good” about these roles rather than considering their 
performance as subject to some form of determinism. 
Analysis and the Banality of Evil 
 In discussing the contribution that “radical interpretative reflexivity” can make to 
understanding Arendt’s notion of the banality of evil, Kieran Bonner challenges this almost de 
facto acceptance of deterministic explanations of human conduct by making reference to Jean-
Paul Sartre’s concept of bad faith. The radical interpretative approach that Bonner refers to as “a 
configuration of ethnomethodology, hermeneutics and analysis”17 takes as a focal point of its 
analysis the responsibility that a social theorist has for what they say about the world. For this 
perspective Sartre’s notion of bad faith and its criticism of those that deny the production of the 
reality that they have a hand in creating is a notion that is clearly relevant in responding to the 
claim that the social sciences are only “describers” of society and are not responsible for the 
version of society presented by the objective observations they make. Dahrendorf’s concerns 
about the concept of role providing only a limited understanding of self through its conception of 
social actors as rule followers is comparable to Bonner’s argument to the extent that both have 
misgivings about the way the account of society offered by the social sciences reinforces and/or 
is reinforced by certain aspects of conventional ways of understanding the matters being 
addressed. An important difference is that Bonner is not resigned to accepting the accounts 
offered by conventional understanding and uses the notion of bad faith (as adapted by Peter 
Berger) to recognize the choice social actors have about meeting the expectations associated with 
the roles they play in society. In line with the concern shown by Analysis, Bonner’s Radical 
Interpretative approach further pushes the notion of bad faith by noting that its concern with 
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saying yes or no extends only to acknowledging the possibility of choice without an interest in 
trying to work out what choice to make in a particular case.18 
 Bonner’s criticism seems to be confirmed by the story Sartre tells of a young man who 
approached him during the Second World War and sought his advice about whether he should 
join the French Resistance or stay at home to help his ailing mother. Sartre responds by 
inquiring: 
 By what authority, in the name of what golden rule of morality, do 
you think he could have decided, in perfect peace of mind, either to 
abandon his mother or to remain with her? There are no means of 
judging. The content is always concrete, and therefore 
unpredictable; it has always to be invented. The one thing that 
counts, is to know whether the invention is made in the name of 
freedom.19 
The absence of a “golden rule” may emphasize the importance of recognizing that decisions 
made about what should be done are freely decided upon on a case by case basis. But to 
acknowledge a lack of absolute certainty that would achieve “perfect peace of mind” does not 
rule out the possibility that judgment can be exercised as part of working out the choices to be 
made. 
 Bonner’s development of the notion of bad faith as involving a concern not just for 
making choices but for the “good” of the choices being made also seems to further develop a 
sense of the particularity of the problem associated with the banality of evil. In noting the 
deterministic sense in which Eichmann treated the orders he was given, Bonner observes that: 
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Accepting the rule or the order as an expectation that has to be met 
allows the agent to alienate the content of the action by focusing on 
the impressions of the doer. It displaces the focus from what he is 
doing to how he feels about what he is doing. Is this an everyday 
method that enables the conflation of the difference between moral 
convictions and table manners?20 
The reference to “moral convictions and table manners” alludes to Arendt’s criticism of the 
willingness shown by the populations under the control of the Third Reich to simply shed one set 
of morals for the next in order to remain in compliance with the conventional sense of right and 
wrong.  
This view is dramatically illustrated in the film version of Joseph Heller’s novel Catch-22 
in a conversation that takes place in a brothel between a young American soldier and an old 
Italian man in which the old man defends “the greatness of Italy.” After the old man makes the 
argument about the importance of survival over all other concerns the soldier asks him if he has 
any “principles” and he replies: “of course not.” “No morality?” the young soldier asks next, and 
the old man replies: 
I am a very moral man. And Italy is a very moral country. That is 
why we certainly will come out on top again if we succeed in 
being defeated ... I was a Fascist when Mussolini was on top and 
now that he has been deposed I am anti-Fascist. When the 
Germans were here I was fanatically pro-German but now I am 
fanatically pro-American. You will find no more loyal partisan in 
all of Italy than myself.21 
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This example illustrates the understanding that steadfastly maintains a fidelity towards moral 
convention through its changing proscribed forms of conduct but in a way that is without regard 
for principle and its concern with the “good” of an activity. What though is the connection that 
Bonner identifies between this willingness to disregard principle for moral convention and a 
focus on the “impressions of the doer” that draws the performer’s attention away from the deeds 
they are performing no matter how horrible these deeds may be? 
 The narcissistic tendency of this attitude that is also noted by Arendt in her description of 
Eichmann and what she refers to as his “inability to ever look at anything from the other fellow’s 
point of view”22 is a phenomenon that she suggests is not Eichmann’s alone. Arendt also 
identifies this attitude as a stable part of the speeches made by the leader of the SS Heinrich 
Himmler, which he was able to utilize in motivating the soldiers charged with performing the 
killings. She suggests that it was his “gift” to recognize: 
how to overcome not so much their conscience as the animal pity 
by which all normal men are affected in the presence of physical 
suffering. The trick used by Himmler...was very simple and 
probably very effective; it consisted in turning these instincts 
around, as it were, in directing them toward the self. So that 
instead of saying: What horrible things I did to people!, the 
murderers would be able to say: What horrible things I had to 
watch in the pursuance of my duties, how heavily the task weighed 
upon my shoulders!23 
Bonner recognizes the broader significance of Arendt’s description for her political theory as the 
self-absorption indicative of the attitude shown by Eichmann and Himmler represents a reversal 
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of her conception of political thinking which she praises as the capacity to adopt an enlarged 
perspective capable of considering (without necessarily endorsing) the perspectives of others.24 
 Essential to appreciating the connection between this attitude and the performance of 
monstrous deeds is, as Bonner notes,25 Arendt’s discussion of the humour she finds in 
Eichmann’s words both in his pretrial examination and during his testimony at trial. She both 
summarizes and emphasizes this point in the opening inscription to Eichmann in Jerusalem by 
quoting Bertolt Brecht: “O Germany – hearing the speeches ring from your house one laughs. 
But whoever sees you reaches for his knife.”26 The apparent contradiction of this phenomenon 
that involves something that is to be taken both lightly but also something that is to be 
considered dangerously serious seems to have little in common with other occurrences that 
involve this type of dynamic, such as the thrill seeker who gets a rush from the dangers 
associated with an activity like skydiving. As a form of laughter it does not seem to resemble 
either the type of “joyful wisdom” that Nietzsche describes as emerging from an encounter (often 
tragic) with one’s own limits. 
 What is laughable about Eichmann is that he is not “in” on the joke which makes him 
ridiculous and a more apt comparison would seem to involve likening him to another ridiculous 
figure like Don Quixote. The “remoteness from reality” that Arendt observes in Eichmann seems 
applicable to describing Quixote but also suggests a distinction that could be made between the 
two figures besides Eichmann’s prominent role in genocidal violence. This is a difference that 
can be appreciated in a speech made by Cervantes’ character in the 1950’s play Man of La 
Mancha: 
When life itself seems lunatic, who knows where madness lies? 
Perhaps to be too practical is madness. To surrender dreams – this 
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may be madness. Too much sanity may be madness – and maddest 
of all: to see life as it is, and not as it should be!27 
 Cervantes’ words if applied to Eichmann would suggest that Eichmann’s attitude is one that 
reflects a concern with being “too practical,” but in what way could a “remoteness from reality” 
be associated with this attitude? 
 One way to pursue this question is to consider Bonner’s discussion of the Gorgias in 
which a different response from that of Cervantes’ character is worked out in relation to the view 
that practical concerns negate the interest in what ought to be. In responding to the exchange 
between Socrates and Gorgias’ student Polus over “the good” of rhetoric, in which Polus claims 
that those who are unjust are also the happiest, Bonner suggests that: 
Polus can be interpreted as the kind of actor who as a practical man 
of the world recognizes that bad things happen in the world, and 
bad things happen to good people and has reconciled his beliefs 
accordingly. However, Socrates shows him a way to reconcile what 
we want to believe (unjust people are unhappy) with what we must 
believe (the truth).28 
The speech from Cervantes acknowledges the importance of maintaining a sense of what should 
be but frames this as a response to the conflict between “life as it is” and the “dream” of what 
else it could be. In Bonner’s account the problem is framed in terms of seeking ways to reconcile 
the tension between what is and what ought to be rather than fashioning a response that involves 
escaping from the lunacy of day-to-day life. 
 Arendt’s discussion of “inner emigration,” which was an argument that made the rounds 
in post-war Germany, would seem to fit well with the understanding that practicality nullifies the 
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opportunity to be concerned with life as it should be. As previously noted the idea behind this 
argument could easily be explained in terms of Goffman’s dramaturgical model as the Nazi 
officials suggested that their support for the party masked their personal distaste for its policies. 
This act was (allegedly) kept up all the more so by those who appeared to support the party most 
fervently as they had to work harder at “managing impressions” and silence any suspicion about 
the bad impressions they secretly held of the regime. The inner emigrant’s attitude of being too 
practical might seem like an appropriate way to characterize Eichmann’s support for the Final 
Solution in light of Bonner’s observation that at the key moment when Eichmann learns of the 
plan to murder the entire Jewish people he reports that after this decision he lost all joy in his 
work. Despite his personal misgivings about the duty he was expected to perform Eichmann 
obviously continued in his position and for him to suppress his personal inclinations would 
understandably account for the lack of joy that someone who prioritizes their feelings and 
personal impressions of events above all else would experience in these circumstances. 
Presumably by having an attitude that can be characterized as too practical Eichmann would 
acknowledge that his own impotence prevents him from acting upon what he feels to be truly 
important; less clear is how he comes to possess the resolve that allows him to set aside his 
personal inclinations. This type of reserve would not seem to align with Eichmann’s character if 
he is thoughtlessly trapped into considering the implications of what he is involved with 
exclusively in terms of the impression they make on him personally. 
 What might also give pause to characterizing Eichmann as an inner emigrant is that 
Arendt does not make this association when explaining the way in which Eichmann accounts for 
his support of the Final Solution. Her explanation considers the importance that Eichmann’s 
conscience had in determining which activities he would choose to support, which would seem 
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to have given Eichmann the capacity to set aside his personal inclinations about the activities he 
engaged in performing. The dedication that Eichmann demonstrates towards acting upon the 
dictates of his conscience are illustrated by two occasions where Eichmann had a “weak 
moment” and allowed his personal feelings to interfere with what his conscience had told him to 
do. These occasions involved his effort to secure the freedom of three Jews with whom he was 
personally connected and when these instances were brought up at his trial Arendt suggests that 
“this inconsistency still made him feel somewhat uncomfortable”29 even on the stand where 
mentioning his efforts to save lives would have obviously served his defence well. His reaction 
to these instances also seems hard to reconcile with the inner emigrant argument considering that 
this argument would suggest that securing the release of these individuals would be a source of 
great pride for Eichmann as it would show that he had had the courage to act upon what he felt 
should be done. That Eichmann had the opposite reaction and was embarrassed by these 
instances suggests the importance he attached to ensuring that in answering to his voice of 
conscience he made sure to disregard his personal feelings about the activities he was to perform. 
 Eichmann also mentions his conscience in speaking about the significance he draws from 
his involvement in the Final Solution by making the disturbing comment that “I will jump into 
my grave laughing, because the fact that I have the death of five million Jews [or “enemies of the 
Reich,” as he always claims to have said] on my conscience gives me extraordinary 
satisfaction.”30 Arendt suggests that the import of this statement is undercut by Eichmann’s 
pronouncement that “I shall gladly hang myself in public as a warning example to all anti-
Semites on this earth.” She considers these statements to be another example of Eichmann’s 
thoughtless disregard for what he is saying and a demonstration of how little he cared about 
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contradicting himself so long as he was “elated” by using words that stir within him great 
emotion. 
 However, some consistency might be found in Eichmann’s two statements if they are 
explained in relation to his concern with answering to his conscience. The “laughter” that 
Eichmann speaks of could be likened to someone who “laughs all the way to the bank” and the 
reason that Eichmann seems to think he has made off so well is that his elimination of the 
enemies of the state is a testament to how well he responded to what his conscience called upon 
him to do. His comment about being a warning to anti-Semites seems to suggest that the horrid 
way the Nazi movement pursued this worldview is a demonstration of how dangerous this form 
of prejudice can become. This would not contradict Eichmann’s statement about drawing “great 
satisfaction” for the part he played in the Final Solution if understood as him taking the position 
that the folly of joining a misguided movement does not diminish his record of doing what his 
conscience demanded of him by maintaining an unwavering commitment to the cause to which 
he had sworn his allegiance. The conscience understood in this regard would not operate as an 
innate sense of right and wrong but would make its claim to preserving a sense of what ought to 
be in response to what is by serving as a reminder of what an individual is duty-bound to 
perform. 
 A difficulty with this explanation is the plea that Eichmann entered at his trial would 
seem to indicate that a conscience that operates in this way does little to maintain a concern for 
what ought to be. Eichmann stated that he was “not guilty in the sense of the indictment” and his 
lawyer later explained on his behalf that Eichmann meant that he felt he was morally but not 
legally responsible for what he had done.31 This response appears to run counter to the self-
understanding of someone who claims to be concerned with answering to their conscience but 
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can be explained in relation to the influence that Kant’s Categorical Imperative had upon 
Eichmann’s decision making. In describing this influence Arendt suggests that “from the moment 
he was charged with carrying out the Final Solution he had ceased to live according to Kantian 
principles, that he knew it and that he had consoled himself with the thought that he no longer 
‘was master of his own deeds,’ that he was unable ‘to change anything.’”32 Arendt’s account also 
suggests that Eichmann could not so easily give up his old Kantian habits and he maintained 
“what he himself called the version of Kant ‘for the household use of the little man.’"33 This 
meant answering to his conscience became synonymous with answering to Hitler’s orders as law 
and with a dedication reflective of an “odd” attitude “very common in Germany” of treating the 
laws as if they were self-legislated and not originating from an external source of authority.34 
 The occasion when Eichmann seems to have decided to fully exchange his Kantian 
principles for the household version of Kant seems to have occurred early on in his involvement 
with the Final Solution when his conscience objected to the murder of German Jews which had 
been ordered after the killing of Jews from Eastern Europe had already begun. Unlike the 
occasions when Eichmann’s feelings were offended, such as the resentment he held towards 
being passed over for promotion where he had been able to perform his duty without 
interference, Eichmann acted upon the objections his conscience had to sending German Jews to 
their death. He felt at liberty to make arrangements for them to arrive in the Lodz ghetto in 
Poland where the killing had not yet begun instead of further East where his superiors had 
ordered them to face a firing squad.35 Eichmann’s understanding of Kant’s Categorical 
Imperative, in which he had accepted the death of Jews from Eastern Europe with apparently 
little or no objection had still managed to convince him that he could decide for himself whether 
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the orders he had been given concerning the deaths of Jews from Germany were right or wrong 
and that he should act upon his sense of right and wrong in this case. 
 These Kantian principles were soon abandoned by Eichmann but he did not abandon the 
habit of answering to his conscience. Its concerns were rededicated to operate in a way that 
would tell him that to obey Hitler’s orders was right and to disobey them was wrong but without 
Eichmann considering the rightness or wrongness of the orders he was receiving. With his 
conscience now operating under the auspices of this household version of Kant it “began to 
function the other way around” with its voice demanding that he fully dedicate himself to 
Hitler’s order to eliminate all Jews. This dedication was shown when Eichmann disobeyed the 
orders he had been given by Himmler that were issued in support of his efforts at the end of the 
war to gain personally from securing the release of Jews from Nazi persecution. Although he was 
unsuccessful at opposing these efforts Eichmann felt compelled to act and knowing that 
Himmler’s activities went against Hitler’s wishes he answered to what his conscience demanded 
and sought to carry on the killings without Himmler’s full authorization. 
 Eichmann may have acknowledged that his observance of Kantian principles – in the 
problematic way he understood these principles – was corrupted by his acceptance of the 
household version of Kant but by continuing to consult his conscience he could continue to claim 
that he was concerned with what should be the case and not just what is the case. Eichmann’s 
reasons for treating Hitler’s orders as the set of laws that determine what he should do are left 
unexplained, a point that Bonner makes clear in his discussion by noting that: 
Sociologically, the issue for understanding action is not that 
Eichmann chose to obey and do his duty as a soldier (i.e. 
knowingly meet the role expectations) and so is in good faith, but 
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his failure to provide an account for why he supported legal 
crimes.36 
Eichmann’s understanding of what he ought to do does not attempt “to reconcile what we want to 
believe (that resistance to genocide is possible) with what we must believe (that going along with 
the practice was appealing to most).” His concern for what he should do seemed to have no 
regard for what was being done and like Cervantes’ character he sought to exchange a 
dreamworld for the “lunacy” of the everyday world. In Eichmann’s case this created the funny 
but horribly dangerous spectacle of someone who participated in mass murder as a way to 
answer to what his conscience demanded. This is to say that Eichmann’s case demonstrates he 
was caught up with additional concerns besides the problems associated with the “evil of 
banality” or the fixation on day-to-day affairs that tempts individuals into becoming “too 
practical” and giving up their concern for what they should do. Eichmann’s involvement in the 
Final Solution was also a matter of him consulting his conscience about what he should do, 
which suggests that the banality of evil held an attraction for him by appealing to his sense of 
“the good.” 
 According to this argument, then, the fairly subtle difference between suggesting that 
Eichmann was driven not by feeling but by conscience is significant to note not just as an 
idiosyncratic observation about his personality, but also in terms of what it seems to indicate 
about the banality of evil. Eichmann maintains an unreflexive appreciation of “the good” of his 
activities but without losing his concern for what he should do. This understanding of Eichmann 
acknowledges “the sad and very uncomfortable truth of the matter probably was that it was not 
his fanaticism but his very conscience that prompted Eichmann to adopt his uncompromising 
attitude during the last year of the war”37 – uncompromising, that is, in pursuing the elimination 
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of the Jewish people. In Eichmann’s case the way in which the banality of evil appeals to the 
concern for “the good” of an activity drew him in to being involved in the Final Solution for the 
sake of what he thought he should do, but the defence of “just following orders” seems to 
suggest an appeal to “the good” can be very open-ended. The “inner emigrant,” the ideological 
fanatic, those who answer to their conscience and the criminally motivated can all claim to be 
concerned with some version of “the good” through their acceptance of a banal form of evil 
which orders society in a way that mass murder becomes conventional. The emphasis on “just 
following orders” may seem to be a simplistic way to understand the significance of the banality 
of evil but the importance of this statement is that it is hidden in plain sight. The simplicity of 
this notion is precisely what gives it such broad appeal. 
Conclusion 
 This brief introduction to the banality of evil has discussed its connection to an 
unreflexive sense of “the good” and suggests that Analysis, through its focus upon working out 
an understanding of “the good” in relation to the matters its approach takes into consideration, is 
able to contribute to a discussion of the banality of evil that addresses its connection to “the 
good.” An interest has also been expressed in understanding what Arendt’s notion of judgment 
could also contribute to this discussion, which is a consideration that may seem to make a 
discussion of genocide seem unnecessarily judgmental and self-righteous in its condemnation of 
a practice that obviously very few observers would support. An objection might be raised that 
this sort of self-congratulatory attitude misses the opportunity to reflect upon the banality of evil 
and develop a sense of a problem that is not a simple matter of “good overcoming evil” but 
concerns an ambiguity whose significance could be endlessly worked out as part of a discussion 
that considers the significance of genocide as a practice. One way this problem could be 
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formulated would be to characterize social order (or even the notion of “the good”) as a 
pharmakon that is indispensable for the generation of social life while also recognizing that this 
order is a necessary part of generating a way of life with genocidal aims that seeks to eliminate 
all who participate in it. The response to this problem would shift from making easy arguments 
about the importance of opposing genocide to developing a way to deal with the understanding 
that social order is something that is needed but also capable of doing great harm. 
 The possibility of recognizing that the banality of evil concerns problems that can be 
ambiguous and need to be continuously worked out to be understood is not ruled out by 
considering the notion of judgment. The additional contribution that judgment can make to this 
discussion is its appreciation of the different human faculties and their appropriateness in 
addressing a particular concern in relation to the banality of evil. For instance, a focus on the 
banality of evil in terms of its significance would be recognized as the providence of the activity 
of thinking which formulates the problems it addresses as matters that could be endlessly 
considered. Judgment could also be a part of responding to the suggestion that “we are all like 
Eichmann” and faced with the same circumstances would not be able to avoid doing as he had 
done by formulating an understanding of a social actor who shows the possibility of doing 
something very different than Eichmann had done. In this sense a judgment of people or 
practices would not be a focus on condemning others or other ways of doing things but a more 
reflexive concern of attempting to “better” appreciate each of the human faculties, which is a 
problem that potentially anyone who participates in the exercise of these faculties can choose to 
address. The interest in this writing will be to consider the way in which this appreciation of 
what the exercise of each of the human faculties involves can be worked out through a 
consideration of the banality of evil as discussed by Arendt in connection with Eichmann and the 
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Final Solution by considering the extent to which this notion is relevant to a discussion of the 






















The Genocide in Rwanda and the Appeal of Everyday Concerns 
Judgment is for the greater part employed in throwing stumbling-blocks in 
the way of the imagination, in dissipating the scenes of its enchantment.38 
– Edmund Burke, On Taste 
Introduction  
 A long-standing problem with discussing genocide has been the arguments suggesting 
that under certain circumstances its occurrence is not a subject that should be addressed. This has 
played out in the political arena when a debate over national sovereignty is manipulated not only 
by the power carrying out the genocide who wishes to avoid outside interference but also the 
countries who have no wish to take part in the military intervention required to bring an end to 
the killing when this type of military action is assessed as being not in their geopolitical interest. 
In the case of Rwanda the current government that came to power after overthrowing the 
previous genocidal regime has actively sought to censure commentary on the country’s events 
that it finds disagreeable. Their contention has been that certain commentators lack the standing 
to voice their views on events in Rwanda on account of them not being from Rwanda, 
particularly in the case of Western nations whose track record brings into serious question how 
genuine those commentators actually are in their commitment, understanding and concern for the 
well-being of the region. The standard argument made to defend the merits of addressing the 
issue of genocide has involved an appeal to human rights, but in what way can the basis of this 
appeal be articulated? Its implication is that those who commit genocide are answerable for their 
understanding of what human activities should be engaged in, but can anyone claim to have a 
better understanding than others of what is involved with being human? 
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 After a brief introduction of the events in Rwanda that are relevant to this discussion of 
the Rwandan genocide, the analysis will examine the issues associated with the merits of 
addressing the subject of genocide. The argument will be to consider the way in which the 
judgment about whether the Rwandan genocide is a matter of human rights or a matter only for 
Rwandans can involve a discussion of these concerns that represents more than an exchange of 
opinion about the merits of these two positions. In response to this demand the analysis will 
present a version of judgment that recognizes its reflexive component of being concerned with 
the “good” of addressing the way that a particular instance of genocide has relevance to the 
question of what is involved with being human, while also recognizing that such a question can 
never be given a definitive answer.      
Background: Rwanda’s Place in Human History 
 As a former colonial state the influence of foreign rule upon Rwanda’s history marks both 
the events in this history and the telling of these events. The legacy of Belgium’s influence has 
the dubious distinction of racializing the traditional feudal-like arrangement between the Tutu 
“nobility” and Hutu “peasants,” which has been a defining feature of much of the violent conflict 
in the region of Burundi and Rwanda ever since.39 Just prior to Rwanda gaining its independence 
in 1961 a number of small- and large-scale massacres began against the Tutsi minority that 
continued throughout the years of a Hutu-led dictatorship until the government ordered the 
genocide in 1994. The event that sparked the genocidal campaign was the downing of the plane 
containing the leaders of both Rwanda and Burundi who had been meeting to discuss the Arusha 
Accords peace agreement. This agreement was signed the previous year after Rwanda had been 
invaded by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), who under the leadership of their former military 
commander Paul Kagame have formed the government in Rwanda since the end of the genocide. 
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The RPF began as a rebel group that drew its membership largely from the families of Tutsis 
living in refugee camps in Uganda after they fled the massacres in Rwanda in the late 1950’s and 
early 1960’s. The Rwandan government prior to Kagame’s rule had initially sought to delay the 
implementation of the power-sharing arrangement laid out in the Arusha Accords in order to 
maintain the dominance of the Hutu elite in Rwandan society but under the pressure of the 
international community Rwanda’s President Juvenal Habyarimana had begun to show signs in 
the days leading up to his assassination of agreeing to begin the peace process in earnest. 
 The responsibility for the assassination of the Rwandan President continues to be a matter 
of debate with suspicion being directed at the RPF whose forces had been amassing along the 
border in preparation for a new advance into Rwanda when Habyarimana’s plane went down. 
Given that the climate of anti-Tutsi sentiment in Rwanda had intensified after the RPF’s first 
invasion and the history of violent massacres in the past, the President’s death could be expected 
to spur further violence against the Tutsi minority. This new wave of violence would provide the 
RPF with a pretext to justify their plans for a second invasion. 
 The case could also plausibly be made that the assassination was ordered by political 
rivals within the President’s own party, the National Revolutionary Movement for Development 
(MRND). Many of the top-ranking members in the MRND stood to lose personally from the 
implementation of the Arusha Accords and to counter the aims of those looking to normalize 
relations with the Tutsi the party’s more radical members were pushing a “Hutu power” 
movement that endorsed the violent removal of all Tutsi from Rwanda. The United Nations 
mission under General Romeo Dallaire that was stationed in Rwanda as part of the Arusha 
Accords had reported in the infamous “genocide fax” that the government had already begun to 
make preparations for a genocidal campaign prior to the assassination.40 The President’s death 
30 
 
could be seen as being in the interests of his rivals in the MRND as it would lend credibility to 
the views of Hutu extremists; this stoked fears about the Tutsi secretly conspiring to subjugate 
the Hutu population as they had done before with the assistance of the Belgians during colonial 
rule. These fears are representative of the traditional stereotype that portrays the Tutsi as being 
relentless in their pursuit of power and wielding it for the purposes of exploiting the Hutu 
population. This situation was framed by the extremists as necessitating that steps be taken to 
ensure the removal of all Tutsi from the country. 
 The Western powers played a significant part in the political events in Rwanda around the 
time of the genocide but mainly through the notable inaction of the UN force. The MRND had 
already calculated in advance that the Western powers were far from committed partners in 
Rwanda’s political future and they chose as one of the first targets of their attacks a small 
contingent of Belgian soldiers from the peacekeeping force. The Belgian forces stationed in 
Rwanda were the backbone of the UN mission as they provided it with its largest contingent of 
well-trained and well-equipped personnel. The deaths of its soldiers had the impact the MRND 
had hoped for as the Belgian government promptly made the decision to withdraw the remainder 
of its forces to avoid risking any further casualties. Before withdrawing the Belgians did assist 
with the evacuation of foreign nationals who were undoubtedly at an increased risk of danger by 
remaining in the country but were not the direct targets of the genocide. As the Belgian forces 
left the positions assigned to them by the UN mission to take part in these evacuations the 
Rwandan government forces immediately moved in to murder the thousands of Rwandan 
citizens that had been left behind.41 These incidents seem to confirm Dallaire’s assertion that the 
genocide could largely have been prevented with a modest increase in the force size and 
capability of the UN mission. Dallaire instead ended up having to fight against the UN leadership 
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to prevent them from completely withdrawing the UN mission from Rwanda and he was left 
with only a skeletal force to command as the genocide was taking place. A larger UN force did 
eventually arrive to intervene in the hostilities but only after the MRND forces were already 
fleeing in surrender. These reinforcements that were sent by the French government to support 
the UN mission have drawn criticism for doing little more than providing safe passage out of the 
country for their former allies from the MRND who along with their supporters were the 
individuals responsible for the genocide. 
 The track record of the West in Rwanda has been used by the current RPF government to 
make the argument that Rwandans not only have a special relationship to their telling of their 
nation’s history but Westerners who seek to comment on this history are most likely meddling in 
Rwanda’s affairs in a way that will lead to no good. One problem with this argument is the RPF’s 
own beginnings in a foreign country as its founding members were born and raised in Uganda 
before moving to Rwanda as adults. Once in power the RPF also made the decision to have 
English, which they learned to speak as their native tongue in Uganda, replace French as the 
country’s official language. This is not a move that would suggest the RPF had a concern with 
preserving Rwandan culture from foreign influence, considering that French was spoken by most 
Rwandans at the time this change was made. In relation to the criticism concerning the 
undeniable harm the West has done in Rwanda, its suggestions that those who have hurt 
Rwandans are disqualified from commenting upon the country’s history could be challenged by 
acknowledging that the genocide was largely the work of Rwandans killing other Rwandans. 
 These criticisms could be answered by noting that the forced expulsion of Tutsi from 
Rwanda is the reason that the RPF came to live in the refugee camps in Uganda; to deny them of 
their Rwandan heritage for having to endure this type of suffering seems both inappropriate and 
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extremely harsh. In response to the primary involvement of Rwandans in carrying out the 
genocide, the West has been accused of being responsible for instigating the hostilities between 
the Hutu and Tutsi in a way that manifested itself in violence not seen prior to their arrival. This 
criticism also would not be applicable to the Tutsi in Rwanda who were the targets of the 
genocide or the RPF who brought an end to the killing when the involvement of the Western 
powers in the conflict failed to do so. What seems to underpin these arguments about the 
Rwandan people’s stronger claim to telling the nation’s history is the juxtaposition between the 
thoughtless disregard for the country’s affairs that is observable in the West’s fleeting 
commitment to the region and the greater loyalty shown to the area by its local inhabitants. 
Theory and Method in the Study of Rwanda 
 The different responses to these concerns about academics from other countries 
commenting on the events in Rwanda are reflected in the differences between the methodological 
approaches that have been used to study these events. In Remera, Pierre Bettez Gravel’s study of 
the rural region of Remera in Rwanda during the early 1960’s, Gravel speaks in relativistic terms 
about the cultural practices he observes in Rwanda to try to ensure the appropriateness of his 
comments about another culture. In his discussion of the inherent bias of the Rwandan legal 
system which favours the country’s most powerful members Gravel reminds his readers to take 
into consideration the cultural context of the phenomenon he is examining. He explains that in 
the arrangement of the country’s legal affairs: 
There is no morality involved. The English language has no words 
available to express these ideas. The closest we can come to it is: 
might is “right,” which, morally speaking, is not true. The moral 
concepts of “right” and “wrong” as understood in our culture were 
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introduced by the missionaries, although there have been values 
concerned with appropriate and inappropriate behaviour in terms 
of cultural norms.42 
Gravel’s acknowledgement of the cultural norms observed in Rwandan society seems to imply 
that they do provide some sense of what is appropriate conduct but in a way that is less 
developed than the understanding provided by Western notions of morality. This is a view that 
would only seem to support the concern about Westerners lacking the sensitivity to comment 
upon the events in Rwanda’s history. A purely relativistic argument that avoids making these 
blanket assertions about the superiority of one set of cultural practices over another could 
respond to these concerns by making the argument that all cultures are equal but different. A 
challenge that has been recognized for those who make this argument and seems to apply when 
speaking about Rwanda is explaining what type of contribution the West could make by 
commenting on the practices of another culture if all cultures are different from one another and 
share no common ground. 
 An approach that tries to avoid the difficulties associated with cultural relativism by 
striving to describe events objectively has also had to answer to criticisms about the merits of an 
explanation deriving from a Western source. This has been shown in the response of the RPF to 
the accusations that their soldiers committed war crimes in incidents that have been documented 
in works such as Allison Des Forges’ Leave None to Tell the Story. The RPF’s argument has been 
that those who have compiled this evidence lack an awareness of the situation on the ground, 
which makes their depiction of events overly naïve. This has been shown both by their inability 
to appreciate the political motivations of the local actors who are charging the RPF with these 
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crimes, as well as by their inability to appreciate the way war needs to be conducted in the region 
in order to be won. 
 This charge of an unintended bias being contained in the work of foreign scholars 
reporting on events in Rwanda – as a general problem and not just in this specific case involving 
the accusations of war crimes against RPF soldiers – could be answered by an approach that is 
focused on the way that Rwandans voice their understanding of events. One example of this 
approach is Scott Straus’ work Intimate Enemy: Images and Voices of the Rwandan Genocide, 
which contains transcripts of the interviews he conducted with inmates in a Rwandan prison who 
had been convicted for their involvement in the genocide. The idea behind Straus’ work of 
allowing his readers to judge the evidence for themselves by publishing these interviews without 
further commentary or analysis seems open to the criticism that those lacking an understanding 
of the context might be naive in their appreciation of the accounts being provided. An approach 
that seeks the type of awareness that avoids the unintended bias that is of concern to this 
criticism is demonstrated in Lee Ann Fujii’s work Killing Neighbours: Webs of Violence in 
Rwanda, in which Fujii focuses on developing relationships with the Rwandans she interviews to 
better understand the way her status as a foreigner impacts their interactions. She describes being 
told in an exchange with one of the interviewees “that I was not like other bazungu [foreigners], 
whom she then parodied with a vivid impression of a fastidious and standoffish foreigner. 
Laughing over a common joke and sharing a meal were indicators that we were building 
relationships.”43   
 A comparable approach is also used by Susan Thompson in Whispering Truth to Power: 
Everyday Resistance to Reconciliation in Postgenocide Rwanda, who directly addresses the 
RPF’s influence upon the way events in Rwanda’s history are discussed. After describing how 
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the Rwandans she interviewed came to view her as “one of them” by virtue of the harassment 
she was receiving at the hands of government officials while living in Rwanda and researching 
her book, Thompson argues that the voices of many Rwandans are being suppressed, not as 
much through the unintended bias of foreign academics, but through the active efforts of the RPF 
to silence its critics.44 The tactics they employ to this end are characterized by her as being 
conducted in an almost colonialist fashion, but in a disguised form. Thompson cites the 
government’s revival of the traditional “gaccacca” or grass courts to show the way the RPF 
plays a double game of enacting policies that proclaim to create unity and end ethnic 
divisiveness while in practice the Tutsi are being privileged within Rwandan society at the 
expense of the Hutu. The idea behind these courts was to deal with a prison population that had 
grown beyond the state’s capacity to manage after swelling from the vast number of Hutus 
incarcerated for their part in the genocide. Relief upon the system was to be accomplished 
through a model of restorative justice that would use the gaccacca courts and its method of 
having the community be given a voice by meeting as a whole to decide the fate of the accused.   
 One of the difficulties with these “community” courts was the government 
representatives from the RPF sent to oversee their proceedings would frequently have them 
conducted in their native tongue of English rather than the locally spoken French or Kyrwandan. 
The courts have also been accused of accepting false accusations, particularly against those Hutu 
who fled during the war and returned to the communities to find the property they once owned 
has been claimed by others in their absence. This manoeuvring within the courts against the Hutu 
fits as part of a narrative that contains a politically charged notion of a “survivor” where only the 
survivors of the genocide are recognized as having suffered during the various conflicts in 
Rwanda and only the Tutsi are recognized as the “survivors” of the genocide who are entitled to 
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the very tangible benefits of seeking restitution for their suffering. Perhaps not surprisingly these 
sorts of activities by the gaccacca courts have contributed to the view that the RPF government 
is more interested in imposing a form of victor’s justice rather than a form of restorative justice. 
This is an understanding that is reflected in a comment by one of the respondents in Thompson’s 
study, who says of the country’s efforts are reconciliation: “For me, the state means those with 
power, and with power you protect your own people.”45 
Network Theory and Cultural Acceptance 
 One response to the suggestion that power arrangements within Rwandan society are in 
flux and depending on who is “in charge” will favour one group over another would be to study 
the way these allegiances shift in order to anticipate what their future developments will be. This 
has been a concern of one of the currently more influential contemporary sociological theories, 
social network theory, which focuses upon identifying patterns that illustrate the flow of 
influence in society. The first iteration of social network theory appeared in John Arundel 
Barnes’ 1954 article “Class and Committees in a Norwegian Island Parish” as part of his study of 
the social dynamics of a small fishing village in Norway. Barnes considered the class-centric 
models used to describe British society inadequate for describing the egalitarianism of 
Norwegian society whose citizenry had developed a distaste for domination by the political 
centre in response to the period the country spent under foreign Danish rule. His analysis begins 
by examining the organization of relationships in the village’s main occupational setting of 
fishing and describes these as being arranged hierarchically with the decision-making process 
involving little consultation between those who hold power and their subordinates. The 
composition of a fishing crew is considered by the villagers to be a vital feature for the success 
of a fishing boat, which may seem to make the notion of networking understood in the everyday 
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sense of “making contacts” a relevant way to account for who joins which crew. Barnes is 
careful to explain though that his use of social network theory does not pertain to the 
organization of relationships in the autocratic set of arrangements characteristic of the workplace 
and he offers a more Social Darwinist type of explanation to describe the process by which the 
fishing boat captains recruit their members. 
 Barnes stresses as an important feature of his understanding of social network theory the 
relative equality between the members of society interacting through these networks as well as 
the importance its members attach to the idea of arriving at their decisions through universal 
consensus. He describes the presence of intermediaries within the system who act as buffers to 
bridge the gaps between members in the network to ensure a sense of equality within the network 
as a whole. Barnes also describes the challenge of maintaining a sense of universal consensus in 
the cases when disputes arise over decisions that divide members of the community. In these 
circumstances a “trial vote” is held in which the available options are weighed by use of a secret 
ballot. The secrecy involved with this vote might seem unnecessary in a social network if all 
members must openly agree to the decisions made by the community, but this voting is used as a 
way to prevent its members from voicing their dissent with the group’s decisions publicly. 
Barnes explains that: “When there is an irreconcilable division of opinion this is sometimes 
concealed by first taking a trial vote, to decide which view has greatest support; this is followed 
by a confirming unanimous vote, which alone is recorded in the minutes.”46 The trial vote shows 
what the majority opinion is, or what is in closest proximity to consensus, which all members 
will agree to support in the vote held openly. Barnes comments further on why the employment 
of this technique is significant to the process of arriving at a consensus: 
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Why then is the achievement of formally unanimous decisions 
considered so important? Here I think we are dealing with a 
principle of fairly wide application. People living and working 
together inevitably have conflicting interests but in general they 
have also a common interest in the maintenance of existing social 
relations. Individual goals must be attained through socially 
approved processes, and as far as possible the illusion must be 
maintained that each individual is acting only in the best interests 
of the community. As far as possible, that is, the group must appear 
united, not only vis-à-vis other similar groups, but also to itself. 
Voting is a method of reaching decisions in which divergence of 
interest is openly recognized, and in which the multiplicities of 
divergence are forced into the Procrustean categories of Yes and 
No. Significantly, voting is rare in simple societies and in small 
groups of modern society. Membership in a collectivity implies 
accepting a share in the collective responsibility for the group’s 
actions as well as a share in the decision to act in a certain way.47 
The explanation Barnes gives of social networks seems to share with Functionalist theory the 
understanding that a well-run society is one in which its members strive to achieve consensus as 
well as the idea suggested by the Durkheimian notion of mechanical solidarity that the members 
of a small-scale society such as this fishing village will hold views with a high degree of 
commonality. The village’s voting procedure may seem somewhat contrived, but since each of 
the participants publicly voice their consent to the decisions being made, this would seem to 
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challenge those who would claim that they may take part in activities that are being performed 
collectively even though they do not necessarily agree personally with what is being done. 
 The more recent and well-known work of Bruno Latour presents a version of network 
theory that is not focused on the notion of consensus or other concepts used within the 
Functionalist perspective. Latour actually disavows any association between his writing and the 
social sciences’ discussion of social network theory, preferring to use the term “actor network 
theory” (AT) to describe his work. He provides in his article “On Actor Network Theory. A Few 
Clarifications Plus More Than a Few Complications” an overview of his theory that he claims 
not only moves beyond social theory but repudiates a number of concepts commonly employed 
in theoretical discussions in general.48 Latour acknowledges ethnomethodology as an influence 
upon his work, and if understood in ethnomethodological terms then broadly speaking one of the 
main thrusts of actor network theory is to collapse the distinction between theorist and member 
and avoid second-order explanations. In his article he makes this point by suggesting that: “A 
network in mathematics or in engineering is something that is traced or inscribed by some other 
entity – the mathematician, the engineer.”49 Latour describes the way that a theoretical account 
that employs actor network theory differs from others in that it recognizes it is also an “acting” 
part of the network that it is describing: 
An actor network is an entity that does the tracing and the 
inscribing. It is an ontological definition and not a piece of inert 
matter in the hands of others, especially of human planners or 
designers. It is in order to point out this essential feature that the 
word “actor” was added to it.50 
40 
 
Latour repeatedly returns to and emphasizes this point that an actor network acts as a frame of 
reference for its own explanation while the contribution of the theorist is to add to an actor 
network by suggesting ways it can be expanded and connected to the frames of reference of other 
networks. By doing so the theorist’s explanation then becomes part of the network it explains. 
 Latour discusses the use of the word “cause” in science as an example to demonstrate the 
contribution a theorist makes to the explanation of an actor network and how this contribution 
may be evaluated. He argues that: “Either the cause designates a body of practices which is tied 
to the network under description – and this is what growth of networks means – or it is not 
related and then is just a word added to the description, literally it is the word ‘cause.’”51 The 
relevance of the notion of cause is described in terms of the capacity of this concept to offer a 
frame of reference that is appreciable to other frames of reference. Through this same 
understanding Latour suggests that actor network theory “solves” the problem of reflexivity. The 
importance of reflection to an actor network is established on the criterion of the degree to which 
it expands the connective possibilities of the network.52 Failure do so, however, would simply 
append the word “reflexivity” to an actor network in the same empty way the word “cause” is 
appended to a network if it generates no connection. The theorist is “not left to despair or navel 
gazing”53 by focusing on concerns associated with reflexivity that have no connection to the 
frame of reference of the network being discussed. 
 Latour’s description of actor network theory and its focus on the capacity of actors to be 
understood by other frames of reference may seem to resemble Arendt’s description of political 
thinking, which is concerned with developing an enlarged perspective capable of appreciating the 
perspectives of others. One important difference between these explanations is Latour’s 
insistence that an actor does not necessarily or even typically have to be endowed with human 
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agency. Any entity that generates action, including non-human entities such as cellphones, board 
meetings, etc. can be counted as an “actor.”54 The idea that actors are conceived only as human, 
Latour argues, is relative to the frame of reference of a particular actor network that has chosen 
to accord special status to a particular type of actor, but this special status need not be granted 
within the frame of reference of another network. Actor network theory actually denies human 
beings this special status on the basis that expanding the notion of an actor to include non-human 
entities grants actor network theory greater explanatory power. 
 A criticism of Latour’s idea of granting agency to non-human actors could be developed 
from Arendt’s discussion of the suggestion that objects contain some form of agency. Her 
argument is to trace back the significance of objects to the human agents who bestow it upon 
them, suggesting that even the works of art that express the unique style of a great artist only 
(passively) represent the human agent who (actively) worked upon them: 
The essence of who somebody is cannot be reified by himself. 
When it appears “objectively” – in the style of an art work or in 
ordinary handwriting – it manifests the identity of a person and 
therefore serves to identify authorship, but it remains mute itself 
and escapes us if we try to interpret it as a mirror of a living 
person.55 
Arendt’s understanding of an actor focuses not on the influence they have upon the behaviour of 
others but on what their activities demonstrate about the actor who gives these activities their 
significance. With objects being “mute,” their significance must always be spoken of from some 
other source – a human agent – that actively engages in an explanation of what an object means. 
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 Latour’s account of an actor shows that his discussion of actor network theory does not 
share Arendt’s focus upon understanding what is involved with acting “freely” in this sense of 
being an agent who has the capacity to give meaning to their activities. The problem that seems 
to concern Latour when he discusses actor network theory is understanding what is involved with 
gaining acceptance. This type of focus initially might appear to position his theory well for 
responding to concerns about the appropriateness of Westerners commenting on the situation in 
Rwanda as he elaborates in detail upon finding ways to connect seemingly unrelated “frames of 
reference” with one another. Latour even argues that, for actor network theory, forging these 
types of links and associations represents a new type of ethical obligation for a theorist, and 
through this commitment he suggests that his theory: 
is not reduced to moral relativism but gets back a stronger 
deontological commitment: either an account leads you to all the 
other accounts – and it is good – or it interrupts constantly the 
movement ... and it is bad. Either it multiplies the mediating point 
between any two elements and it is good – or it deletes and 
conflates mediators and it is bad. Either it is reductionist – and 
that’s bad news or irreductionist and that’s the highest ethical 
standard for AT. We will see that this touchstone is much more 
discriminating than the quest for epistemological purity or for 
foundations or for moral norms.56 
Latour argues that actor network theory is ethically committed to developing accounts that are 
receptive to further expanding and connecting with other accounts but he does not explain what 
is “good” about making these types of connections. In relation to the concern about Westerners 
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commenting on Rwanda’s history, actor network theory may be able to formulate an account that 
connects these two frames of reference that would further develop an understanding of the 
practices of both societies, but the response to this explanation could simply be: So what? What 
benefit is served by this understanding and what business is Rwanda’s affairs to those who are 
not Rwandan? 
 This discussion of the appropriateness of Westerners commenting on events in Rwanda’s 
history has sought to work out an understanding of the sensitivity needed to conduct a dialogue 
between these two cultures. This understanding has been developed through an examination of 
the works of Gravel, Des Forges, Straus, Fujii and Thompson and the different approaches they 
each take in their studies of Rwanda. Barnes’ and Latour’s accounts of network theory have also 
been considered in this discussion to further develop an understanding of what constitutes a 
competent way of approaching an analysis of this society and its practices. The discussion of 
Latour’s work suggests that even if his analysis, with its focus upon bringing together different 
frames of reference, competently addresses the concerns about the differences between Western 
and Rwandan culture, the problem of what “good” is sought by pursuing its explanation would 
still need to be addressed. 
 The Claim for Human Rights 
 One example where this concern for the merits of an explanation is recognized is in Des 
Forges’ comments about the reports of war crimes committed by the RPF. These comments are 
described in a BBC article that states: “While stressing there can be no equation between 
genocide and war crimes, Alison Des Forges of Human Rights Watch says RPF leaders do have a 
case to answer. ‘Their victims also deserve justice,’ she says.”57 In these comments, Des Forges 
makes the type of straightforward plea often heard from representatives of human rights 
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organizations about the need for the sake of working for what is just to combat the harm that is 
done in the world. The “good versus evil” sense to this appeal belies the more complicated issues 
associated with the concern for human rights violations that is based upon the view that the 
offences committed by certain activities are in some sense significant to humanity. This implies 
that part of what is involved with responding to these offences is an understanding of what being 
human means as well as making the argument that this understanding justifies intervening 
against those who violate human rights.   
 A claim “to know better” than others can encounter the type of difficulties that Bonner 
describes when he discusses the type of reception those making this claim likely will receive: 
Imagine in our modern era a person saying to us that we don’t 
believe what we say we believe. We can imagine many people 
would be offended at the presumption built into that proposition. 
We can imagine someone saying– how dare you try to speak for 
my beliefs and worse contradict me when I speak for my beliefs?58 
The arguments about respecting the sovereignty of another nation even when they are 
committing genocide against their own people – whether this argument is made either genuinely 
or cynically out of political calculation – could be seen as another version of this understanding 
that those who “dare speak for others” are out of line. A counterargument that could be made 
when discussing Rwanda would be to recognize that the rest of the world is answerable for its 
impact upon the country’s affairs but that the Rwandans who perpetrated genocide are 
answerable for the impact they have on world affairs through the implications that their 
genocidal activities have upon what being human means. But does this concern for the meaning 
of human activity, which is used to justify the need to intervene in the affairs of another 
45 
 
sovereign nation, have any relevance to understanding what constitutes an appropriate response 
to genocide or is it simply a matter for outside academic observers to debate? 
 One way that this relevance has been given consideration is Arendt’s suggestion that the 
banality of evil is representative of a form of thoughtlessness, which is an understanding she 
proposes after observing Eichmann to be someone who displays an inability to think. Her 
understanding could be used to discuss the activity of thinking in a way that recognizes a 
distinction between an inability to think, which is indicative of thoughtlessness, the occasions 
when an individual is simply being “thoughtless” or inconsiderate, and “not thinking,” which is 
crucial to the ability to think by allowing a break to be taken from its activity. This break from 
thinking that “not thinking” provides could be compared to the way that rest is required as part of 
physical exercise by even those in the best of shape or the way that with the breathing cycle 
exhaling is a necessary part of the intake of air. These distinctions suggest that a problem to 
consider with the activity of thinking is not to be concerned with ways of eradicating the 
cessation of thinking in all its forms. The focus is instead with working out an understanding of 
when a break from thinking is needed as part of a “healthy” engagement in this activity, and 
when not being involved in its engagement involves being inconsiderate, or in extreme cases, is 
reflective of an inability to think. A difficulty in working out this understanding is that the 
meaning of human activity can be endlessly considered and this implies that for the activity of 
thinking the “good” of not thinking is not something that can ever be known in an absolute sense. 
 A lack of certainty about the way thoughtlessness might develop suggests that the 
inability to think can potentially be a part of any line of thinking just as it can always potentially 
be avoided by one. This implies that if an analysis examines a particular line of thinking – 
whether the formal work of a theorist or part of everyday understanding – and argues that its 
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understanding could potentially be supportive of a banal form of evil, then making this argument 
would by no means equate this line of thinking with the thinking of those whose everyday 
activities are directly involved in choosing to go along with mass murder. The possibility to 
provide this support would not be an indication that this thinking will necessarily develop into 
compliance with genocide when given the opportunity, nor would it suggest excluding from 
consideration the possibility for this thinking to be the basis of an individual’s refusal to take part 
in mass murder. For example, Goffman’s notion of front and back stage may seem to support the 
claim of being an “unwilling” participant in genocide but this same notion could be understood 
in a way that would suggest to individuals to conceive of themselves as being able to maintain a 
sense of distance from the demands of society when it calls upon them to commit mass murder. 
 This argument that a situation is not an absolute determinant of either the thinking 
involved or the choices that will be made in response to it can also be applied to some of the 
different ways in which the perpetrators of genocide have been portrayed. In Shake Hands with 
the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda, Romeo Dallaire details the advantages that each 
of the belligerent parties in Rwanda received militarily by engineering/allowing the genocide to 
take place but despite recognizing its practical advantages for these parties he contends that the 
decision to perpetrate genocide cannot be understood as a decision that human beings would be 
capable of making. He elaborates upon this point in an interview discussing his meeting with the 
“devils” who were the main architects of the genocide in Rwanda and how these men were 
physically different from other human beings: 
When I shook their hands, their hands were cold. But they weren’t 
cold as a temperature. They were cold as if another body. Although 
they had a human form their eyes were not human. Their eyes were 
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reflecting the most evil that I could ever imagine. It was being 
personified and that personification coming from my religious 
background was the devil … I had been literally able to shake 
hands with the devil.59 
Dallaire portrays the perpetrators as doing something that is not possible for humans to do, while 
others have used Arendt’s discussion of the banality of evil to suggest that when a demand is 
placed upon individuals to take part in genocide the human response is to comply.  
Arendt seems to reject both of these assertions in a response she makes to the way the 
banality of evil has been interpreted by commentators: 
 You say that I said there is an Eichmann in each one of us. Oh no! There 
is none in you and none in me! This doesn’t mean that there are not quite a 
number of Eichmanns. But they look really quite different. I always hated this 
notion of ‘Eichmann in each one of us’. This is simply not true. This would be as 
untrue as the opposite, that Eichmann is in nobody.60 
Arendt proposes seeking a middle ground between the view that “we are all like Eichmann,” in 
the sense that in the same situation we could not help but carry out genocide when asked to do 
so, and the other extreme that says he is an inhuman monster with a lust for killing and to whom 
those without a psychological imbalance cannot relate. An image that could be used to appreciate 
this understanding is the view taken of a character in a novel who has a recognizable identity but 
in the choices they make – which each of us could but do not have to replicate – they are not 
necessarily the sort of person others (completely) identify with and consider to be “just like 
themselves.” 
Rwanda and the Banality of Evil 
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 Des Forges’ focus in Leave None to Tell the Story to provide an objective account of the 
events during the Rwandan genocide does not include as part of its considerations a concern with 
working out the implications upon the meaning of human activity of committing mass murder. 
One of the few attempts in this work to go at all beyond a straight reporting of events is the 
demographic profile it seeks to compile of those who performed the killings in Rwanda. The 
information collected together for this profile details the way that:   
many of these zealous killers were poor, drawn from a population 
86 percent of whom lived in poverty … They included young men 
who had hung out in the streets of Kigali or smaller commercial 
centres … Many refugees from Burundi, who transferred their 
anger from their Tutsi-dominated government at home to the Tutsi 
of Rwanda, also rushed to join the killing campaign … Some 
Rwandans, previously scorned by their communities, seized on the 
genocide as an opportunity to gain stature as well as wealth … Not 
all killers were poor and living in misery. The authorities that 
directed the genocide constituted a substantial part of the Rwandan 
elite. 
… Some who refused at the start became convinced to act when all 
authorities seemed to speak with one voice…Unlike the zealous 
assailants, the reluctant set limits to their participation: they might 
massacre strangers in churches or barriers, knowing only that they 
were Tutsi, and refuse to attack neighbours, knowing they were 
Tutsi but knowing also they were not enemies. They might agree to 
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pillage a Tutsi they envied for his wealth and refuse to burn the 
house of a poor widow; they might join in killing a young man 
who loudly proclaimed his loyalty to the RPF but refuse to slay an 
infant. Some became more hardened with experience and learned 
how to slaughter even those whom they once refused to harm; 
others went the other way, apparently swept up by fear or greed in 
the first days of slaughter, they were later repelled by the efforts to 
exterminate even the vulnerable. 
Tens of thousands of Hutu refused to join the killing 
campaign and saved Tutsi lives. Hundreds of thousands more 
disapproved of the genocide but did nothing to oppose it or to help 
its victims.61 
Des Forges’ description of the genocidal killers in Rwanda includes the observations that these 
individuals were rich, poor, locals and foreigners, and in their attitudes they displayed 
enthusiasm, or reluctance, or they grew more or less enthusiastic throughout the campaign. 
Essentially her findings suggest that as a group the killers came from all backgrounds and 
showed all levels of enthusiasm towards their participation in the killings and that from an 
empirical standpoint they do not possess any characteristic or set of characteristics that would 
clearly distinguish them from the rest of the population as a whole. These findings could further 
be put “under the microscope” and operationalized using the tools of statistical analysis for the 
purposes of identifying the presence of an empirical difference with this population that lies 
dormant. But even if a statistically significant feature of this population could be demonstrated 
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this demonstration would not address the significance of collecting “the killers in Rwanda” into a 
category or explain the benefits sought by investigating this group of individuals. 
The works of Jean Hatzfeld in Machete Season: The Killers in Rwanda Speak and Straus 
in The Order of Genocide: Race, Power and War in Rwanda mention Arendt’s notion of the 
banality of evil to understand the perpetrators of the genocide but without considering the 
implications of this notion for human activity. Hatzfeld introduces Arendt’s work into his 
discussion when he describes some of the reservations he felt ethically about interviewing men 
who were imprisoned and “have been deprived of their physical liberty and thus of freedom of 
expression.”62 He mentions as one of his influences to proceed with his study “the power of 
Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem, which was written after she had listened to the words 
of a prisoner, indeed, on the eve of his sentencing.”63 Straus also refers to “the problems of 
interviewing perpetrators,” and though he does not discuss what he thinks these problems 
represent he explains that his reasons for conducting the interviews are similar to Hatzfeld’s, 
noting that this “approach is not uncommon to studies of the Holocaust, and my method in part 
derives from that literature.”64 In a footnote to this comment Straus stresses how the work of 
Arendt and Christopher Browning were “particularly influential” for him, although between 
these two authors he acknowledges a greater debt to Browning.65 This debt is apparent in his 
argument that the statistical data he has accumulated: 
support “ordinary men” theories of genocide perpetrators. I find 
that the profile of Rwanda’s perpetrators strongly resembles the 
profile of adult men in the country. Rwanda’s perpetrators were not 
especially mad, sadistic, hateful, poor, uneducated, ideologically 
committed or young.66 
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Hatzfeld also describes how the men he interviews were by all appearances “ordinary 
Rwandans” that prior to the genocide “seemed destined for nothing beyond choosing a wife to 
share a rural existence on a hill in a little country in the heart of Africa, a life lived in uneasy 
tolerance of their neighbours, without television or any influx of immigration to connect them to 
the vast outside world.”67 
 In their discussion of Arendt’s work on Eichmann both Hatzfeld and Straus interpret the 
“banality of evil” in a more literal sense that focuses on the individuals who took part in the 
killings and suggests that in terms of their background they are ordinary people. Straus’ 
characterization of the findings of his work as being supportive of “ordinary man theories of 
genocide” that are “particularly influenced by Arendt” is based upon his analysis that the 
demographic profile of those who performed the killings in Rwanda is no different from that of 
the general population. Hatzfeld develops his argument that the prisoners in his study are “banal” 
in who they are as people when he contemplates what motivated them in agreeing to be 
interviewed: “Perhaps they are telling their stories to convince us they are ordinary, the ordinary 
people described by … Hannah Arendt. In some confused way they are also probably trying to 
emphasize, to all of us at the edge of that exterminating whirlwind, an agonizing truth.”68 He 
then quotes one of the informants, Alphonse, to suggest what this “truth” might be: 
Outside the marshes [where these men took part in the killings], 
our lives seemed quite ordinary. We sang on the paths, we downed 
Primus or urwagwa, we had our choice amid abundance. We 
chatted about our good fortune, we soaped off our bloodstains in 
the basin, and our noses enjoyed the aromas of full cooking pots. 
We rejoiced in the new life about to begin by feasting on legs of 
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veal. We were hot at night atop our wives, and we scolded our 
rowdy children. Although no longer willing to feel pity, we were 
still greedy for good feeling. 
… 
At the end of the season at the marshes we were so disappointed 
we had failed. We were disheartened by what we were going to 
lose, and truly frightened by the misfortune and vengeance 
reaching out for us. But deep down, we were not tired of 
anything.69 
In this and other passages Hatzfeld plays on the suggestion from the men that the summer they 
spent participating in the genocide was the “lucky season.”70 He suggests this “lucky season” 
stands out from the “natural” cycle of seasons his interviewees patterned their lives on as 
farmers. In part this is explained when Hatzfeld notes in passing that while the men took part in 
the killings they allowed their crops to lie fallow during the growing season.71 
Hatzfeld’s focus on their neglect of their fields provides an insight to his overall analysis 
of the perpetrators: they may have been ordinary farmers before the genocide, and they may even 
continue to talk in the manner of their profession and use “natural” terms like “seasons” to 
describe their participation in the killings. Despite these “ordinary” appearances their 
experiences during the “lucky season” in which the genocide occurred separated these men from 
what came “naturally” to them. This separation taught them that killing is not just an acceptable 
way of life, but with the “abundance” it provided for them during their participation in the 
genocide, it became the way of life they preferred. Hatzfeld’s argument recognizes these men not 
to be diabolical agents of evil by nature or birth but he also does not accept the position that they 
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were simply innocents driven by circumstance to commit a crime that was not of their own 
making. The genocide put the men in a position where they were confronted with having to 
breach the inhibitions they felt towards killing and once they chose to breach these inhibitions 
they willingly left them behind. 
Hatzfeld is suggesting that his analysis modifies the understanding that the perpetrators 
are the “ordinary people … described by Arendt” with his argument that the experience of 
participating in the genocide transformed his interviewees’ views towards killing. Hatzfeld does 
not focus on the issue of whether or not the perpetrators’ growing acceptance of killing was an 
inevitable transformation or if they could possibly have viewed becoming involved in a different 
way. A clearer point of comparison with Arendt’s writings is the idea that a person’s views 
towards perpetrating genocide can be transformed to suit the circumstances or social “milieu” in 
which they find themselves. This aspect of Hatzfeld’s work seems to align with Arendt’s 
comments about the “moral collapse of Europe” under Nazi rule and the way that: 
morality, at the very moment of its collapse … stood revealed in 
the original meaning of the word, a set of mores, of customs and 
manners, which could be exchanged for another set with no more 
trouble than it would take to change the table manners of a whole 
people.72 
Hatzfeld focuses on the way the change in the conditions of society changed the prisoners in his 
study into something abnormal when prior to their involvement in the genocide he argues they 
were simply “banal” individuals who were normal and ordinary in every sense. Arendt’s focus is 
on the banal understanding of morality as a concern for normality and the way in which 
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individuals will support committing genocide when this is what society demands of them to be 
normal. 
 Des Forges’ comments to the BBC about the importance of defending human rights 
suggest that the merits of investigating genocide can be worked out through a concern for the 
impact that the activity of committing genocide has upon the meaning of human activity in all of 
its forms. Des Forges does not take up a discussion of these concerns in her study of Rwanda and 
Arendt’s notion of the banality of evil, which she represents as thoughtlessness, was used to 
consider the significance that genocide has upon the (human) activity of thinking. Hatzfeld’s and 
Straus’ discussions of the banality of evil in their studies of Rwanda were also considered but 
their work was recognized as being concerned with the ordinariness of the people who 
perpetrated genocide and not with the impact that genocide has upon human activity and the way 
in which this concern might be related to a consideration of the merits of investigating the 
subject of genocide. 
The Skandala and the Shift from Intentionality to the Activities Performed 
 One way an investigation might seek to identify those who take part in mass murder 
while also reflecting upon the “good” of conducting this investigation is by considering Arendt’s 
discussion of the skandala. This is a notion that Arendt attributes to Jesus of Nazareth, which is a 
name she uses to distinguish the religious figure of Jesus Christ who preaches forgiveness of sin 
from the moral figure that speaks about the importance of exercising judgment to evaluate the 
merits of an activity being performed. She comments that: 
This great lover of sinners, of those who trespassed once 
mentions ... that they there are others who cause skandala, 
disgraceful offences, for which “it were better that a millstone were 
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hanged about his neck, and he cast into the sea.” It were better that 
he had never been born. But Jesus does not tell us what the nature 
is of these scandalous offences: we feel the truth of his words but 
cannot pin them down.73 
The discussion of skandala turns the focus away from the doer and their intentions and directs it 
towards the nature of the offences committed. This is an understanding that Arendt uses to make 
sense of the banal form of evil that Eichmann displays through his claim that he is not 
responsible for the momentous, monstrous deeds that he had an integral part in authoring. 
 The skandala are referred to as being like stumbling blocks or boulders that block the 
pathway of those who commit these offences, which connects in an interesting way with Arendt’s 
description of thinking as an activity that stops to reconsider the endless significance of things. 
The impediments that emerge from committing skandala could be seen as the ghostly remnants 
that represent what is left over from the occasions where thinking has been neglected. Arendt’s 
arguments seem to suggest that these remains become planted in an individual’s consciousness, 
and that from the impact that these offences have upon the self the activity of thinking becomes 
petrified. Arendt’s account of thinking describes it as involving a self-dialogue which requires an 
individual to be a reasonable partner for themselves to converse with and she contends that those 
who refuse to take part in the type of offences that the skandala involve seem to understand that 
this is what is required for the self-dialogue to occur. This is a point that is reflected in Arendt’s 
comments about the nonparticipants in the Final Solution whose refusal to comply with its orders 
she suggests represents an unwillingness “to live together with a murderer – themselves.” In 
Kantian terms to live with oneself as a murderer involves the contradiction of a universal law 
that it self-legislated but the self does not agree should be applied universally. The life the 
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murder lives relies upon the understanding that thou shalt murder and thou shalt not murder, 
which entails forming a partnership with the self that cannot be sustained in thought. 
The Banal Accommodation to Order 
 The cases involving genocide offer ample evidence of the situations where the measures 
that could have been in place to stop mass murder – such as a concern for preserving a sense of 
self that would permit the self-dialogue that thinking engages in – clearly were not enough to 
prevent it from happening. In Rwanda the government’s order to commit genocide was accepted 
for a variety of different reasons by the nation’s inhabitants, the most easily identifiable being the 
appeal to a racist ideology. The groundwork for this appeal was laid in part by the “Hamitic 
hypothesis” which argued that the Tutsi came to the area of Rwanda-Urundi centuries ago to 
conquer the original Hutu inhabitants.74 This hypothesis was initially embraced by the Tutsi 
during colonial times as it made the case that they were descended from the lost biblical tribe of 
Ham in Ethiopia and shared (some) ancestral roots with Europeans, allegedly making the Tutsi 
the “natural” leaders of the more local and African Hutu population. From independence 
onwards the more radical elements of the Hutu population reinterpreted the Hamitic hypothesis 
to make the claim that they were the rightful rulers of Rwanda on the basis that the Hutu were 
the original inhabitants of the region and their numerical superiority over the “foreign Tutsi 
invaders” gave them the democratic right to be in power. This hypothesis was recognized by the 
killers in a very gruesome way during the genocide as the bodies of thousands of murdered 
Tutsis were thrown into the Kagera River in Rwanda – a tributary of the Nile – as a way to 
symbolically “send them back to Ethiopia.”75 
 The mainstream acceptance that the assassination of the President helped to give the 
racist ideology of Hutu extremism is noted in a number of firsthand reports that acknowledge the 
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way Habyarimana’s death helped to mobilize the populace to commit genocide. This includes his 
death being mentioned by all 23 prisoners who participated in Straus’ study76 Intimate Enemy 
although their remarks also make clear that the racist views of extremism were not universally 
accepted even among those who carried out the killings. One respondent mentions his doubt 
about the idea that all Tutsi were traitors secretly assisting the invading RPF forces: “I thought 
the accomplices were in the city. But with my neighbours, I did not think about it.”77 The same 
type of hesitancy is expressed in Hatzfeld’s Machete Season by a prisoner named “Jean-
Baptiste” who took part in the genocide when he comments upon the rumours that Tutsi women 
saw themselves as being “too good” to do farm work. Jean-Baptiste explains that the “Hutu 
noticed none of that hearsay in the Tutsi women of their neighbourhood, who bent their backs 
beside their Hutu wives and lugged water home the same way they did.”78  
 Those who killed Tutsi without claiming to be convinced by the racist views of Hutu 
extremism often describe the way their participation in the killings was related to their normal, 
everyday activities and concerns. The militia in charge of rounding up and organizing civilians 
into death squads was named the interhamwe or “those who worked together,” which seemed to 
encourage the sense that murdering Tutsi was simply a matter of taking an alternative line of 
work to farming. The weapons of choice were also typically farm implements and the prisoners 
in Hatzfeld’s study draw comparisons between the similar feel physically of wielding a machete 
for the purposes of doing the cutting needed to look after their crops and livestock and the use of 
a machete for the purposes of cutting human beings.79 More commonly mentioned than these 
attempts at “branding” the killings as work are the threats and/or promises of reward made to the 
would-be participants in the genocide. These are aimed at having an impact upon very practical 
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matters like the financial loss incurred by having to pay for a bribe to get out of participating in 
the death squads and the financial gain that will be obtained from looting. 
 Once the order was in place to murder Tutsi it could accommodate those who were racist, 
looking to do a job, securing the welfare of their private, practical concerns or were motivated by 
some combination of these factors. This reflects the understanding that the activities engaged in 
to pursue these interests are determined by the prevailing social order without a concern for the 
merits of the way in which they are being pursued and it takes the form of the banality of evil 
when complying with this order involves committing mass murder. Arendt’s discussion of the 
skandala would suggest that those who claim not to be committed to the aims of the genocide 
they took part in are no less responsible for what they had or had not done to contribute towards 
its execution. But an unsettling implication of the banality of evil is the suggestion that a desire 
to comply with the prevailing social order will allow everyday concerns to draw in supporters 
who will participate in mass murder, perhaps even more effectively than racist views that lack 
the backing of mainstream support. 
Judgment as Self-Defining 
 The individual exceptions to the vast majority who comply with an order to participate in 
mass murder shows that the way everyday concerns draw in participants is not unavoidable. The 
example of these exceptions, while important not to overlook, is also important to discuss in a 
way that avoids suggesting everything works out in the end. This is not to say that a concern for 
genocide prevention should be entirely ruled out but to suggest also considering ways of 
responding to the occurrence of genocide other than the problem of imaging how it will 
disappear. This is an understanding that can be developed by reflecting upon the example Fujii 
discusses of “Gustave,” who describes the way he drew from the everyday notion of friendship 
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as a resource to resist becoming involved in the practice of genocide. Gustave characterizes his 
understanding of what friendship involves: 
Gustave: A true friend is someone who gives you good advice … 
Interviewer: Can you give me an example of bad advice? 
G: For example, someone might recognize you and might ask you 
to help kill someone or to go steal the belongings of others, saying 
you’ll be rich. 
I: Was there ever someone who asked you to help kill someone or 
steal another’s things? 
G: No one did, because when I notice that someone has bad ways, 
I cannot go near them. Even today, I cannot be friends with people 
who think like that. 
I: In general, how do people show they are true friends to one 
another? 
G: True friends must have the same ideas, that is good ideas. They 
have to help one another in everything. Each has to steer the other 
in the right direction.80 
Gustave is described by Fujii as a “resister” and is distinguished from those she classifies as 
“joiners” who (for one reason one another) had gone along with the killings in Rwanda. Fujii 
notes that both joiners and resisters place a high value on obedience but in the case of resisters 
“the valorization of obedience, however, did not translate into obeying orders … [known] to be 
wrong.”81 Gustave’s account acknowledges the temptation obedience holds for him when he 
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states he does “not go near” those who act in “bad ways” and describes a “true” friend as 
someone that can “steer the other in the right direction.”    
 Fujii does not further discuss the relation between right and wrong and obedience, but it 
is a phenomenon considered at some length by Arendt in her essay “Personal Responsibility 
Under a Dictatorship.” She asks, “In what way were those few different who in all walks of life 
did not collaborate?” and her answer connects her discussion of keeping good company with 
oneself with the notion of judgment: 
The nonparticipants, called irresponsible by the majority, were the 
only ones who dared judge by themselves, and they were capable 
of doing so not because they disposed of a better system of values 
or because the old standards of right and wrong were still firmly 
planted in their mind and conscience … [They] were those whose 
conscience did not function in this … automatic way – as though 
we dispose of a set of learned or innate rules which we then apply 
to the particular case as it arises, so that every new experience or 
situation is already prejudged and we need only act out whatever 
we learned or possessed beforehand. Their criterion, I think, was a 
different one: they asked themselves to what extent they would still 
be able to live in peace with themselves after having committed 
certain deeds; and they decided that it would be better to do 
nothing, not because the world would then be changed for the 
better, but simply because only on this condition could they go on 
living with themselves … To put it crudely, they refused to murder, 
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not so much because they still held fast to the command “Thou 
shalt not kill,” but because they were unwilling to live together 
with a murderer – themselves.82 
The considerations Arendt mentions when describing judgment share with Gustave’s account the 
understanding that the decision to act (or not act) is arrived at not through some mechanically-
minded process but with an eye towards keeping good company with oneself. Gustave’s concern 
with avoiding those with bad ways and wanting to only be around those who can steer him right 
suggests an important difference with Arendt’s notion of friendship. To be so concerned with the 
physical proximity of others seems to suggest that friendship has a hypnotic power that negates 
the capacity for judgment and allows ideas to be transmitted between friends almost by osmosis. 
This is not to deny that friendship can be influential in both good and bad ways but to suggest 
also adding to this understanding of its influence other possible ways to relate to those who have 
good or bad ways beyond simply falling under their grip. Friendship then would become not so 
much a matter of being subject to the fortune of having good or bad friends but to emphasize the 
importance of finding ways to relate to the good and bad of friendship. The way that Gustave 
wants to discriminate between the good and bad of friendship could be developed beyond the 
circularity of saying that bad friends give bad advice by using as a criteria Arendt’s sense of 
seeking to befriend ourselves through what we do. This circularity need not be thought of as ever 
being fully avoidable considering that what is involved with befriending ourselves is also not a 
matter of self-evidence or capable of being determined in a mechanical fashion. 
 Arendt’s discussion of “obedience” in the same essay provides an example of judging 
action with a concern for keeping good company with ourselves. She describes her distaste for 
the word obedience and the praise it receives as a political virtue. The trouble she sees is with a 
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notion of obedience that fails to recognize the importance of consent, i.e. that any political 
system one obeys is de facto a political system that is also being consented to and supported by 
our-“selfs.” This distinction between obedience and consent seems to bring the concern for 
“living at peace with ourselves” into the judgments we make about our political involvements by 
emphasizing that our participation is something our-“selfs” agree to even when this involvement  
appears to have been imposed upon us by others. 
 One of the implications of the idea that our judgments about certain actions may prevent 
us from being at peace with ourselves is this begins to introduce a sense of finality into the way 
actions are understood. Arendt suggests that the acts Eichmann commits make him someone that 
nobody would want to share the earth with,83 and her judgment is by no means one that needs to 
be universally accepted: other views and reactions towards what Eichmann has done are clearly 
possible. This judgment says something about Arendt, and this is precisely the point about the 
open-endedness versus the finality of judgment: it says something about those who exercise it 
but the exercise of judgment also admits to endless interpretation about its application. 
 A difficulty with judgment is to avoid appearing judgmental even though the exercising 
of judgment seems called for in certain circumstances or becomes notable in its absence when 
not exercised. If judgment is not exercised mechanically then for it to avoid becoming 
judgmental seems to require attention to the circumstances in which it may be called for and 
working through the particulars of those circumstances to decide upon the appropriate way for it 
to be exercised. This understanding of judgment suggests the “good” of an analysis focused on 
its concern with understanding “right” and “wrong” as the discussion of the banality of evil has 
shown that everyday concerns can draw support for mass murder if no consideration is given to 
the “good” of the order being followed. 
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 Arendt argues that the Eichmann trial makes the notion of judgment a central issue since 
the point of a trials is to judge a defendant.84 The next case to be examined will be the trial of a 
notorious war criminal from the Cambodian genocide, Kiang Kuk Iev, a.k.a. “Duch.” Duch’s 
trial will be used to evaluate the extent to which Arendt’s assessment of Eichmann as “banal” is 
instructive for assessing a major war criminal on trial for his participation in genocidal killings, 
when in Duch’s case this trial occurs in a very different time and place than either Nazi-occupied 
Europe or Rwanda. 

















Re-Creation as Part of Working Through: The Particular and the Universal in 
the Cambodian Genocide 
 Neither in knowledge nor in reflection can anything whole be put together, 
since in the former the internal is missing and in the latter the external; and so we 
must necessarily think of science as art if we expect to derive any kind of 
wholeness from it. Nor should we look for this in general, the excessive, but, since 
art is always wholly represented in every individual work of art, so science ought 
to reveal itself completely in every individual object treated.85 
– Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Materialien zur Geschichte der Farbenlehre 
(quoted in Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama) 
Introduction 
 The discussion of the Rwandan genocide in the previous chapter suggests examining the 
willingness to comply with mass murder in relation to the notion of thoughtlessness. The 
argument considers the way in which this form of compliance is possible to avoid through 
exercising judgment and the focus of this faculty upon understanding the “good” of an activity 
being performed. This discussion develops its argument by addressing the issue of what 
conditions need to be met to provide appropriate commentary on the Rwandan genocide, with 
the initial focus on whose commentary should be considered appropriate. In the examination of 
the Cambodian genocide in this chapter the issue of what constitutes appropriate commentary 
will again be taken up in relation to the notion of thoughtlessness with an interest in developing 
an understanding of what is meant by notions that (like the “good”) are supposedly of universal 
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human significance. The investigation will consider the way in which society was ordered during 
the Cambodian genocide as its (particular) case to examine and develop an appreciation of what 
is involved with the (universal) concern for the notion of justice, which is the notion that emerges 
as a focus in this discussion of the genocide. The discussion will also seek to treat the relation 
between the universal and the particular as not only a resource but a topic of its examination by 
including as part of its investigation a reflection upon what is possible to learn from applying 
universal notions to particular cases. 
Background: The Comparison between Nazism and the Khmer Rouge as a Matter of 
Historical Accuracy 
 The Holocaust and the “killing fields” of Cambodia stand as well-known symbols of the 
horrors of genocide, but even if little thought is required to make this association, the 
significance of designating an event as “genocidal” is often not as easily settled. One of the 
concerns in developing a sense of the term’s significance is that it involves taking into 
consideration the unique set of circumstances of each occasion where genocide is said to have 
occurred. In comparative forms of investigation the use of genocide as a general term to classify 
these occasions seems problematic considering the complexity involved in comparing different 
instances of genocide with distinct historical, cultural, etc. backgrounds. The concern typically 
shown in these forms of investigation with recognizing the uniqueness of each case being 
compared may even seem to lend credence to the suggestion that little can meaningfully be said 
about what the term genocide signifies other than it refers to killing that occurs on a tremendous 
scale. 
 If the meaning of this term is recognized as being not fully settled then one way to 
respond to this sense of uncertainty would be to employ a method that examines the situations 
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categorized as genocidal and attempt to discover their connection with other phenomena. What 
this term refers to could then be explained by making reference to the prevailing economic 
conditions, the ethnic composition of the affected population, etc. The interest shown in 
resolving concerns about the meaning of the term genocide by seeking to accumulate additional 
phenomena that it can be associated with seems reminiscent of Durkheim’s concerns about 
sociology being conceived of as a discipline without a field of study due to a lack of its own 
distinct set of phenomena. One of the differences between the seeming lack of phenomena 
connected with the killing that transpires during genocide and the disappearance of sociological 
phenomena described by Durkheim is that Durkheim cautions against conceiving of sociology as 
a catchall category that simply replicates the work done in other disciplines while the phenomena 
associated with comparing different instances of genocide disappear not through replication but 
simply by not appearing at all. 
 A comparison between the details of the Holocaust with those of the Cambodian 
genocide may offer a more tangible explanation of the way the phenomena associated with a 
comparative study of genocide seem to “vanish”. The tension between the understanding this 
form of study seeks to establish and the difficulty associated with being sensitive towards the 
context in which different instances of genocide occur seems apparent by even just proposing 
that a global conflict originating in Europe be juxtaposed with a regional conflict sparked by the 
Vietnam War thirty years later in Southeast Asia. This brings to mind some obvious historical, 
cultural differences such as Germany’s standing as one of the leading industrialized nations in 
the world during Hitler’s reign and Cambodia’s status under the Khmer Rouge as a developing 
nation emerging from its colonial past. The “racial revolution” started by the Nazis in peacetime 
that expanded into a war of conquest across Europe and the globe also stands in contrast with the 
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Khmer Rouge’s communist revolution that emerged as part of a civil war provoked by the 
devastating impact of the American bombing raids on Cambodia (which are estimated to have 
contained three times the amount of explosives that the U.S. dropped on Japan during WWII).86 
Unlike the Nazi revolution the devastation from which the revolution in Cambodia emerged 
avoided exploding into a larger conflict until the Khmer Rouge started a small-scale war with 
neighbouring Vietnam at the end of its short time in power. 
 With a little imagination, however, this same set of circumstances could be used to 
illustrate the commonality between the reign of the Nazis and the Khmer Rouge by (for instance) 
deemphasizing the differences in scale between their levels of industrial development, the wars 
they each provoked and/or the specific content of their revolutionary aims in transforming 
society. Their similarities could then be found by stressing that both regimes were overthrown 
through their involvement in these wars that they started and by noting that the revolutions 
founded by each of these governments involved a conscious effort to radically alter and re-
engineer a society that was in disarray (the economic devastation that the treaty of Versailles 
imposed on Germany; the devastation from the aftermath of the war experienced in Cambodia). 
 Whatever a direct and certainly more thorough comparison between Nazi Germany and 
Democratic Kampuchea might determine about the similarity or dissimilarity of the conditions 
within the two nations prior to and during their enactment of policies of mass murder, the 
possibility of connecting the two regimes seems to be strengthened by the attention that the 
designation of “genocide” brings to their legacies. For example, the way in which the legal 
framing of the Nazis’ activities as crimes against humanity (and later as genocide) brought a 
focus upon Eichmann has a parallel in Cambodia in the figure of Kaing Kek Iew – known better 
as “Duch” – who gained notoriety for his involvement in the country’s genocide as the director 
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of the infamous S-21 Tuol Sleng prison. This connection may seem a bit unsatisfying, however, 
as it suggests that the difficulty with identifying genocidal phenomena when comparing the 
different instances where these activities are said to have occurred can be resolved by simply 
designating the activities of the regimes being compared as “genocidal.” These phenomena may 
seem contrived if they are only making their appearance by being given this designation after the 
fact. 
 One way to counter the concerns about the potentially ephemeral quality of genocidal 
phenomena is to verify them on the basis of their historical accuracy, but a comparison between 
the figures of Eichmann and Duch much like the more general comparison between the regimes 
of which they were a part seems to be a matter that is open to interpretation. For instance, 
Eichmann acted more as an administrative coordinator overseeing the transportation by rail of 
Jews to the various concentration camps across Europe under Nazi control while Duch was the 
director of one infamous prison in Cambodia. This difference in position also meant differing 
forms of involvement in the killing process as Eichmann was the prototypical “desk murderer” 
who made his contribution without spending much time at the concentration camps. Duch had a 
more direct involvement in the day-to-day operations of his prison and focused upon ensuring 
that the “best practices” of torture and execution were employed by his guards, even admitting 
during his trial that he had taken part (perhaps more routinely than he suggests) in the torture and 
killings himself.87 Duch’s “closer” involvement in these operations gave him a hand in the deaths 
of tens of thousands of individuals as opposed to the more “distant” part Eichmann had in the 
deaths of millions. 
 These sorts of differences suggest Duch’s position had a greater resemblance to one of 
the directors of the concentration camps than to the more administrative position occupied by 
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Eichmann. Rudolph Hoess then might come to mind as the most appropriate figure to compare 
given his position as the commandant of Auschwitz, the most infamous of the concentration 
camps. A case could also be made to compare Duch with the commandant of Treblinka, Joseph 
Stangel, as Stangel shares with Duch the same horrendous track record of leaving only a handful 
of remaining survivors among the thousands that came under his power. If the raw number of 
deaths that occurred at S-21 is the focal point then a smaller camp from the Third Reich might 
seem to offer the closest comparison, while a different form of analysis might emphasize that the 
operations at S-21 had the unique task of securing confessions and carrying out the executions of 
many of the Khmer Rouge officials who had fallen out of favour with the party. This made its 
operations distinct not only from many of the killing centres of Nazi Germany but (as Duch 
himself has pointed out)88 from others in Cambodia. 
 Even if the historical evidence offers little support for either a comparison between the 
positions Eichmann and Duch held within their governments, or for the amount of attention they 
have received relative to other officials more instrumental in the atrocities committed by their 
respective governments, one commonality they share is the position they symbolically occupy as 
figures who represent the atrocities committed by the regimes in which they each served. A 
discussion of the figures used to represent genocide shifts the focus of the analysis towards the 
discourse surrounding this subject matter though without necessarily abandoning the relevance 
of its historical considerations. Other figures besides Eichmann and Duch might make more 
sense historically speaking to represent the genocide committed by the Nazis and the Khmer 
Rouge (excluding from consideration the more well-known leaders of these respective 
movements, Hitler and Pol Pot). One figure that merits consideration in this respect would be 
Eichmann’s boss Reinhard Heydrich, who is credited with having an instrumental role in 
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planning the Holocaust including being involved with organizing Kristallnacht, the 
Einsatzgruppen or “mobile killing units” responsible for shooting hundreds of thousands of 
civilians during the war, as well as for his position as chair of the Wannsee conference.89 The 
argument could be made that Heydrich’s death during the war allowed Eichmann to obtain 
greater notoriety during the Nuremberg trials where he was named in absentia as a central figure 
in orchestrating the Final Solution, a status that later would heighten the drama of Eichmann’s 
capture and trial in Jerusalem. 
 As for an appeal to the historical record in Cambodia a case could be made for Duch’s 
boss Nuon Chea, who had a lead role in organizing the mass killing committed by the Khmer 
Rouge, including having responsibility for ordering the deaths of many of those sent to Toul 
Seng for torture and execution. Duch’s notoriety relative to Chea and others within the Khmer 
Rouge was enhanced by the more prominent position he occupied at Tuol Sleng which more than 
likely would not have become a famous memorial site in Phnom Pehn if Duch had been more 
competent and not failed to execute Chea’s orders to destroy the prison along with all evidence 
of its murderous activities. 
“Just” Telling the Truth: The Demand to Investigate the Cambodian Genocide and the 
Limits of Historical Accuracy 
 A concern for the historical accuracy of using Duch as a figure to represent the 
Cambodian genocide seems to imply that the account that can make the strongest claim to being 
objective is also the one that is most convincing. This is an understanding that puts the historical 
record in the position of verifying whether Duch is a significant figure in the Cambodian 
genocide or if this is “just the way he is being talked about.” The sense might develop from this 
understanding that the relation between the historical representation of genocide and other forms 
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of the discourse is inherently adversarial. This sort of antagonism might be recognized in the 
account photojournalist Nic Dunlop gives in The Lost Executioner of his (successful) search 
through Cambodia to find Duch in hiding. The concern that seems to drive Dunlop during his 
journey is to “bring home the truth” of the Cambodian genocide and show the importance of 
addressing its occurrence by obtaining a fuller understanding of its events than previously 
reported. Dunlop demonstrates this type of focus in his discussion of the international attention 
received by the trial of former Khmer Rouge official Sam Bith. During the genocide Bith ordered 
the kidnapping and execution of three foreigners from Britain, Australia and France in an attack 
in which, Dunlop points out, “ten Cambodians were also killed.”90 
 Dunlop is critical of the attention given to the case involving Bith and notes that, even 
though Nuon Chea was called to testify at Bith’s trial, the foreign press showed little interest in 
questioning Chea despite his central involvement in orchestrating the genocide. Dunlop contrasts 
his interest in the trial with that shown by other members of the foreign press by describing the 
day Chea was called to testify and what the reaction was to an announcement made by court 
officials that Bith was too ill to take the stand, and the proceedings would be temporarily 
postponed. “The assembled journalists groaned and gathered their gear, then crammed around 
the courtroom door, ready for Sam Bith. I kept an eye out for Nuon Chea.”91. Dunlop then 
describes how as Bith left the courthouse the other reporters rushed to take his photograph but 
“out of the corner of my eye I noticed that another LandCruiser [for Chea] was making for a 
different gate. I broke from the crowd and ran to follow it out into a busy main street.”92 In 
Dunlop’s telling of this episode, a historically accurate version of events and the attention given 
to the reporting of these events literally and figuratively head in two different directions. This 
point is further reinforced in his description of the conclusion of the trial when Bith was found 
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guilty and Dunlop refers to the British ambassador’s enthusiastic view of the ruling as a “major 
step ‘towards justice for the families of the three young men.’” Dunlop also notes that in the 
ambassador’s comments “no mention was made of the ten Cambodians who lost their lives.”93 
Dunlop ends his discussion of Bith’s trial by emphasizing that his own lack of interest in this trial 
shares the locals’ appreciation of the situation. He explains that “most Cambodians I spoke to 
were unimpressed with the verdict, believing the case was an isolated example and the result of 
pressure from three Western governments, all of them major donors to Cambodia’s national 
development programme.”94 
 Dunlop’s discussion of Bith’s trial illustrates his concern with having an understanding of 
the Cambodian genocide that focuses on the historical relevance of the concerns addressed and is 
sensitive to the appreciation that the locals have of its events. His concern with developing this 
type of understanding is also consistent with the actions he takes in pursuit of finding Duch as he 
demonstrates by these actions his firm commitment to bringing the parties most responsible for 
the atrocities committed against the Cambodian people to justice and avoid having them simply 
fade into history. The impressive level of commitment Dunlop demonstrates to accomplish this 
aim is reflected in his decision to pursue Duch in even the most remote and dangerous parts of 
the country, including the regions of the jungle still under the control of the Khmer Rouge. Just 
as Dunlop’s actions during Bith’s trial reflect his way of distinguishing his interest in the 
Cambodian genocide from other foreign journalists, his journey through Cambodia also reflects 
his way of acquiring a different sense of the genocide than the one many Westerners receive from 
the more “touristy” experience of visiting the memorial site set up at Tuol Sleng in the capital 
city of Phenom Penh. 
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 Dunlop does not suggest, however, that his main ambition in pursuing Duch stems from a 
sense of pure adventurism or from wanting to compensate for some lack in the “typical” 
Westerner’s experience of the country. At the outset of his journey he describes a set of aims that 
reflect both his concern with making a contribution towards what can be known and learned 
from the Cambodian genocide and with addressing some of the outstanding problems it 
continues to present. “If we were ever to understand the Cambodian holocaust, and bring any 
measure of justice,” Dunlop explains, 
finding Duch and others like him was vital. Duch was the most 
important witness to those dark years and could shed light on a 
highly secretive period in his country’s history. And I wanted to 
know what it was that had turned a seemingly ordinary man from 
one of the poorest parts of Cambodia into one of the worst mass 
murderers of the twentieth century.95 
The claim that Duch is “the most important witness to those dark years” aside, Dunlop does not 
seem concerned about the bounty of fame rewarded for helping to bring the former prison 
director into custody. His attraction seems to be to the idea that a clear statement of the atrocities 
committed during the Cambodian genocide and the apprehension of its most notorious offenders 
is all that is required to inspire a call for justice against those who had a hand in perpetrating its 
crimes. 
 Dunlop shows the conviction he feels towards this idea – and his disappointment in its 
expectations not being met – when he mentions at the end of his story the thousands of “mug 
shots” taken of the prisoners who entered Tuol Sleng prison and asks in disbelief: “If we can’t 
respond to the overwhelming evidence in the form of photographs of the condemned, what does 
74 
 
it say about us? What does it say about photography?”96 This unhappy ending Dunlop puts on his 
story is written while in the midst of the uncertainty created by a lengthy postponement to the 
beginning of Duch’s trial that (at the time of his writing) created doubts about him ever having to 
face prosecution. The disappointment Dunlop expresses towards his experiences in Cambodia 
could be used to illustrate two observations pertaining to other investigative work on the subject 
of genocide. Consider first the closing words of Dunlop’s book in which he offers a contrast 
between the sense of clarity he has from the photographs he captured of Duch during his journey 
and the empty feeling that persists with him whenever he views the prison photograph of a young 
mother, Chan Kim Srun and her baby, who were killed together in Tuol Sleng: 
The pictures I took of Duch are safely in my drawer. Although I 
was nervous when I took them, they are incredibly sharp. And if I 
look closely I can just make out my own silhouette in the reflection 
of the eyes. I look at Kim Srun’s as she looks back at her 
tormentors and I see nothing.97   
The idea that the photograph of Kim Srun portrays an image that Dunlop is incapable of 
identifying with even though he is highly sympathetic of the terrible fate she met is perhaps 
interesting to keep in mind when recalling the beginning of his story when he talks about the 
need to find Duch if “any measure of justice” can be brought to the region. In both cases the 
language Dunlop uses suggests that the efforts to work on behalf of those killed in the genocide 
are only partial and inadequate while the need to do this work is unquestionable considering that 
if this need is not addressed then “What does it say about us”? 
 This sentiment about the content of genocide studies presenting an unquestionable need 
to pursue justice is certainly not unique to Dunlop’s writing on the subject and it relates to a 
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second observation concerning the form he uses to present his findings from Cambodia. Dunlop 
considers the evidence that has been well-documented in photographs to be indisputable and the 
mimetic properties of photography as a medium makes this seem like a hard position to oppose. 
This interest in presenting indisputable evidence is also not unique to Dunlop’s work and is a 
common scholarly practice reflected in the type of written documents well-known within the 
field of genocide studies, such as Alison Des Forges’ lengthy and factually-oriented report on the 
Rwandan genocide discussed in the previous chapter.98 A parallel could perhaps be drawn within 
genocide studies between presenting evidence in a form that is considered indisputable and 
considering the content of this evidence to present an unquestionable need for justice. Dunlop’s 
work shows his interest in these “parallel” considerations, but even though he considers the 
evidence from the photographs to be unquestionable and indisputable in both the form in which 
it has been presented and in the need to address the issues presented by its contents, he is 
compelled to acknowledge that the significance of the evidence he is dealing with is still subject 
to discourse. He acknowledges this as much by what he writes about in expressing his 
disappointment that Duch was not swiftly taken to trial once he was brought into custody as by 
his decision to write about his experiences in Cambodia. This decision displays Dunlop’s 
recognition of the need to further explain the significance of the photographic evidence 
documenting the genocidal activities that took place in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge and 
how these activities desperately call for justice to be done. 
The Discourse on Genocide and its Phenomena 
 This discussion of comparing different instances of genocide has considered the problem 
of what makes an account seem significant and the way in which this problem is addressed by an 
appeal to historical accuracy. Dunlop’s concern with making this appeal by ensuring what is 
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reported about the Cambodian genocide carries the weight of the historical record is reflected in 
his focus upon the firsthand accounts provided by Duch’s testimony and the photographs taken at 
S-21. In the end his approach seems to come full circle after he acknowledges that the evidence 
he considers to be most convincing does not necessarily develop into a concern for appreciating 
the significance of the events they document and the way this evidence is discussed and 
interpreted is essential to its understanding. Both the content of Dunlop’s writing and his 
decision to write about his experiences in Cambodia suggest that the way he understands the 
difficulty with developing this concern is as a matter of a lack of public interest in the events that 
occurred during the genocide. This suggests that Dunlop’s concern with “setting the record 
straight” by exposing the “hard” evidence to a larger audience is not unlike a realization that 
General Romeo Dallaire comes to when listing off what he considers as his failings as former 
head of the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Rwanda. Dallaire argues that he initially 
underestimated the importance of effectively communicating events to the media and came to 
view attracting international attention away from other news stories like the Tonya Harding 
scandal as one of his central tasks as a military commander in charge of preventing genocide.99 
 Both Dallaire and Dunlop are clearly disappointed in the response to well-documented 
evidence of genocide and show the ambivalence of not wanting to have to further explain the 
importance of this evidence while also experiencing a need to increase its exposure to a wider 
audience. In spite of this ambivalence Dallaire displays both a tremendous amount of drive in the 
public relations campaign that he orchestrates to draw attention to the situation in Rwanda as 
well as a certain amount of savvy during his interactions with the media. His aptitude in these 
matters provides a clearer example of the phenomena associated with the discourse on genocide 
being treated as phenomena in their own right as opposed to the view Dunlop seems to favour of 
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having the expectation that these phenomena will simply fade into the background of the 
discussion after the “hard” evidence is presented. Dallaire’s approach is to focus upon the 
different techniques that can be used to effectively present evidence of a genocide in addition to 
thoroughly documenting its events, as he seems to take the view that the discourse is a means to 
inspire his audience to take some form of action against the injustices committed. The historical 
or cultural relevance of the phenomena associated with this discourse could be viewed with 
indifference if the goal of efficiently and effectively communicating a particular message is 
given priority. But even if the discourse is open to being interacted with in a cynical fashion this 
certainly would not rule out the possibility to take a more complementary approach that seeks to 
present the phenomena that are considered to be the most historically and culturally relevant 
while also being cognizant of the public’s perception of genocidal events. 
 The differing levels of emphasis placed upon the accuracy and accessibility of the 
materials presented could be seen as a difference in the ways the discussion of genocide can be 
used to respond to the tension between the need to present irrefutable evidence of its occurrence 
and the “irrefutable” need to act against the injustices presented by evidence of genocide. In 
Dunlop’s work the tension between meeting these demands seems to come to a head when he 
describes these needs not just as competing interests to be weighed against one another but in 
one circumstance coming into direct conflict with each other. Dunlop recognizes this conflict in 
his observation that: 
For most Cambodians ... talk of justice means little in their struggle 
to survive in what has been one long trail of suffering. As they 
overcome their problems in a country still reeling from the effects 
of a protracted war, they have more pressing needs. After all, it has 
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been over two decades since the Khmer Rouge genocide was 
exposed and made known to the world.100 
To observe that most Cambodians are uninterested in the way the genocide that took place in 
their country has been responded to is clearly a problem for Dunlop’s interest in wanting to work 
on behalf of the individuals impacted by its injustices while also being sensitive to the local 
appreciation of its events. How can he make a claim to work on their behalf in seeking justice for 
the atrocities committed during the genocide if those who were targeted by the genocide show 
little interest in the proceedings set up to administer justice? What if the problem is not simply a 
technical matter and what if the issue is not the manner in which justice is pursued but whether 
or not a concern for justice is even relevant when confronting genocide? 
 These are questions that will be considered as the discussion in this chapter progresses 
but what is perhaps interesting with Dunlop’s reaction in light of his focus on hard evidence is 
that he seems to be acknowledging that the direct involvement of Cambodians in the genocide is 
not the sole determinant of their views of its events. In explaining the factors that contribute to 
the lack of interest shown in these matters by the local populace he again mentions the lack of 
effort put towards bringing about swift justice. In addition to these actions (not) taken in 
response to the genocide he also acknowledges the impact that the discussion of the Cambodian 
genocide has had upon the views of those who were most closely involved in its events. This was 
demonstrated in the Sam Bith trial when Dunlop observed the local population’s cynical 
response to the proceedings’ focus on the impact that the Cambodian genocide had upon 
Westerners. The damage that has been done by neglecting the pursuit of justice and by discussing 
the genocide in a way that neglects to mention concerns relevant to Cambodians suggests that 
different words and actions could potentially sway the local population to become more engaged 
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in the response made to the country’s genocide. To acknowledge this possibility is not to deny 
the difficulty of engaging the local population’s interests through either dialogue, a more 
vigorous prosecution of the parties deemed responsible for the genocide, and/or by somehow 
alleviating the “struggle for survival” that Dunlop suggests deters many Cambodians from 
becoming more involved in the efforts to seek justice. The question of the specific strategies and 
techniques needed for this engagement would not necessarily address an issue suggested by 
Dunlop’s observation about the attitude of the Cambodian population towards the judicial 
proceedings. This issue is the tension between trying to reconcile the difficulty of claiming to be 
sensitive to issues that are relevant to the concerns of the local population while also claiming to 
seek justice on behalf of a Cambodian populace that has shown a lack of interest in the legal 
proceedings set up to prosecute those who committed offenses during the genocide. In this case 
even if those who suffered the most from the genocide could be convinced to take an interest in 
the response to its occurrence, what would justify going against their (initial) wishes of not being 
concerned with this response? One way to address this tension is to consider Dunlop’s claim that 
the injustices that took place under the rule of the Khmer Rouge government necessitates 
responding to the Cambodian genocide despite the lack of public interest. This claim implies 
developing an understanding of the Cambodian genocide that is aware of but does not 
necessarily replicate the local appreciation of events. In Dunlop’s case this seems to involve 
treating what the notion of justice means as self-evident and supposing that anyone who knows 
what is just will respond to the events of a genocide with a sufficient level of concern once they 
are presented with evidence of mass murder being committed. In contrast to Dunlop’s position, 
or at least the way this position has been represented here, this analysis will seek to depart from 
the understanding that a concern for justice can be treated as self-evident by recognizing that 
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what constitutes justice is representative of a universal problem that can never be known 
universally. This suggests that the meaning of what constitutes justice in relation to genocide is 
to be worked out through a consideration of each instance in which it occurs. 
 The starting point for working out this understanding of justice will be to consider 
Arendt’s coverage of the Eichmann trial and its focus on the possibility for justice in his case, a 
focus that she makes clear in explaining her understanding of the aims of his trial: 
The purpose of a trial is to render justice, and nothing else; even 
the noblest of ulterior purposes – “the making of a record of the 
Hitler regime which would withstand the test of history,” as Robert 
G. Storey, executive trial counsel at Nuremberg, formulated the 
supposed higher aims of the Nuremberg Trials – can only detract 
from the law’s main business: to weigh the charges brought against 
the accused, to render judgment, and to mete out due 
punishment.101 
Arendt’s account of Eichmann continues to be a source of controversy and the debate over her 
work will be considered in this chapter as part of developing a version of what justice would 
mean in relation to his case. Events concerning Duch’s case will also be discussed to consider 
what relevance if any the idea of applying a notion of justice that is of universal significance has 
to a discussion of the Cambodian genocide. 
The Arendt Controversy: Judgment as a Private Matter 
 “If one reads the book carefully, one sees that Eichmann was much less influenced by 
ideology than I assumed in the book on totalitarianism. The impact of ideology upon the 
individual may have been overrated by me.”102 This appraisal Arendt makes in a comparison of 
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the views her two books Eichmann in Jerusalem and The Origins of Totalitarianism provide of 
the notion of ideology identifies one of the issues that has been part of the lengthy and involved 
controversy over her work on the Eichmann trial. Critics of Arendt have alleged that Eichmann is 
a fanatical anti-Semite and have been angered by her refusal to acknowledge the importance that 
his hatred for the Jewish people has for explaining his participation in the Final Solution and by 
extension the participation of many other lesser known Nazi supporters. These critics have 
argued that her account fails to hold Eichmann and others responsible for their actions and also 
fails to acknowledge that the Holocaust is representative of the dangers uniquely posed to the 
Jewish people by one of Western civilization’s oldest afflictions, antisemitism. Arendt’s critics 
seem concerned that this danger is being identified using the most recent theory du jour such as 
the perils of modern technology, modern rationality or some other potential threat posed 
generally to people never targeted by the Nazi killing machine: in Arendt’s case her “theory” 
warns of the dangers posed by the banality of modern bureaucracy. One component of her 
argument that has been especially troubling for critics is the attention Arendt devotes to 
discussing the Jewish councils that were enlisted by the Nazis to organize the shipment of Jews 
to the death camps. Her critics seem troubled by the suggestion that if Eichmann is not 
recognized as a committed anti-Semite then this leaves less room to distinguish his involvement 
in the Holocaust from the Jewish councils. If a clear distinction is drawn between anti-Semites 
and Jews then this would make clear that the act of forcing Jews to participate in the murder of 
their own people is indicative of the sadistic impulses of a convinced Nazi like Eichmann. 
 Even in the Origins of Totalitarianism, where ideology is featured more prominently in 
Arendt’s argument, she is far less focused on its antisemitic content. Her emphasis is upon 
viewing ideology as a form of understanding that structures the way its followers mentally 
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comprehend and experience the surrounding world. While she contends that “the actual content 
of postwar antisemitic propaganda was neither a monopoly of the Nazis nor particularly new or 
original” what distinguished their usage was that it “was ingenious enough to transform 
antisemitism into a principle of self-definition, and thus to eliminate it from the fluctuations of 
mere opinion.”103 By making Judaism and Aryanism a hereditary characteristic, human volition 
was no longer viewed as having an impact on the key political determinant for the German 
people and the rest of the European peoples who came under Nazi control. Its ideology operated 
as a master narrative that fit all events into an interpretive scheme and even became part of what 
constituted these events through the consequences of its harsh organization of the population into 
categories of Aryans and non-Aryans.104 The animosity that has historically been directed 
towards the Jews has a clear affinity with the Nazis’ views but Arendt stresses that over and 
above the intense hatred characteristic of antisemitic belief the defining features of Nazi ideology 
were that it became both inescapable and all-encompassing in its scope for those under Hitler’s 
rule. Its explanation of events might be suspiciously repetitive for anyone who might stop and 
give a second thought to the idea that race uniformly explains everything that happens in the 
world but the key notion is precisely that the consistency of Nazi ideology fulfills the need for 
understanding without the faculty of thought having to be exercised. In the Origins Arendt 
observes that “human beings need the constant transformation of chaotic and accidental 
conditions into a man-made pattern of relative consistency” and argues “that totalitarian 
movements conjure up a lying world of consistency which is more adequate to the needs of the 
human mind than reality.”105 Ideology maintains an unmodified explanation of events “through 
sheer imagination” by which its followers “are spared the never-ending shocks which real life 
and real experiences deal to human beings and their expectations”.106   
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 Arendt’s suggestion that her coverage of the Eichmann trial shows she had overstated the 
impact of ideology in the Origins is somewhat complicated by her use of the same example in 
both works to illustrate the fanatical grip that ideological movements can have upon its 
followers. In the Origins she discusses the Nazi propaganda at the end of the war that promised 
that the Fuhrer “in his wisdom had prepared an easy death for the German people by gassing 
them in case of defeat”.107 She further shows in Eichmann the wide acceptance of this 
propaganda within the general populace by relating a story told by a doctor about a private 
German citizen “who was not a leader, may not have even been a party member” and was asking 
about receiving treatment for varicose veins as the Russian armies were quickly bearing down on 
their city.108 When the doctor advised this woman to be more concerned about evacuating the 
area before the arrival of the advancing Red Army she responded in a satisfied tone that “the 
Fuhrer will never permit it. Much sooner he will gas us” and much to his dismay the doctor notes 
that among others listening nearby “no one seems to find this statement out of the ordinary.”109 
The additional emphasis in Eichmann upon the pervasiveness of Nazi ideology among not just 
the upper party ranks but also the civilian populace seems to further conflict with her assessment 
that after covering the trial she realized her work in the Origins had overestimated the impact 
ideology had upon the followers of Nazism. 
 The shift in her position towards de-emphasizing the importance of ideology is made 
clearer through a consideration of the way the notion of agency is treated within these two 
works. This is a point noted by Corey Robin in an article written in response to the back and 
forth debate over the significance of newly released portions of the “Sassen interviews” 
conducted with Eichmann in Argentina that are the subject of Bettina Stangleth’s work Eichmann 
Before Jerusalem.110 Stangleth concludes from these interviews that the blatant antisemitism 
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Eichmann was willing to expresses in private shows that his performance at the trial managed to 
trick Arendt into thinking that he was simply some banal bureaucrat. Robin defends Arendt 
against this charge by suggesting that “banality” and “antisemitism” are not mutually exclusive 
notions and Arendt’s portrayal of Eichmann shows the way he exhibits both of these qualities.111 
Although not responding to Robin directly, Steven Aschheim challenges this argument by 
conceding that “Arendt’s insights – that genocide and bureaucratic banality are not necessarily 
opposed, that fanatical antisemitism (or for that matter, any ideological predisposition) is not a 
sufficient precondition for mass murder – remain pertinent”112 but still contends that the evidence 
Stangleth provides clearly indicates that anti-Semitic ideology was Eichmann’s primary interest 
and motivation for his involvement in the Nazi party. What could also be added to Aschheim’s 
criticism is that the idea that Eichmann took a lead role in the deaths of millions of Jews during 
the Final Solution but was not acting primarily from anti-Semitic motives is on its face a very 
counter-intuitive argument. 
 Aschheim uses Stangleth’s work to demonstrate the difficulties with describing Eichmann 
as banal but interestingly his depiction could be seen as offering confirmation for some of 
Arendt’s observations about Eichmann at his trial. This includes Aschheim’s description of 
Eichmann’s boastfulness, his inability to take into account the concerns of those he converses 
with and his repeated use of clichés without any concern for directly contradicting himself in 
what he says. Eichmann displays these traits in the Sassen interviews when he explains his great 
pride in having executed the Fuhrer’s will through his prominent role in the Final Solution while 
he is speaking to an audience of Holocaust deniers and Hitler apologists who want nothing more 
than one of the “great architects” of the Final Solution to deny that millions of Jews were 
murdered during Hitler’s reign. Eichmann also contradicts the claim he made during his trial 
85 
 
about adhering to Kantian morality and its universal moral precepts by reciting Nazi party 
slogans about artificially imposed “international” moral laws that lack the gravitas of the 
biological laws of racial struggle.113 Whereas Arendt recognizes Eichmann as continually see-
sawing between these types of contradictions without fully coming to rest on any one position 
over another, Aschheim argues that Eichmann is consciously playing different parts to different 
audiences. He suggests that the “true” Eichmann is the one who relishes his central role in 
having brought about the death of millions of “enemies of the Third Reich” and as a matter of 
principle refused to pander to his sympathetic neo-Nazi listeners by renouncing his previous 
involvement in Hitler’s plans.114 
 These two depictions of Eichmann agree that his actions during the Final Solution were a 
matter of choice and something for which he should be held accountable but they differ on the 
way to ensure that the discussion does not exclude a sense of volition from its considerations. 
The difference between these positions on this point is illustrated by the puzzlement Arendt 
expresses about those who criticize her work for making judgments about the participants in the 
Holocaust and repeat the argument against her that “judging itself is wrong; no one can judge 
who had not been there.” She responds to this criticism by noting that: 
This, incidentally, was Eichmann’s own argument against the 
district court judgment. When told there had been alternatives and 
that he could have escaped his murderous duties, he insisted that 
these were postwar legends born of hindsight and supported by 




A version of this argument was repeated even recently by the 104-year-old former secretary of 
Joseph Goebbels, Brunhilde Pomsel, who (in an explanation that seems almost as if postwar 
denials were dutifully passed down the Nazi ranks) defended her decision to work in the Third 
Reich’s propaganda ministry by suggesting that “the people who today say they would have done 
more for those poor, persecuted Jews I really believe that they sincerely mean it. But they 
wouldn’t have done it, either.”116 The charges against Eichmann or other Nazi supporters of 
privately holding anti-Semitic beliefs is meant to act as a safeguard against the claims that their 
involvement in the Final Solution was a matter of “just doing a job” without having full 
knowledge of its operations and/or the power to alter the course of its events. Stangleth and her 
supporters use the Sassen interviews to frame Eichmann’s involvement in the Final Solution as a 
question about the facts of what he personally believed and circumvent the questions about 
judging the activities committed in public during the reign of the Third Reich. These activities 
may seem easy to condemn in Eichmann’s case but harder to assess in the case of other 
participants117 and suggest the need to develop in both of these cases an understanding of 
judgment which is concerned with matters that cannot be resolved by an appeal to facts. 
 The title of Stangleth’s work seems to also reflect the idea that the exercise of volition is 
restricted to the private realm as the statements made by the Eichmann Before Jerusalem are 
more of a focal point for her analysis than the Eichmann in Jerusalem who appears and makes 
statements in public at his trial. The accusations against Eichmann of secretly holding antisemitic 
views not only seek to maintain the culpability of those who chose to become involved with the 
Final Solution but also lend support to the idea that individuals cannot be held responsible for 
their actions if they are part of an organization whose goals differ from what they personally 
believe. The concern with exempting the actions committed as part of an organization is 
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somewhat curious considering that to deny that Eichmann is accountable for his involvement in 
the Final Solution, whatever his level of enthusiasm for antisemitism, would be a fairly extreme 
position to take. It is especially puzzling as a way of criticizing Arendt for her “softness” towards 
Eichmann given her emphatic denial of any suggestion that coercion absolves Eichmann of his 
involvement in the Nazi organization. Quoting Mary McCarthy, Arendt suggests that “If 
somebody points a gun at you and says, ‘Kill your friend or I will kill you,’ he is tempting you, 
that is all.’”118 
The Phenomenon of Thoughtlessness 
 The way Arendt frames her discussion shows what a portrayal of Eichmann looks like 
that understands him to be conditioned by his involvement in the Nazi organization but still 
responsible for the actions he commits within it. How might this be reconciled with the criticisms 
of her work that suggest that Arendt’s references to the notion of the banality of evil are 
incompatible with the understanding that Eichmann is accountable for his part in the Final 
Solution? One striking aspect of her explanation in light of the extensive controversy that has 
ensued is how little attention she actually devotes to the phrase “banality of evil” within 
Eichmann in Jerusalem. This brevity is itself informative for understanding what Arendt aims to 
do in her writing as it underscores that she considers herself to be merely making an observation 
about Eichmann at his trial without attempting to fully work out the implications of the 
“phenomenon” she has observed.119 
 Aside from the subtitle, Arendt uses the phrase “banality of evil” in the very last line of 
her report on the trial when she is describing Eichmann’s execution and suggests his final words 
in which he repeats platitudes typically said of the deceased at a funeral almost conveniently 
drive home “the lesson” that above all Eichmann’s defining characteristic is his banality.120  Her 
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only other remarks in which she mentions the “banality of evil” appear within the postscript in a 
paragraph addressing the critics who were upset with her over the implications of her description 
of Eichmann. Arendt suggests in a “don’t shoot the messenger” type of response that she simply 
was observing the “fact” of Eichmann’s banality, which she contends was so obviously on 
display at his trial that it “stared one in the face.”121 She refers again to Eichmann’s final words 
and how plainly they make clear the “lesson” of him being banal, which is clearly not the same 
as trying to explain why this is a defining characteristic of one of the central figures in the Final 
Solution, nor explaining any other of the unsettling implications that may follow from 
recognizing that what defines Eichmann above all else is him being banal.   
 Arendt also briefly clarifies that she does not mean to suggest Eichmann is “stupid” by 
referring to him as banal but that he exhibits the quality of “thoughtlessness”122 to an extreme 
degree. His grasp of his surroundings is accomplished in a formulaic fashion – hence the heavy 
reliance on cliché – that seems to leave him without the ability to adjust his prior notions of the 
world and take into consideration the way others experience life from their perspective. 
Eichmann’s execution shows this thoughtlessness to not simply be a lack of empathy for others, 
as his inability to appreciate the way individuals form their experiences of the world also extends 
to himself and his own encounters with his surroundings. Instead of his last words being a 
reflection upon his life that he uniquely lived and experienced as “Eichmann” he simply recited 
these nice-sounding clichés typically said at funerals about the deceased. Eichmann faced his 
death as if he was having an “out-of-body experience” although without even having the ability 
to relate to or imagine what going through an execution would be like for the “Eichmann” who 
was about to be hanged. “Under the gallows, his memory played him the last trick” Arendt 
remarks, “he was ‘elated’ and he forgot that this was his own funeral.”123 
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 The description Arendt provides of Eichmann’s banality shows further affinity with her 
suggestion in the Origins that the followers of ideology “are spared the never-ending shocks 
which real life and real experiences deal to human beings and their expectations.” But 
importantly, what she observes about Eichmann does not seem to fit with her suggestion that 
ideology shields its adherents from reality by encasing them in an unwaveringly consistent and 
comprehensive worldview. Surprisingly, one of the top Nazi officials in charge of the Final 
Solution had little need to be inspired by a revolutionary spirit that sought to radically transform 
society according to the fantasies of racial purity. What sustains Eichmann’s involvement in the 
Final Solution is that “he merely, to put the matter colloquially, never realized what he was 
doing.”124 He drew satisfaction from using a bland turn of phrase to describe some of the most 
disturbing events the world has ever known and in Arendt’s words this disparity between what he 
experienced and the way he describes these experiences is “word-and-thought-defying.”125 
Although Arendt considers the criticisms that question her description of Eichmann as banal to 
have little merit or relevance she also suggests that she could have imagined an “authentic 
controversy” developing over her use of the phrase the “banality of evil” for the serious 
implications it has for a number of issues. This includes recognizing “the strange 
interdependence of thoughtlessness and evil”126 or the idea that an individual could do more 
harm by failing to appreciate what they were doing was wrong than by deliberately seeking to do 
harm. 
Thoughtlessness as an Empirical Pattern 
 One approach to take in considering the relevance of the banality of evil as a way to 
understand the Cambodian genocide would be to seek evidence of a pattern by identifying 
individuals that figured prominently in the organization of mass murder during the Cambodian 
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genocide and examining if they could plausibly be characterized as banal in the way that Arendt 
uses this term to describe Eichmann. Various accounts of Duch and his activities during the 
genocide suggest he might be a viable candidate for this type of comparison, including the 
account provided by the psychiatric evaluation used to determine his competency to stand trial, 
which concluded that Duch is normal in all respects expect for a notable lack of ability to see the 
world from the perspective of others.127 Duch also responds to the questions about his decision to 
not execute the few prisoners left alive in S-21 at the end of the war by explaining that he “didn't 
think about those people I was keeping for my own use. I never imagined that the Communist 
Party of Kampuchea would be overthrown ... That’s why they survived. Not because I had pity 
on them or had a plan for them. I simply did not think about them.”128 
 Duch and Eichmann also show themselves to be extraordinarily sharp at remembering in 
vivid detail events of interest to them personally even though they often forget the events that 
they were a part of which would be of greater significance to a general audience.129 In Duch’s 
case he had developed a friendship with a French prisoner, François Bizot, who was captured by 
the Khmer Rouge and was held in a prison camp that Duch ran prior to his assignment as director 
of S-21. Bizot later wrote a published work about his experiences in this camp and at trial Duch 
could recall the specific page numbers from the book that (for him) brought back fond memories 
of Bizot’s time as his prisoner,130 which was indicative of Duch’s attitude throughout Bizot’s 
testimony. Duch treated being on trial for mass murder as an occasion to catch up with an old 
friend and talk about the passages he liked from his book, even though Duch claimed he could 
not remember the descriptions from this same book of the murderous living conditions and 
torture that occurred within the camp under his command.131 
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 The selectiveness of Duch and Eichmann’s memories during their trials is not always to 
their advantage and on occasion what each of them recalls without provocation provides an 
opportunity for further incrimination. In Eichmann’s case Arendt observes that: “Even the judges 
had to admit that they knew no answer to the question: ‘Why did the accused confess before 
Superintendent Less to a number of incriminating details of which, on the face of it, there could 
be no proof of his confession, in particular his journey to the East, where he saw the atrocities 
with his own eyes?’”132 Duch’s conversion to Christianity and desire to confess his sins seems to 
inspire his willingness at the outset of his trial to admit wrongdoing for the activities he 
performed during the genocide while Eichmann speaks more from his tendency to be boastful 
about having done his duty, and done it so well. Duch also showed concern for his legacy as the 
former director of S-21 as he seemed to take pride in the “rational” approach he took towards 
running his prison. In one instance he compared his operations to the prisons in the area of 
Democratic Kampuchea under the control of Ta Mok by noting that Ta Mok “didn’t bother 
interrogating his prisoners ... He just killed them”133 suggesting his diligence in making sure to 
torture his inmates before their inevitable execution is a credit to Duch’s measured disposition. 
 The desire to protect his “life’s work” may even be seen as an explanation for Duch 
neglecting his orders to destroy S-21 and its mountain of documents. This mirrors Arendt’s 
suggestion that Eichmann grew tired of being a nobody and wanted to be found in hiding in 
Argentina in order to lay claim to the notoriety he gained since the war.134 She notes as well that 
Eichmann saw himself taking a reasoned approach to his task, although in Eichmann’s case he 
maintained his “rational” approach to orchestrating the mass murder of the Jews by claiming to 
have done only what was in fulfillment of his duty to the Fuhrer and by “humanely” avoiding 
any excess cruelty.135 The sense that Duch’s religiosity might not be entirely free of egotism 
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could also be argued by noting his interest in gaining renown as a repentant sinner. When he was 
initially confronted in hiding by Dunlop about his past and was compelled to reveal his identity 
as the former director of S-21 Duch went on in his confession to compare himself to St. Paul. His 
claim to this persona seems to have been undercut by both his attempts to use his trial as an 
occasion to employ his skills in the game of interrogation and confession136 and by his decision 
to ultimately recant his guilty plea at the end of his trial. Duch did so on the argument that he did 
not like the insinuation that he alone (or even primarily) was responsible for the killings 
committed by the Khmer Rouge and certainly his position on this point is not entirely without 
merit. 
 The idea that Duch displays a sense of “thoughtlessness” in these matters is more evident 
in the observations that Thierry Cruvellier provides throughout his coverage of Duch’s trial that 
as a skilled and seasoned interrogator he grew annoyed by the amateurism of the prosecuting 
lawyers who sought to make the case against him.137 Duch, who Cruvellier refers to as the 
“master of confessions,” even thought that from his experience with the to and fro of 
interrogation he would be capable of swaying court and public opinion in his favour –  as his 
“friend” Bizot had done to him years before in the M-13 prison – and eventually convince his 
captors to set him free. However, Duch’s defence is more reminiscent of the buffoonery 
displayed by Eichmann during his trial, considering that as part of his closing statement to the 
court Duch decided to win over his audience by reciting poetry. The poem he read out dealt with 
the subject of facing one’s fate bravely and Duch offered in commentary the suggestion that 
“sometimes we do a job we don’t like,”138 an observation that a witness for the prosecution 
answered by remarking that “I’m not sure that a truly honorable man could wish for anything 
other than fair retribution for the crimes of which he knows he is guilty.”139 Upon hearing this 
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Duch bowed deeply and respectfully in acknowledgment of the soundness of witnesses’ words, a 
gesture he had performed only one other time to a witness during the trial. Later on, after being 
handed down a thirty year sentence at the close of the trial, Duch chose to appeal the decision in 
search of a lighter sentence.140
    
 An approach that understands the relevance of the banality of evil for investigating 
genocide in terms of patterns of behaviour might also consider situations in which 
thoughtlessness is interrupted and determine if this type of interruption correlates with genocide 
prevention – an issue that is often a focal point for the study of genocide. A clue for identifying 
the situations in which this type of interruption occurs is offered by a fairly well-known, and 
gruesome, motivational speech that the head of the SS, Heinrich Himmler, gave to a killing 
squad under his command: 
This is one of the things that is easily said: “The Jewish people are 
going to be exterminated,” that’s what every Party member says, 
“sure, it’s in our program, elimination of the Jews, extermination – 
it’ll be done.” And then they all come along, the 80 million worthy 
Germans, and each one has his one decent Jew. Of course, the 
others are swine, but this one, he is a first-rate Jew. Of all those 
who talk like that, not one has seen it happen, not one has had to 
go through with it. Most of you men know what it is like to see 100 
corpses side by side, or 500 or 1,000.141 
Himmler contrasts the experience of his “hardened soldiers” with the hypocrisy and big talk of 
other apparently dedicated Nazis who lack a full commitment to the party’s extermination 
program on account of their personal fondness for some of the living, breathing individuals 
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targeted in the “Final Solution.” This tendency to make exceptions for a favoured few was not 
only evident among the rank and file members of the Nazi party that Himmler alludes to in his 
speech but reached all the way to the top to the Fuhrer himself who granted protection to a doctor 
in Austria classified as Jewish under Nazi law. Hitler extended his protection out of gratitude for 
the kindness the doctor had shown in treating his mother for cancer when he was an 
adolescent.142 In Eichmann’s case, he had shown concern for Dr. Josef Lowenherz, the head of 
the Jewish council of Vienna and on one occasion after losing his temper and slapping 
Lowenherz’s face he apologized to him in front of his Nazi staff.143 In Cambodia, Duch’s 
willingness to seek the release of Bizot came at personal risk and suspicion of his loyalty to the 
party and this type of suspicion of course could have meant his death sentence. Dunlop also 
describes Duch’s words about how he began to have doubts about the arbitrary nature of the 
arrests being made when his “friends and colleagues began to arrive at the gates of S-21,” 
becoming depressed and engaging in the “contemplative” activity of spending “more and more 
time with the artists and painters” interned at S-21.144 Of course whatever doubts Duch may have 
felt, he was able to continue his work at the prison and this is perhaps an indication that having a 
personal liking to those targeted in the killing is not a reliable form of genocide prevention, 
particularly if this is to be accomplished in a systematic fashion. 
 If the idea is taken into consideration that thoughtlessness can be used to identify a 
pattern of behaviour when discussing different instances of genocide then several points of 
comparison emerge from Eichmann and Duch’s appearances at trial. This includes the 
observation that each seems fixated on their personal biographies while remaining unconcerned 
with the events they were a part of that had an impact on world history. They both seem to show 
little care about their part in deciding the fate of others in matters of life and death, and what 
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concern they do show only ever seems to extend to their friends and personal acquaintances. 
They share the odd idiosyncrasy of rhyming off empty expressions that sound good to them in 
the moment but present obvious contradictions which trivialize their legal defences. They each 
describe their willingness to take part in genocide despite having personal misgivings about their 
willingness to comply, with Eichmann considering his continued involvement a matter of duty 
and Duch claiming that he came to the understanding that the communist principles he believed 
in had been corrupted by the Khmer Rouge and once he recognized this he only continued his 
involvement with the party as a way to survive. But even if a pattern of “thoughtlessness” can be 
identified empirically through evidence, perhaps more convincingly than what has been 
suggested anecdotally in this discussion by comparing these two figures, the issue of what 
conclusion is to be drawn from recognizing this pattern remains unclear. Would this mean that in 
situations where mass murder is the generally accepted practice that thoughtless compliance with 
the prevailing social order is inevitable or is “thoughtlessness” a derisive term that only refers to 
those (presumably others) who are “weak-minded”? If thoughtlessness is taken seriously as 
problem that is neither completely overwhelming nor completely avoidable then what is a 
possible response to the challenge it can pose? 
The Demand to Think 
 One example of a way in which to respond to thoughtlessness is the dialogue within 
Rithy Panh’s film Master of the Forges of Hell between Van Nath, one of the few remaining 
survivors of S-21, and a group of the prison’s former guards. This dialogue takes place at the site 
of the prison and involves the guards reenacting their routine and being interrogated by Nath 
about their involvement in the killing and torture that took place there on a daily basis. In his first 
meeting with the guards Nath speaks with them as a group and asks if they feel they were victims 
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of the Khmer Rouge to which they respond in the affirmative by contending they had no choice 
but to follow orders and do their job or else they would have been killed.145 Nath challenges this 
claim in the next scene by describing the gruesomeness of some of the atrocities committed in S-
21 and the diligence with which the guards performed these acts. When the guards respond that 
they simply did as they were told he retorts in a way that recognizes thoughtlessness to be a 
central concern: “Your ability to think as a human being, you lost it.”146 The idea of taking part in 
genocidal activities despite personal misgivings is discussed as a topic in the film by way of a 
story told by a former guard who recalls his encounter with one of the female prisoners, Nay 
Nan. “I had feelings for her,” he explains, “and I felt sorry for her. But at the time she was the 
enemy.” After growing frustrated at being “full of lust” but not being able to act upon his 
impulses the guard finishes his story by describing how he was then “full of hatred and ... beat 
the enemy.”147 
 Nath responds to the guards by explaining that he cannot accept excusing cruelty on the 
basis of needing to follow orders as this means “the end of our world, of justice. There are no 
more ideals and no more human conscience.”148 He then asks one of the guards, Huoy, what he 
was thinking when he took part in the prison’s horrors and his response is that he was “young 
and hot-blooded” and did not think about what he was doing, and that even today he tries to 
avoid thinking about what happened because it “gives him headaches.” He also explains that 
now when he goes out with friends his time at S-21 is the reason why he prefers to get drunk, 
come home and go to sleep. Nath then pointedly makes the comment that “for me it is not like 
that. For me, each of our meetings is very painful ... We only talk of this unbearable past, which 
we can’t escape. I can’t anyway. I’m trying to understand what happened, to make sense of it. I 
want to understand it.”149 Nath seems to be making a demand of the guard Huoy that applies both 
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to his time as a guard in S-21 and in the years since its closure that is akin to a demand Arendt 
makes in her reflections on the Eichmann trial. “If the ability to tell right from wrong should 
have anything to do with the ability to think,” Arendt writes, “then we must be able to ‘demand’ 
its exercise in every sane person no matter how erudite or ignorant, how intelligent or stupid he 
may prove to be.”150 The difficulty that Nath encounters with Huoy is that thoughtlessness seems 
to beget thoughtlessness – that even when Huoy acknowledges that he did not think and is still 
not thinking about what he did his response is not to try and develop a better understanding of a 
problem by working through its concerns but to repress these concerns with drunkenness and 
sleep. 
 In response to the extraordinary acts he committed Huoy reverts to the very common 
attitude of simply putting what bothers him out of his mind as either not worth, possible or 
desirable to think about. In other words, despite Huoy clearly recognizing that thoughtlessness is 
present in his activities involving genocide he does not take this as an occasion to deal with a 
problem. By contrast, Nath recognizes the thoughtlessness that is prevalent in the general 
willingness to comply with mass murder but unlike Huoy treats this as an occasion to begin 
developing an understanding of what being human means. Pahn’s film addresses the concern 
with “trying to understand what happened” at S-21 through a recreation of its events and Nath’s 
questioning also recognizes that to appreciate what the guard’s way of life looks like involves 
working through their understanding of events. The questions Nath asks shows his further 
concern for universal notions like justice and human conscience and his dedication to moving 
beyond simply accepting the guards’ claims by challenging their assertion that thoughtlessly 
complying with an order without considering the implications of its activities for human conduct 
was the only option available to them while living under the rule of the Khmer Rouge. 
98 
 
Thoughtlessness and Duty 
 The willingness to take part in genocide despite a distaste for the activities being 
performed that the former guards at S-21 claim to have adhered to in performing their duties for 
the Khmer Rouge is a form understanding that Jose Brunner focuses on in his article Eichmann’s 
Mind: Psychological, Philosophical and Legal Perspectives, and its discussion of Eichmann’s 
performance of his duty in the Third Reich. Brunner criticizes Arendt’s report on Eichmann from 
the somewhat unique perspective of focusing not upon her discussion of antisemitism or the 
conduct of the Jewish councils but upon her comments about the dubious merits of the discipline 
of psychology. Brunner begins his discussion of Arendt by quoting her claim “that half a dozen 
psychiatrists had certified [Eichmann] as normal,” noting “there is no trace of the evaluation of 
the six psychiatrists who, according to Arendt, evaluated Eichmann in prison” and that the two 
mental health experts who were in charge of his evaluation – the husband and wife team of Dr. 
Shlomo Kulcsar and Dr. Shoshanna Kulcsar – had also refuted Arendt’s claim about this 
matter.151 The core of Brunner’s argument against Arendt is that her portrayal of Eichmann as a 
banal and thoughtless bureaucrat may seem diametrically opposed to the view presented by the 
prosecution lawyer Dr. Hausner that Eichmann is utterly demonic (a view that has also 
dominated much of the criticism of Arendt’s book on the trial), but these two positions are 
similar in the more fundamental sense of offering a reductionist account of Eichmann as a 
simple, one-dimensional character. With respect to Arendt Brunner contends that her 
“understanding was directed exclusively at the diversity of visible and audible phenomena ... It 
left no room for mental archeology, which seeks the forces active in the dark recesses of the 
psyche, encoded in external experiences.”152 
 According to Brunner, Arendt’s phenomenological approach limits her to investigating 
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only “what can be seen or heard” and this precludes her from considering the influence the 
subconscious had upon the workings of Eichmann’s conscious mind.153 He argues that 
recognizing this influence would allow Arendt to appreciate the inner conflicts that made 
Eichmann into a banal, thoughtless bureaucrat. As part of his representation of Arendt’s notion of 
thoughtlessness Brunner refers to her account of the faculty of thought and her discussion of the 
two-in-one or the self-dialogue that individuals engage in that provides them with a conscience 
to evaluate the merits of their actions. Brunner then cites passages from the diary Eichmann kept 
in prison in which he describes conversing with “an inner ‘I’” and suggests that Eichmann has a 
version of inner dialogue that has an “uncanny” resemblance to Arendt’s “theory of thinking.”154 
This claim is hard to reconcile with a passage from Arendt that Brunner cites earlier in his article 
in which she suggests that in conversing with ourselves “we ... must not do anything that would 
make it impossible for the two-in-one to be friends and live in harmony”155 while the thoughtless 
person “will not mind contradicting himself.”156 Yet Brunner is attempting to demonstrate the 
complexity and thoughtfulness of Eichmann’s character by mentioning his discussion of the two-
in-one and showing the inner anguish and discord he experienced over the way he felt about the 
actions he committed in the service of the Fuhrer. Fittingly for Eichmann he makes reference to a 
cliché in order to explain his understanding of what this inner dialogue entails: “To use a familiar 
saying of my prewar years, if one cherishes ‘inner quiet serenity’ more than anything else, then 
one will do anything to restore order in the inner disarray, or at least try to do so.”157 Brunner 
elaborates on Eichmann’s words by suggesting he went along with the Third Reich “out of 
powerlessness not thoughtlessness” but in Arendt’s formulation the relevance of thinking to 
moral concerns makes the question of power irrelevant. As noted in the previous chapter the 
criteria she sets for individuals to determine the merits of their action is the “unwillingness to 
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live with a murderer – themselves.”158 
 Eichmann shows a thoughtless appreciation of thinking that has an “uncanny” 
resemblance not to Arendt’s explanation but to the way that Duch and the guards at S-21 discuss 
the relevance of thought to the performance of their duties. Both seem aware they denied 
thinking about their actions, Eichmann discussing the anguish he felt by not listening to the 
demands of the two-in-one and Duch and the guards (especially in the way articulated by the 
guard Huoy) acknowledging their own thoughtlessness and needing to dull the pain that their 
refusal to think brought upon them. Eichmann’s explanation that he “belonged to those who 
obeyed externally, who did nothing that would have placed them in conflict with their oath ... But 
their inner attitude led to a kind of personality split” seems just as answerable to one of the 
responses Nath makes to the excuses of the guards at S-21 for their going along with the prison’s 
activities: “I don't want to hear ‘obedience to Angkar.’ If everything only thinks Angkar, 
obedience, discipline, carrying out orders or be killed, it’s the end of our world. There are no 
more ideals and no more human conscience.”159   
Goffman and the Distaste for Duty 
 Brunner’s article and its focus on the notion of thoughtlessness within Arendt’s work has 
suggested focusing on the connection between thoughtlessness and the attitude of external 
obedience to actions that internally individuals consider to be distasteful. One way to develop an 
appreciation of this attitude as a phenomenon is to consider contexts where this type of 
external/internal division is maintained other than those involving the practice of genocide. An 
example of this is the discussion within sociologist Erving Goffman’s work The Presentation of 
Self in Everyday Life and the theory of social action he presents on the basis of his 
“dramaturgical model.” Goffman uses this model to draw a distinction between the front and 
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back stage with the front stage representing the region where individuals seek to play the role 
dictated to them by social convention and the back stage being the region for engaging in the 
preparations needed to perform the activities on the front stage. The example commonly used to 
explain Goffman’s theory is that of the job interview which involves meeting with the 
prospective employers (front stage) and the time spent in preparation for the interview (back 
stage). Goffman suggests that the back stage is also the place where an individual can “interrupt 
his performance for brief periods of relaxation”160 and feel more like themselves. He makes this 
point by citing Simone de Beauvoir’s description of women’s attitudes towards men versus their 
attitude towards other women and trumpets her description as offering “a rather vivid picture of 
this backstage activity.” In Beauvoir’s account when women are interacting with other women: 
What gives value to such relations among women is the 
truthfulness they imply. Confronting man woman is always play-
acting: she lies when she accepts her status as the inessential 
other ... [These histrionics] require a constant tension: when with 
her husband, or with her lover, every woman is more or less 
conscious of the thought: “I am not being myself” ... With other 
women, a woman is behind the scenes; she is polishing her 
equipment but not in battle ... she likes this warm easy relaxed 
atmosphere ...  For some women this warm and frivolous intimacy 
is dearer than the serious pomp of relations with men.161 
In certain ways Goffman’s account of the divide between the front and back stage (that he uses 
Beauvoir’s description to illustrate) shows an affinity with the internal/external divide discussed 
by Eichmann and by Duch and the guards at S-21. To be “conscious of the thought ‘I am not 
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being myself’” suggests individuals experience a divide on the front stage between the way they 
act externally and their thoughts internally about what they “truly” believe. Another way of 
seeing this could be to suggest that the accounts by Eichmann and by Duch and the guards at S-
21 do not mention the opportunity for individuals to be “themselves” in the presence of others 
and in Goffman’s terms these individuals have been left to fully internalize the back stage. 
 The lack of playfulness in the way Beauvoir describes “not being oneself” seems 
indicative of bad faith but at least conceivably there are contexts in which an individual can go 
along with something that they do not fully agree with and the consequences would be fairly 
innocuous from a moral standpoint: if someone chose to walk to the store with their friends even 
though they might prefer to jog the distance, for example. The moral implications of the situation 
discussed by Beauvoir also do not seem as dire as the circumstances associated with maintaining 
the posture of a divided self as a way to sustain an individual’s involvement in genocidal 
activities. An observation Goffman makes in another regard about the attitude of those in the 
front stage towards moral matters is however a bit more troubling than what he has to say about 
these issues when he is discussing Beauvoir. After Goffman suggests a division between moral 
and instrumental requirements, or duties performed that are ends in themselves and the “duties 
such as an employer demands of his employees” that are a means to an end, he then states that: 
We find that these two kinds of demands, moral and instrumental, 
seem to affect in much the same way the individual who must 
answer to them, and that both moral and instrumental grounds or 
rationalization are put forth as justifications for most standards that 
must be maintained. Providing the standard is maintained by 
sanctions and by a sanctioner of some kind, it will often be of 
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small moment to the performer whether the standard is justified 
chiefly on instrumental grounds or moral ones, and whether he is 
asked to incorporate the standard.162 
This idea that it will “be of small moment to the performer whether the standard is justified 
chiefly on instrumental grounds or moral ones” seems to offer a fairly accurate description of the 
banal and thoughtless way Eichmann performs his duty in the service of the Fuhrer and the way 
that Duch and the guards at S-21 instrumentally perform their duty in the interests of survival. 
The passage also has a striking resemblance to Arendt’s observation that under the Third Reich 
morality was treated as a matter of convention and could be changed like “table manners”163: 
“providing” it would seem “the standard is maintained by sanctions and by a sanctioner of some 
kind.” 
 A difficulty with applying Goffman’s characterization of the way morality is treated in 
the front stage to Eichmann and Duch’s views of moral concerns is that both Eichmann and Duch 
describe their participation in the Third Reich and the Khmer Rouge (respectively) as not always 
being a matter of them treating morality instrumentally. Eichmann claims that his initial decision 
to swear an oath to Hitler reflected his belief in the arguments made by the Nazi party about the 
injustice of the treaty of Versailles. He suggests when he learned of Hitler’s decision to 
exterminate the Jews that he “lost all joy in his work” – the same phrase (Arendt notes) he had 
used to describe a professional disappointment he had suffered while working as a vacuum 
cleaner salesman.164 The joy that Eichmann allegedly would have experienced prior to Hitler’s 
decision to pursue the Final Solution came from his orchestrating the forced emigration of the 
Jews from Nazi territory and his reaction to both of these policies seems to demonstrate the 
thought-defying way in which Eichmann shows a complete inability to appreciate the suffering 
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experienced by others. 
 Eichmann’s version of events might provoke debate over whether it reflects his 
thoughtlessness or his (poor) attempts to deliberately misrepresent his involvement in the Third 
Reich. This would mean debating whether to believe if he personally agreed with the Nazi 
movement but then became disillusioned with this movement and lost his joy in the work he 
performed for it as time went on or that he secretly agreed with its aims all along despite his 
statements to the contrary. Whether or not he is to be believed Eichmann’s contention – that his 
level of agreement with the policies of the Third Reich changed throughout the different 
“periods” of his involvement in this movement but that his participation in this movement was 
sustained by the compulsion he felt morally to fulfill his duty to the Fuhrer – his understanding 
presents the possibility of a very troubling relation to morality. This is the suggestion that 
Eichmann’s thoughtless relation to morality was provoked not by him treating his involvement in 
the Third Reich instrumentally but that his moral commitment to the Third Reich is what 
provoked him to treat his activities thoughtlessly. He viewed the oath he had made to Hitler as a 
final decision which he believed did not permit him to further reflect upon and develop his 
understanding of the actions he should pursue in different circumstances. 
 Duch’s account of his involvement in the Khmer Rouge seems to fit more closely with 
Goffman’s description of moral demands being treated instrumentally in the front stage. He 
describes his initial involvement in this movement as being inspired by his conviction and 
sincere belief in communism and considered its doctrines to offer the best solution to the troubles 
and hardships experienced by the Cambodian people. When he grew disillusioned with the 
movement (as discussed above) his contention is that he continued to perform his duties not out 
of a sense of a moral obligation to fulfill his oath but in the interests of survival. His way of 
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understanding the concern for survival was not given further thought nor developed beyond an 
unquestioned sense that life was preferable to death under the circumstances he faced. 
The Universal Understood through the Particular and the Particular Understood through 
the Universal  
 An implicit concern throughout this discussion of the banality of evil and the genocide in 
Cambodia has been the old philosophical problem of understanding the relationship between the 
universal and the particular. A challenge for comparing different instances of genocide has been 
to represent genocide and the (universal) content to which its subject matter refers and the 
content of each (particular) case of genocide in a way that gives both of these considerations 
their due. A concern for maintaining this balance between the universal and particular has been 
articulated by Anne Applebaum in her work on the Gulag prison system: 
Every one of the twentieth-century’s mass tragedies was unique: 
the Gulag, the Holocaust, the Armenian massacre, the Nanking 
massacre, the Cultural Revolution, the Cambodian revolution, the 
Bosnia wars among others. Every one of these events had different 
historical, philosophical, and cultural origins, every one arose in 
particular local circumstances that will never be repeated ... This 
book was not written “so that it will never happen again” as the 
cliché would have it. This book was written because it will almost 
certainly happen again ... We need to know why – and each story, 
each memoir, each document in the history of the Gulag is a piece 
of the puzzle, a part of the explanation. Without them, we will 
wake up one day and realize that we do not know who we are.165 
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Applebaum makes these comments in her chapter on “Memory” as part of her argument about 
the importance of remembering the impact of past incidents of genocide upon the current 
geopolitical landscape. She is making the case that any advantage gained from the practice of 
genocide cannot be considered an acceptable part of the regular flow of activities within the 
conduct of realpolitik or else “we become unrecognizable.” Her explanation implicitly 
incorporates an understanding of the universal and the particular that suggests that each informs 
the other and that the way to learn more about why genocide occurs is by investigating the set of 
circumstances in which it has taken place, while more can be known about how to respond in the 
global arena to a particular set of circumstances if what it involves can be classified as genocide. 
 Applebaum’s suggestion that further documentation provides more “pieces to the puzzle” 
for understanding what constitutes genocide seems to be in line with Dunlop’s explanation of 
what motivated his investigation of Cambodia. His focus is on developing an appreciation of its 
events by accumulating data that is historically and culturally relevant and he seems to envision 
that Duch’s testimony (once he is brought into custody) along with the photographs taken by the 
Khmer Rouge at S-21 are the type of documents that allow for “the facts to speak for 
themselves.” Dunlop acknowledges that his efforts to demonstrate that the events in Cambodia 
represent genocide ends in disappointment and his reaction seems to suggest the difficulty is 
associated not with an inability to acquire sufficient data but with understanding the meaning of 
these events through documentation alone. His response to the lack of interest in pursuing justice 
in relation to a genocide well-documented by the data that has been accumulated and his 
comment “what does this say about us?” suggest that something about the activity of genocide is 
significant to being human and that this significance is part of what makes genocide an important 
topic to consider. 
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 Through a consideration of Dunlop’s involvement in Duch’s case in which he implies that 
justice is a concern of universal significance to being human, the analysis examines Arendt’s 
coverage of the Eichmann trial for its focus on the importance in a legal setting of considering 
the relevance of the faculty of human thought for appreciating Eichmann’s case. The argument 
considers the possibility of interpreting her observations about Eichmann’s thoughtlessness or 
inability to engage in the activity of thinking as being representative of a pattern of behaviour 
that could be identified empirically in different instances of genocide. Eichmann and Duch’s 
appearances at trial were then compared on several points that could potentially support this 
pattern but the more pertinent question in the examination was considered to be the implications 
of suggesting that thoughtlessness is prevalent in cases of genocide, especially with respect to 
forming a response to these situations where it is prevalent. These considerations were taken up 
by the argument in its discussion of the ex-S-21 inmate Van Nath and his interrogation of the 
guards who had served in the prison. In this exchange Nath challenges the guards’ assertion that 
they had no other choice than to follow orders by stressing the importance of not losing the 
ability “to think as human beings,” and that accepting their explanation would mean the end of 
“our world, of justice, of human conscience.” The remaining part of this chapter will focus on 
developing an understanding of this concern for what is just that is cited in different ways by 
Dunlop and Nath and consider in what way an appeal to a universal notion of justice is relevant 
to consider in a discussion of the particular case of genocide committed in Cambodia. Through 
this discussion the analysis will work out its understanding of the relation between the universal 
and the particular and the significance that a consideration of each one has for the other. 
 One place to begin a discussion of the relation between the universal and particular is to 
consider the way this notion is understood when it involves sustaining a thoughtless response 
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towards the practice of genocide. As previously discussed, Eichmann describes his moral 
commitment to a universally binding duty that is essential for him to perform and that permits 
him to disregard thinking about the particular circumstances he is dealing with in different 
situations. Duch also describes having a sense of duty in his initial commitment to the Khmer 
Rouge and mentions that his indoctrination included being told to learn to be indifferent to the 
suffering of the party’s enemies that he would have tortured and killed.166 When he grew 
disillusioned with the movement Duch took a view similar to the one expressed by the guards 
interviewed in Pahn’s film. He described being in circumstances that were beyond his control 
and left him with no other option than to think about the “essential” thing of doing whatever he 
needed to do to survive. 
 This idea of disregarding the particular for the sake of the universal (Eichmann and his 
duty) or disregarding the universal for the sake of the particular (Duch and his focus on his day-
to-day survival) is an understanding that could be addressed by referring to a description Arendt 
offers of the faculty of judgment. She notes that judging “is the faculty to judge particulars 
without subsuming them under those general rules that can be taught and learned until they grow 
into habits that can be replaced by other habits or rules”167 which would seem to challenge the 
idea of blind obedience to duty. This emphasis on particularity does not exclude judgments from 
being reliant upon universal notions to make their assessments, which Arendt makes clear in 
distinguishing judging from thinking: 
The faculty of judging particulars (as Kant discovered), the ability 
to say, “this is wrong,” “this is beautiful,” etc., is not the same as 
thinking. Thinking deals with invisibles, with representations of 
things that are absent; judging always concerns particulars and 
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things that are close at hand.168 
Identifying a particular case as “wrong” or “beautiful” implies having some understanding of 
what is “just” or what is “beauty” even if the understanding of these notions is only partially 
worked out (or only ever could be). 
 Arendt also argues that particular examples can contribute to an understanding of the 
universal notions which they exemplify as she observes that: “Most political virtues and vices are 
thought of in terms of exemplary individuals: Achilles for courage, Solon for insight (wisdom) 
etc.”169 This would seem to imply that something could be learned about what the notion of 
justice means by examining its applicability to Eichmann’s case. One way to appreciate how this 
applicability has been shown is to consider the judgment that Arendt imagines rendering on 
behalf of the judges against Eichmann. As part of her explanation she addresses the “banality” of 
Eichmann’s activities – his claim that he unwillingly took part in the Final Solution – and the 
difficulty this claim poses for the Western legal tradition which makes its determination of 
criminality on the basis of intent. She argues that Eichmann’s circumstances are ones that require 
breaking precedence in a legal system also based upon legal precedence and endorses the idea of 
finding Eichmann guilty on the basis of the scale of his crimes regardless of his intentions 
towards them. 
 Arendt also contends that if the reasons for the judges’ decision to find Eichmann guilty 
and be executed were explained in a way that included placing more of an emphasis on the acts 
he committed than upon his intentions, “the justice of what was done in Jerusalem would have 
emerged to be seen by all.”170 She adds this emphasis upon acts over intentions when addressing 
Eichmann in the voice of the judges, and stating that 
you have carried out, and therefore actively supported, a policy of 
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mass murder. For politics is not like the nursery; in politics 
obedience and support are the same thing. And just as you 
supported and carried out a policy of not wanting to share the earth 
with the Jewish people and the people of a number of nations – as 
though you and your superiors had any right to determine who 
should and who should not inhabit the world - we find that no one, 
that is, no member of the human race, can be expected to share the 
earth with you. This is the reason, and the only reason, you must 
hang.171 
Arendt undercuts the argument of “just obeying orders” by equating obedience of a policy with 
actively choosing to support it and suggests that whatever Eichmann’s intentions may have been 
his support for a policy of mass murder is reason enough for him to be executed. What makes 
this policy an executable offense seems to parallel the sentiments expressed in her description of 
the non-participants in the Final Solution. Her suggestion (discussed in the previous chapter) was 
that these individuals could not live with themselves if they had to live with a self who was a 
murderer or destroys the notion of the self through a willingness to destroy other selfs. This 
understanding could be thought of as equivalent to the idea in the political arena that members of 
the human race cannot share the earth with others if this means sharing it with those who are 
willing to destroy the notion of a human race through a willingness to destroy the other groups 
who make up this race. 
 In light of what has been discussed in connection with the examples involving Dunlop 
and Nath, Arendt’s suggestion that “no one, that is, no member of the human race” would 
tolerate Eichmann’s presence is for this analysis the most significant part of what is stated in this 
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passage. One way to think of the distinction she is making is that it recognizes that a concern for 
what being human means can seem irrelevant in response to situations where the banal 
acceptance of an order to commit mass murder becomes the prevailing understanding. The 
possibility to pursue an understanding of what is “human” that involves notions that are 
universally recognized is shown through Dunlop’s example and the concern he has for justice 
when he perceives that this notion is being ignored, or Nath’s example of asking questions that 
emphasize the importance of notions like humanity, justice and our world when these notions 
have been given little to no consideration or Arendt’s example of talking about the importance of 
maintaining a focus on the notion of justice in a trial where this notion can come in and out of 
focus. These examples have developed an understanding of justice for this analysis that 
recognizes the importance of maintaining a sense of concern for what is just in response to 
situations involving genocide. They have also shown that a concern for what justice involves is 
neither exclusive to nor excluded from the formal legal process and this realization suggests that 
a focus on survival in response to what has occurred in Cambodia without concern for what is 
transpiring with the formal legal process – if indeed this is the primary concern of most 
Cambodians as Dunlop suggests – is possible to consider as a just response to the conditions 
being encountered. What would be required to appreciate the “justness” of those who respond in 
this way would be an examination on a case-by-case basis of what can be learned about justice 
from each of them. Nath’s questioning of the guards even suggests that a concern for what is just 
outside of a court setting was not only possible but the needed response for those in their position 
who were asked to routinely engage in killing and torture. Finally, the discussion of justice has 
been an example for this analysis to develop its understanding of the relation between the 
universal and particular. The understanding that a sense of a universal concept is worked out 
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through the particular cases to which it is applied and that (conversely) the particular can be 
understood through reference to universals has been shown by the understanding of the notion of 
justice that has been developed by discussing the examples of Dunlop, Nath and Arendt’s 
investigations of genocidal situations, and by the way in which an understanding of their 






















The Order of Evil(s) 
 So perhaps we shall not miss so very much after all, while Josephine, for her part, 
delivered from earthly afflictions ... will happily lose herself in the countless throng of the heroes 
of our people, and soon, since we pursue no history, be accorded the heightened relief of being 
forgotten along with all her brethren.172 
 – Franz Kafka, “Josephine the Singer, or the Mouse Folk” 
Introduction 
The discussion in the previous chapters of the applicability of the banality of evil to the 
cases of Rwanda and Cambodia developed a sense of the importance of considering the “good” 
of an activity as well as a concern for understanding the meaning of notions thought to be of 
universal significance. The analysis also sought to demonstrate that an understanding of these 
universal notions is formed by considering the particular cases to which they are applied. This 
demonstration was pursued by showing that its understanding of what a concern for justice 
means in relation to the Cambodian genocide was not something known to the analysis in 
advance but worked out over the course of its investigation of this case. A reoccurring issue 
throughout this discussion has been to consider the claim of those who suggest they supported 
the practice of genocide in spite of a personal distaste for the activities involved in its 
performance. Several versions of this claim have been examined including the suggestions about 
“just following orders,” the “internal immigrant,” Eichmann’s concern for duty, the idea of the 
front and back stage in Goffman’s work and the focus on survival described by Duch and the 
former guards at S-21 that were interviewed in Rithy Panh’s film.   
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 The focus in this chapter on investigating a possible connection between bureaucracy and 
banal forms of evil will seek to develop an understanding of the way in which social order is 
constituted such that it sustains and is sustained by a view that considers involvement in 
genocidal practice to be permitted by the separation of private and public concerns. To begin 
addressing these considerations the first part of the chapter will focus on the way the problem of 
not thinking is addressed by Arendt prior to her discussion of this issue in her coverage of the 
Eichmann trial. In perhaps the most well-known of these earlier writings, The Human Condition, 
she indicates that its focus involves the “thoughtlessness” that plagues our times and which she 
seeks to respond to by “thinking what we are doing” and examining the way human activity has 
been understood throughout the Western tradition. A main concern for Arendt in her review of 
this tradition is the extent to which passivity has been regarded as central to the performance of 
human activity. Her argument suggests that as passivity has crept into the understanding of 
human activity it has discouraged concern for what transpires in its affairs, including an interest 
in discussing either the “good” or “evil” that is done in the public arena. In this situation where 
matters of “good” and “evil” are essentially “nobody’s business” evil goes unchecked and to 
better appreciate the impact this can have Arendt devotes part of her discussion to considering 
the notion of evil. Her understanding of this notion seems to evolve over the course of her 
writings but ultimately Arendt appears to suggest that banal, criminal and radical forms of evil 
can all be identified as being a part of the Third Reich’s efforts to carry out the Final Solution. 
 For the analysis in this chapter and its interest in social order Arendt’s observations 
suggest a problem to develop concerning the way in which a society can possibly be ordered 
such that different forms of evil can not only exist together but are compatible with one another 
in working towards the same ultimate aim of carrying out genocide. What will be suggested in 
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the discussion is that banal, radical and criminal forms of evil each involve a sense of “banality” 
through their acceptance of the understanding that what is allowable in public is a constraint 
upon what is believed privately. The argument then discusses the organized attempt to instill 
order in society by engaging in an examination of bureaucratic administration as its case to work 
out an understanding of the extent to which social order is possible for society to impose upon its 
members. This investigation begins its discussion with a consideration of Weber’s work and its 
well-known arguments about the “iron cage,” which is an understanding that is seen as 
comparable to Arendt’s early arguments about ideology and its aim to instill a sense of total 
domination in the way that society is organized by its governing powers. This view that stresses 
the potential for total dominance will then be critiqued with reference to a passage from the work 
of the sociologist Georg Simmel in which he suggests that the “variable requirements of practical 
social life” typically “clash” with the demands of bureaucratic organization and frustrate its 
attempts at imposing order. 
 The final part of the chapter considers the understanding of social order that has been 
developed through the discussion of bureaucracy and reflects upon the way in which this order is 
related to the requirements of practical social life that are generated by everyday concerns. This 
focus sets up the discussion in the concluding chapter of this writing upon the work of Harold 
Garfinkel and his concern with the sense-making practices of everyday members. A brief note is 
made of the interlocutors who will be introduced in the discussion of Garfinkel’s work – Plato, 
Latour and the collaborative writings of Alan Blum and Peter McHugh – which will be 
incorporated as part of the discussion of Garfinkel’s use of breaching experiments. Garfinkel 
refers to these experiments as “aid to a sluggish imagination” and with a lack of imagination 
being noted as part of Arendt’s criticism of Eichmann the work of each of the interlocutors 
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mentioned are discussed in relation to considering in what way an imaginative understanding of 
everyday sense-making practices might contribute to an appreciation of what is included and 
excluded by such practices. 
The Desk Murder: Evil as Ideology Versus Evil as Thoughtlessness 
 Arendt’s critique of modernity in The Human Condition and its discussion of the dangers 
of the bureaucratic “rule of nobody” might seem to provide her with a ready-made explanation to 
account for an Eichmann-like figure emerging within the Third Reich. Although this critique 
makes no direct references to Nazism and only mentions the word “totalitarianism” in passing on 
two occasions her close paraphrasing of arguments previously made in the Origins of 
Totalitarianism suggest this subject area was influential in her writing of The Human Condition. 
The case for meshing these arguments with her report on the Jerusalem trial is, however, not 
entirely clear-cut. In one of the passages where totalitarianism is referenced in The Human 
Condition Arendt endorses the position she takes in her earlier work about the tremendous if not 
near inescapable impact that ideology has upon those held under its sway. This view is hard to 
align with her findings from the Eichmann trial considering her remark after covering these 
proceedings that she felt she had previously overestimated the importance of ideology upon its 
followers.173 But Arendt’s stated support in The Human Condition for the idea that ideology 
becomes practically all-encompassing in a totalitarian form of government is quite literally 
marginal to the main argument of this work and suggests the core concerns of her argument 
could still be relevant to her discussion of the banality of evil even with her changing appraisal 
of the importance of ideology.   
 The decision not to connect her arguments in The Human Condition with her 
observations from the Eichmann trial suggests that either Arendt failed to appreciate the 
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relevance of her critique of modernity to the banality of evil or that this critique does not 
adequately account for the phenomenon she observed in Jerusalem. Some indication of the way 
Arendt sees this matter is suggested by her analysis of the mental faculties of thinking, willing 
and judging in The Life of The Mind. In the introduction to the volume on Thinking, Arendt 
describes her interest in examining the connection between the activity of thinking and the evil174 
that was displayed by Eichmann during his appearance at trial. The other focal point in this 
introduction is the closely related but separate issue of analyzing the activity of thinking in and 
of itself which was an issue she had touched upon but left out discussing at length in The Human 
Condition. The way she frames this discussion suggests that The Life of the Mind builds upon 
and continues her critique of modernity in The Human Condition and a quick review of its 
arguments will help to understand the response she offers to the banality of evil in this later 
work. 
The Vita Activa from the Perspective of Eternity 
 Arendt’s main concern in The Human Condition is to assess the focus of human activity 
at different stages of Western history. She argues that modernity represents the worst era in this 
history and that the worst of modernity is represented by the activity that promotes the 
development of totalitarianism. Her argument has a Heideggerian sensibility to it not only in its 
pessimistic outlook towards modernity but also in its suggestion that modernity’s troubles are 
associated with a “forgetfulness” on the part of human beings towards what is most important to 
them. In her explanation this forgetting is in relation to human activity rather than the 
Heideggerian emphasis upon a neglect of matters that are essential to Being. She pays particular 
attention to the way a focus on the labouring activity has excluded a concern for both work and 
action although without this exclusion ever being total or complete. Arendt cites the invention of 
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the telescope by Galileo as an act of fabrication (which is the hallmark of work) that is a key 
development for ushering in the modern age and she also makes the general observation that 
modern scientists “have turned out to be the only ones left who still know how to act and how to 
act in concert.”175 She traces the endurance of the scientific community as a community back to 
the legacy of the Royal Society, which insisted that its members avoid outside influence upon the 
work they carried out as a group. This independence gave an integrity to this community that 
granted its members the capacity to perform action that “started something new”176 in the world 
as demonstrated in the initiative scientists have shown in devising an understanding of the 
“unearthly” worlds shown by the telescope and the microscope. The trouble with these activities 
as far as their political significance is concerned is that this “action of the scientists, since it acts 
into the natural world from the standpoint of the universe and not into the web of human 
relationships, lacks the revelatory character of action as well as the ability to produce stories and 
become historical, which together form the very source from which meaningfulness springs and 
illuminates human experience.”177 
 This view of the world from “the standpoint of the universe” is a key notion for the 
position Arendt’s argument takes in analyzing the way human activity was appraised and 
understood in Antiquity. This standpoint originated from a view of the world suggested by 
contemplation and was used as the standard for assessing the merits of all other forms of human 
activity. Arendt observes that the “elevation” of contemplation to the position of not only the 
highest of human activities but an experience that all other human activity is to be measured 
against has been instrumental for the traditional understanding of human activity that (allegedly) 
separates the vita activa from the vita contemplativa, or thought from action.178 This separation is 
a move that has lumped together and made indistinguishable to traditional understanding the 
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activities of labour, work and action. As a consequence the different ways of achieving 
permanence through each of these activities – through procreation, the creation of enduring 
objects and the performance of immortal acts – were considered to be merely fleeting attempts in 
comparison to the eternal objects fixated upon in the act of contemplation that are everlasting 
and true. Arendt represents the vita contemplativa as an “Archimedean point” used to survey and 
appraise human activity but this position “from up high” has made the objects “below” seem 
indistinguishable from one another even though they are all within its range of vision. 
 The confusion with the craftsman’s distinct experience of contemplation that takes place 
as part of their act of making objects in the world is one case that shows the misunderstanding 
involved in using the vita contemplativa to comprehend the other activities that transpire within 
the vita activa. The craftsman works from an ideal model that they gaze upon in their mind and 
from the understanding of the tradition of thought the craftsman’s image has been viewed as a 
step towards achieving the experience of contemplative wonder that is typical of philosophical 
contemplation. In glimpsing at this model all that is left for the craftsman to do (or not to do) is 
to “let his arms drop” instead of working to fashion an object after their ideal image but Arendt 
contends that “contemplation, in this respect, is quite unlike the enraptured state of wonder with 
which man responds to the miracle of being.”179 In practice the idea which the craftsman works 
from is inseparable from the making of the object for which it serves as a model. This point is 
illustrated by the common notion of an idea being “a source of artistic inspiration,” which would 
be odd to speak of if this idea inspired an artist to create a poem or a painting without also 
inspiring them to do the work of making the object. Arendt suggests that the philosopher’s 
contemplation of the eternal is actually being misunderstood when conflated with artistic 
contemplation and argues that “the motionlessness which in the state of speechless wonder is no 
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more than an incidental, unintended result of absorption, becomes now the condition and hence 
the outstanding characteristic of the vita contemplativa.”180 Essentializing the stillness of this 
experience is also supportive of the view that the movement involved in the conduct of human 
worldly affairs is unnecessary and to be avoided. 
 Arendt argues that eventually this Archimedean point would turn back on itself181 and the 
eternal objects perceived in the state of contemplation come to be viewed as external to the 
contemplator and (by virtue of its own understanding) were regarded as being part of the external 
world whose affairs were to be avoided. What would have a tremendous impact on modernity 
once the experience of contemplation was emptied of its contents and eventually jettisoned from 
the “vita activa itself and hence [from] the range of ordinary human experience”182 is that the 
disdain for worldly affairs still remained as a constitutive element of human understanding. The 
notion of Cartesian doubt is reflective of this development in its considering all objects external 
to human consciousness to be unreliable as a source of knowledge. It then directed its focus upon 
explaining scientifically subjects whose material is authored through human activity.183 In 
relation to the world of human affairs this study includes human history explained not in terms of 
unpredictable acts of human volition but by the unfolding process of predictable historical laws;  
in the natural world this concerns a study of natural phenomena once they have been constrained 
by means of human intervention. This intervention involves the use of tools created by human 
hands such as the telescope and/or by the use of the controls imposed by scientific forms of 
experimentation. 
Passivity and “Thinking What We Are Doing” 
 What is perhaps surprising about Arendt’s response to the way the perspective suggested 
by the Archimedean point tumbles through Western history and (alongside other developments) 
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eventually lands itself into the difficulties presented by modernity is that to work through these 
difficulties she turns to the activity of thinking. In the Prologue of The Human Condition Arendt 
lays out the aims of her work using terms that are very familiar to her later discussion of the 
banality of evil in Eichmann in Jerusalem: 
What I propose in the following is a reconsideration of the human 
condition from the vantage point of our newest experiences and 
our most recent fears. This, obviously, is a matter of thought, and 
thoughtlessness – the heedless recklessness or hopeless confusion 
or complacent repetition of “truths” which have become trivial and 
empty – seems to me among the outstanding characteristics of our 
time. What I propose to do is very simple: it is nothing more than 
to think what we are doing.184 
Arendt makes the argument for distinguishing between thinking and contemplation and one way 
she explains the difference between the two is by contrasting the passive state in which objects of 
contemplation are perceived and the activity of thinking, arguing that “if no other test but the 
experience of sheer activity were to be applied to the various activities within the vita activa, it 
might well be that thinking as such might surpass them all.”185 She emphasizes this point in the 
closing lines of The Human Condition by quoting the Roman philosopher Cato’s paradoxical 
description of the two-in-one or self-dialogue that is involved in the activity of thinking: “Never 
is he more active than when he does nothing, never is he less alone than when he is by 
himself.”186 
 Arendt considers thinking to be an endangered activity in the modern age where the 
model for human conduct is statistical regularity and compliance with societal norms. The 
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contrast between this age which “may end in the deadliest, most sterile passivity history has ever 
known”187 and the highly active state of thinking suggests that her criteria for evaluating human 
activity is the level of activity involved in its performance or the degree to which an activity is 
active or passive. Of labour, work and action she considers labour to be the most passive activity 
in that its engagement with the world occurs through meeting the demands of biological 
existence. Troublingly, the passivity described at the end of the modern age becomes even more 
extreme than this with technological advancement eliminating the need to perform labouring 
tasks. This has created a “society of jobholders” whose activities in a sense fall outside of the 
vita activa by lacking even the labouring activity’s minimal engagement with the world and the 
initiative that it requires for individuals to fulfill the necessities of life. This state of affairs is one 
that Arendt describes in very gloomy terms: 
Laboring is too lofty, too ambitious a word for what we are doing, 
or think we are doing, in the world we have come to live in. The 
last stage of the laboring society, the society of jobholders, 
demands of its members a sheer automatic functioning, as though 
individual life had actually been submerged in the over-all life 
process of the species and the only active decision still required of 
the individual were to let go, so to speak, to abandon his 
individuality, the still individualy sensed pain and trouble of living, 
and acquiesce in a dazed, “tranquilized,” functional type of 
behavior.188 
Modernity in this “last stage” takes the view that all of human existence is determined by the 
labouring activity, but with the need to actually perform labour no longer a concern in the 
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jobholding society, the focus of activity is directed towards consumption. Human existence then 
lacks any sense of permanence as the objects of consumption simply vanish after making their 
appearance in the world without leaving a humanly recognizable trace.189 The understanding that 
the demands of the labouring activity unavoidably determine all of human existence also adds 
the difficulty of making human activity unrecognizable to its own authors as this understanding 
and its concern with meeting the needs for survival that are predetermined removes the sense of 
there being any choice about the form human activity will take in its performance. 
The Umpire 
 These concerns with the passivity of the modern age emerge again in Arendt’s volume on 
Thinking in The Life of the Mind as part of her discussion of Kafka’s short parable HE. This 
parable depicts the struggle of the unknown figure “He” and is used by Arendt as a sketch of the 
way in which the activity of thinking transpires. “He’s” struggle is with two equal and opposing 
forces, one that pushes him ahead and one that pushes him from behind, and each support “He” 
in his fight against the other force. The “dream” of He, Kafka explains, is that “he will jump out 
of the fighting line and be promoted, on account of his experience in fighting, to the position of 
umpire of his antagonists in their fight with each other.”190 Arendt interprets the parable as a 
description of the way human beings insert themselves into the eternal flow of time and break it 
up into the tenses of past, present and future.191 She speaks approvingly of Kafka’s representation 
of the way this takes place noting that “He” (who she notes is not an anonymous “somebody”) 
fights for his position in time and is not “just a passive object that is inserted into the stream to be 
tossed about by its waves that go sweeping over his head”192 but deflects the course of time in a 
new direction. Arendt also offers a criticism of Kafka’s account that is reminiscent of her 
concerns about the Archimedean point in The Human Condition as she is weary of the idea that 
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“by jumping out of the fighting line ‘He’ jumps out of the world altogether.”193 She describes the 
position of the umpire to be more like “the quiet in the center of a storm which, though totally 
unlike the storm, still belongs to it.”194 
 This position in the centre is the place of thinking in time at the present moment “now” 
that has as its object of concern the meaning of the events from the past behind it and the future 
ahead of it, its thoughts being composed of these events but without being determined by them in 
their course. The duration of this moment “now” lasts only as long as the thinking activity 
continues: otherwise time continues to pass along unbroken without a concern for what it means. 
Of note, Arendt recognizes throughout her discussion of thinking a fundamental indeterminacy 
that distinguishes it from other productive activities, including even mental ones like reasoning, 
which aims at arriving at truth. Thinking’s examination of the “never ending affairs of human 
existence” takes place without ever “arriving at a final solution to their riddles but ready with 
ever-new answers to the question of what it all may be about.”195 Although Arendt does not seem 
to use the phrase “final solution” with any intended irony, the understanding that the meaning of 
events can be rethought provides a clear contrast to the fatalistic outlook of totalitarian 
movements and the Nazis’ interest in “eliminating the Jewish problem,” as well as Eichmann’s 
stated refusal to disobey a Führerbefehl once he had sworn his oath. The focus on meaning also 
reflects the importance of speech throughout Arendt’s discussion of human activity, including her 
remarks in The Human Condition about the inability of scientists to speak about the significance 
of their acting in the world. She attributes this inability to their reliance upon the use of 
mathematics, which could be thought of as the language of the Archimedean point. Its 
propositions such as notions like non-Euclidean forms of geometry or even the use of more basic 
concepts like that of infinity cannot be translated back into terms that are relatable to human 
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experience. The inability to speak also figures prominently in Eichmann in Jerusalem in Arendt’s 
observations about Eichmann’s heavy reliance on the use of cliché. She considers his use of these 
meaningless phrases to reflect his thoughtless lack of concern for the significance of his actions. 
Judgment and Taste 
 If thoughtlessness refers to an inability to think of the meaning of things in new ways, the 
question might be asked about whether this inability also excludes the possibility of doing 
something new. The newness of action seems relevant in accounting for the phenomenon of 
Nazism considering the obvious impact that WWII had in changing the course of the twentieth 
century. The central involvement of the Nazi movement in events of historical significance might 
be seen as presenting a challenge for Arendt’s discussion of the faculty of the will, whose 
greatness she describes in terms of its ability to start something new through the performance of 
novel deeds.196 Arendt does however make an important distinction between great and monstrous 
deeds in her account of the will’s capacities197 and one way to appreciate this account of this 
faculty is through a comparison to her explanation of thinking. Much in the way that thinking has 
the ability to begin a train of thought that brings new meaning to events the will has the capacity 
to begin a new chain of events that extends into the future in unpredictable ways. 
 The understanding that thinking in the sense of the ability to tell right from wrong is a 
capacity that Arendt contends is to be demanded of every person of sound mind (as discussed in 
the previous chapter) also has a certain parallel in her account of the will. Its capacity for 
freedom is not an acquired power or talent possessed by a select few but is unavoidable for every 
person who by virtue of being born literally gives birth to a new series of events that are uniquely 
their own. Individuals are, however, typically reluctant to accept their capacity for freedom. The 
sense of responsibility this imposes is felt to be especially burdensome in relation to starting a 
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chain of events whose consequences unfold in an unpredictable way. This implies that 
individuals are responsible for the occurrence of future events when they cannot possibly foresee 
the way in which these events will transpire. A resource for dealing with the uneasiness 
experienced towards the will’s capacity for freedom is “another mental faculty, the faculty of 
Judgment, an analysis of which at least may tell us what is involved in our pleasures and 
displeasures.”198 Judgment offers a way to deal with the uncertainty of events by presenting the 
opportunity in reflection to evaluate the merits of a course of action that was, is or is to be willed. 
This would seem to imply that independent of their degree of impact upon human history the 
deeds performed by the Nazis could be evaluated on the basis of a judgment about whether they 
are to be considered great or monstrous. Arendt’s appeal to judgment as a way to respond to the 
unforeseen consequences of willing to do something new is interesting to compare to her 
discussion of action and the way in which through its own capacity for promise-making and 
forgiveness this faculty can deal with the uncertainty generated by its ability to start something 
new. Her response to what Eichmann had done during the Final Solution involved rejecting the 
idea of forgiveness since in her view Eichmann lacked the thoughtfulness required to show 
himself as a person and “in granting pardon, it is the person and not the crime that is forgiven; in 
rootless evil there is no person left to forgive.”199 
 A difficulty with investigating Arendt’s discussion of judgment is that she had just begun 
writing her volume on this faculty shortly before her death and it remains unfinished, with only 
an epigraph from Cato having been written into her typewriter. Nevertheless, one important 
component of her account of this faculty is its association with the sense of taste. As mentioned 
in the previous chapter she references the Kantian idea about the importance of examples for 
making judgments, particularly ones that stand out and “exemplify” the notion under 
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consideration. Arendt mentions Achilles as an example of courage to illustrate the way an 
example “remains a particular which in its very particularity reveals the generality which 
otherwise could not be defined.”200 She also describes taste operating negatively by virtue of its 
capacity to provoke disgust either towards objects considered aesthetically unpleasing or towards 
activities considered morally repugnant. One instance where distaste could be observed in 
relation to the activities of those who carried out the Final Solution is Himmler’s reaction during 
his visit to the small city of Poznań, Poland in which he became physically sick after witnessing 
the shooting of Jews. Himmler then felt compelled to make his infamous speech to boost the 
morale of the soldiers serving in the killing squads and overcome the distaste they might be 
feeling towards their activities by praising them for both their ability to “endure” the act of 
killing while remaining “decent” and for their part in “a glorious chapter” of history “that has not 
and will not be spoken of.”201 The well-known Arendt scholar Elisabeth Young-Bruehl also 
recognizes Arendt referencing her understanding of judgment in her analysis of Eichmann’s 
testimony by noting that he too had been disgusted after witnessing the killing of Jews with his 
own eyes. Young-Bruehl notes Eichmann’s statement that a key influence upon his decision to be 
involved in the Final Solution was that “no examples in his environment, no communicated 
judgment of others, stood in his way”202 since “he could see no one, no one at all, who actively 
was against the Final Solution.”203 
 The instances involving Himmler and Eichmann suggest that judgment was a relevant 
consideration for the activities they each engaged in during the Final Solution but that their 
assessments about what they judged to be right or wrong were simply cast aside and ignored. 
Their willingness to go along with what disgusted them as well as Eichmann’s lack of 
imagination in not thinking to look to other examples of how to act besides those which he saw 
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immediately around him could certainly be criticized by others (or themselves) afterwards for the 
judgments they chose to make in these circumstances. The importance of assessing the merits of 
what others had done during Nazi rule is something that Arendt considers in need of stressing 
after witnessing the backlash against her coverage of the Eichmann trial for the way she is 
“judging others.” This suggests developing an understanding that is receptive to the possibility of 
making these sorts of judgments after the fact and considers making them to be more than a 
futile exercise while also recognizing that judgment – even when its sensibilities are present 
within an individual – offers no guarantee of acting as a deterrent against participating in 
atrocities in either the case of ourselves or others. Arendt recognizes this to be so in stating that 
“since this question of judging without being present is usually coupled with the accusation of 
arrogance, who has ever maintained that by judging a wrong I presuppose that I myself would be 
incapable of committing it?”204 Her conclusion is not to suggest a form of moral relativism of 
“anything goes,” but in response to the possibility that each one of us could engage in 
wrongdoing, focuses on developing a clearer understanding of what judgment involves as a way 
in which to avoid its pitfalls. 
Genocidal Deterrence: The Human Conscience and Thinking 
 A central concern of Arendt’s discussion of the connection between thoughtlessness and 
evil is identifying the forms of deterrence that prevented individuals from supporting the Third 
Reich. The interest in examining this connection that she developed after covering the Eichmann 
trial involves her considering the possibility of thinking becoming an active form of deterrence 
against genocidal practices. This may seem counterintuitive on account of her characterization of 
thinking as an unproductive activity that appears to do nothing.205 A key distinction she makes in 
her explanation of thinking is between the idea of a conscience that is considered to be an 
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internalization of laws (moral and legal), which impose an ever-present set of social norms each 
of us feels commanded to conform to, and the notion of a two-in-one or self-dialogue that we 
have with ourselves in thinking that alerts me about what we cannot do. Arendt seems to take a 
Kantian view of the notion of having a conscience that operates as a stand-in for the symbolic 
order by making an argument that implies obeying what the conscience demands is 
representative of an instance of moral hegemony. The dictates of the human conscience are 
understood to be externally imposed upon an individual and they will remain susceptible to the 
moral weakness of disobeying its dictates no matter how strong the pressure to conform to the 
expectations of society is exerted upon them by their conscience.  
 After her coverage of the Eichmann trial Arendt’s focus in moral matters is directed more 
upon the dangers that can be associated with obeying the expectations of society. Initially, her 
explanation of the human conscience seems to stress the importance of maintaining a sense of 
moral integrity to avoid misdeeds, even if she is suggesting that this integrity is susceptible to 
being corrupted by other sources of influence. But this view seems at odds with her 
characterization of morality as “table manners,” which she offers in critique of the way that 
under Nazi rule the vast majority of individuals readily exchanged one set of “customs” (e.g. 
thou shalt not kill) for another (thou shalt kill) to suit the times. As part of this critique Arendt 
observes that it is the members of “respectable society” or those who were the most greatly 
attached to the previous order who also were the most willing to accept the dictates of a new 
order.206 This suggests that individuals went along with and supported the Nazi regime not as a 
matter of the moral weakness of lacking a commitment to what their conscience demands be 
done to conform to the expectation of society, but from a too-willing adherence to the external 
pressure to obey what the “conscience” commands. The apparent incongruence of these 
130 
 
explanations could perhaps be reconciled by recognizing that the difficulty in both the case of the 
moral weakness of disobeying the dictates of conscience and the need for “respectable society” 
to stay attached to the expectations of society is reflective of moral hegemony and points to the 
importance of an individual’s sense of right and wrong being self-legislated.   
 The way in which Arendt addresses the issue of deterrence in relation to the faculty of 
thinking is by postulating that “if there is anything in thinking that can prevent men from doing 
evil, it must be some property inherent in the activity itself, regardless of its objects,”207 meaning 
that thinking can prevent evil even if its object of concern is not necessarily morality. She 
describes this property by choosing Socrates as an example of an individual who engages in 
thinking and alludes to his description of a “friend” that awaits him at home and will expect an 
account of any thoughts he leaves unexamined.208 This is a reference to the two-in-one or the 
dialogue we can conduct with ourselves that warns us against doing anything that would prevent 
us from still being ourselves. For instance, if I hold to the idea that murder is not something that 
people should do but contradict myself by committing murder, then I would no longer be a self 
but a person at war with myself who is composed of different, conflicting notions of the self. The 
two-in-one informs individuals about not doing what would go against the way they are “self-
constituted” and does so in a way that is analogous to the idea that a square cannot be round and 
still be constituted as a square, with an important difference being that the acts identified in 
thinking as problematic are not recognized as such through some type of logical necessity. In 
Arendt’s account thinking has a “liberating” effect on individuals by releasing them from feeling 
as though they have no other choice than to obey the expectations of society. This opens them up 
to the possibility of making judgments about the particular set of circumstances they face in a 
way that reflects what they decide for themselves as unique individuals. 
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Good and Evil in the Public Realm: Radical Evil and Evil as the Preoccupation of 
Respectable Society 
 Arendt’s earlier discussion of the two-in-one that appears in the concluding remarks to 
The Origins of Totalitarianism differs in its account of thinking by taking as its target her 
concerns with ideology and the sense of inevitability to events suggested by its worldview. She 
argues that the contention of an ideological worldview that preordained categories such as class 
or race dictate with “iron-clad necessity” the way history unfolds is an understanding that can be 
combated by thinking and the capacity of this faculty to begin something new. The Life of The 
Mind builds upon this earlier account of thinking in the Origins by adding to its capacity for 
newness a concern with the meaning of irresolvable questions and a concern with refusing to 
allow the self to commit acts that go against the way the self is constituted. The discussion of 
meaning and the self reflects a shift in the target of Arendt’s focus away from the issues 
associated with ideology and towards those brought to her attention by the banality of evil. 
 The difference between these two targets can be gleaned from her brief allusion in The 
Human Condition to the notion of evil, which is mentioned as part of her discussion of the loss 
of the public realm in the modern age. A presupposition of this discussion is that each of the 
activities within the vita activa is tied to a location. The loss of the public realm is particularly 
devastating to action as this activity requires others or a “public” to be performed just as the 
world of objects serves as the location for the performance of work and labour and as the parable 
from Kafka suggests the location for the activity of thinking is in time.209 She discusses a number 
of developments that contribute to the loss of the public realm but most significant of these 
developments to the issue of evil is, ironically, the Christian notion of doing good works. No one 
is to be a witness to the performance of these works including even the doer of these deeds210 
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themselves who would otherwise risk being corrupted by becoming unduly drawn into the world 
of human affairs if after acknowledging their performance they take pride in what they have 
done. This view of human affairs is consistent with the traditional sense of the vita contemplativa 
that reinforces the understanding about the futility of this-worldly concerns. The performance of 
deeds without a public represents to Arendt a confused notion that fails to appreciate the way 
human activity is constituted and in her terms these deeds are more like private activities 
performed with good intentions. To explain the implications that the loss of the public realm has 
upon the notion of evil Arendt refers to Machiavelli’s concerns about the people learning from 
the Church leaders “to be good and not ‘to resist evil’ – with the result that ‘wicked rulers do as 
much evil as they please.’”211 
 Even though Arendt writes The Human Condition under the auspices of her concern for 
the confusion that “thoughtlessness” brings about in understanding the different activities within 
the vita activa, her comments do not seem to be directed against the difficulties associated with 
the banality of evil but towards combating “radical evil.” Radical evil involves contravening 
moral norms, but not as a way to avoid doing harm and preserve the integrity of the self, which 
(as discussed) her argument suggests was the focus of the non-participants in the Final Solution 
in refusing to go along with the conventions of a society that ordered its members to commit 
mass murder. In the case of radical evil its concern with contravening moral norms is part of a 
deliberate attempt to engage in activities that are hurtful to others and/or show no concern for 
their suffering while eschewing any humanly understandable motives. In comparing these two 
forms of evil an example of criminal evil could be killing others for financial gain but the killing 
that occurs in radical evil lacks any sense of utility including even the less tangible interest in 
satisfying sadistic impulses. 
133 
 
 The different set of problems presented by the banality of evil from those suggested by 
the notion of radical evil are described by Arendt when she summarizes the concerns she has 
about the implications of the banality of evil for a number of issues that in her view have yet to 
even be recognized let alone adequately addressed.212 She argues that the difficulties in grasping 
the unacknowledged and troubling implications of the banality of evil are reflected in the basic 
ways of characterizing what occurred during the Final Solution: “The moral point of the matter is 
never reached by calling what happened by the name of ‘genocide’ or by counting the many 
millions of victims: extermination of whole peoples had happened before in antiquity, as well as 
in modern colonization.”213 This characterization misses the ideological fantasies of the Nazis, 
whose aspirations had been described by Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism as uniquely 
constituted and distinguishable from even the colonialist aims of “expansion for expansion’s 
sake,” which seems to border on futility but without completely abandoning a sense of tangible 
accomplishment through its concern with conquest. In her explanation, the anti-utilitarian sense 
to the killing operation of the Nazis is ultimately self-destructive and is representative of the 
most extreme case of radical evil or of “wicked rulers doing as much evil as they please.” The 
focus on the scale of the Final Solution not only fails to adequately acknowledge the unique way 
the “evil” the Nazis engaged in manifested itself in totalitarian objectives that lack humanly 
discernible motives but most importantly in connection with the banality of evil this focus does 
not sufficiently consider the implications of these activities taking place within a legal order. 
Radical evil may be an appropriate term to explain the activities of certain individuals at certain 
times during the Final Solution but what is most troubling to Arendt is that its operations were 
sustainable primarily through the involvement of individuals who were not “outlaws, monsters, 
or raving sadists, but … the most respected members of respectable society” for whom “it was 
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enough that everything happened according to the ‘will of the Fuhrer,’ which was the law of the 
land, and in accordance with the ‘word of the Fuhrer,’ which had the force of the law.”214 
 Arendt’s observations about the capitulation of respectable society to the murderous aims 
of the Third Reich bring her journey through the history of human activity to a gloomy end. This 
journey may have begun with the tremendous promise of human beings, acting together in 
concert through “action” to achieve a form of greatness that simply is not available to them on 
their own, but it concludes in startling contrast with the image of individuals who under Nazi 
rule are left to think of ways to work up the near superhuman strength of character that is 
required to confront society’s demand to perform unthinkable atrocities “that ought never to have 
happened.”215 This is the situation Arendt describes for individuals “in the rare moments when 
the chips are down,”216 but to what extent does the banality of evil serve as a model of 
contemporary human activity for the (not-so-rare) moments when the chips are not down? What 
type of approach can individuals cultivate towards the norms of society and continue to be able 
to live with themselves? 
Habit, Thinking, Conscience and the Example of Deterrence 
 The warnings issued within the two-in-one require independence from the self to 
encourage it to rethink what it is considering to do, but actually should not do, which would 
imply that these warnings are not formed through a method that is within the self’s conscious 
awareness. A more mundane version of thinking than the extreme case of living in the Third 
Reich is “thinking over” a tough decision like deciding whether or not to take a job offer in a 
different city or getting married and having children. In its deliberations over matters involving 
questions of meaning that in being developed are recognized as being irresolute the self forms a 
response that is reflective of its idiosyncratic judgments about what examples are “good” to 
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follow and what matters it finds to be tasteful or distasteful. These types of deliberations 
typically take time to work through and develop a “better” understanding of the relevant 
concerns but their extended duration does no more to arrive at an ultimate justification for what 
is in proper taste or what examples are the most appropriate to follow. The commonly offered 
suggestion “to sleep on it” and receive the benefit of removing oneself from the immediate 
situation before making a potentially life-altering decision only further suggests that the process 
by which these decisions are made is mysteriously buried deep within consciousness. 
 The interest in developing a method may involve reconsidering the notion of habit, which 
Arendt refers to derisively when describing the way morality and ethics during the reign of the 
Third Reich simply degraded into mere mores, habits and customs that could be easily 
exchanged like “table manners.”217 Habits could conceivably be developed in a way that could 
help the self to more consciously be aware of what activities violate its sense of itself while still 
allowing individuals to be engaged with their surrounding world. Ideally this could even involve 
the awareness to recognize when the circumstances may require rethinking the course of action 
suggested by a certain habit or habits. To enlist Kafka’s parable to help describe the benefit of 
habit, his parable suggests that the intensity of the thinking activity extends a moment in time, 
but its cessation of all other activity means at some point it must come to an end to permit an 
individual to go on with their lives. Habit would have the benefit of dispersing over time the 
understanding developed in thinking, so this understanding would still be appreciated, but at a 
lower level of intensity that would permit individuals to carry on with other matters than those of 
concern to thinking. Habit could perhaps be compared to a preventive medicine such as a vaccine 
or a homeopathic remedy while thinking is an intervention like emergency surgery that is needed 
when a healthy regimen or routine is not sufficient to address a sudden medical crisis. Just as 
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neither one is a cure-all for dealing with the body’s ailments so too should thinking and the 
development of “good” habit not be seen as resolving all the issues associated with dealing with 
the banality of evil. 
 An important consideration in relying upon either thinking or habit as a form of 
deterrence against genocidal practice can perhaps be appreciated by comparison to one of the 
more fundamental concerns for Arendt in relation to the notion that having a conscience would 
be a deterrence against wrongdoing. This is the understanding that the trust in its powers rests 
upon the old metaphysical assumption that human beings are essentially good and only commit 
harm unintentionally. A problem that she contends was recognized by Socrates and Plato at the 
beginning of the philosophical tradition is that “only good people are ever bothered by a bad 
conscience”218 and the reign of Third Reich demonstrated that more than enough people did their 
part to support its murderous agenda without being bothered enough by a conscience to do 
otherwise. Arendt argues that Socrates’ solution to this problem is shown by the optimism of him 
spending his days in the marketplace engaged in conversation in an effort to persuade others to 
take up the examined life. By contrast, Plato ascribed to the view that only the “professional 
thinkers” who chose to take up a life in philosophy would show concern for the examined life, 
and no amount of persuasion would permit others to “join in” this conversation. His solution to 
what essentially is a version of the problem of the hermeneutic circle was to use myths and laws 
not in the hopes this would turn towards “the good” the individuals who had closed themselves 
off from thinking but to simply prevent them from doing harm to others. Arendt’s sympathies lie 
more with Socrates as she takes the Kantian position that thinking in the sense of the ability to 
tell right from wrong is not restricted to the few “professional thinkers.” However, with the 
experience of the Third Reich in mind, she is left to conclude about the capacity to think “that it 
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cannot be denied that it is certainly much less frequent than Socrates supposed, although one 
hopes a bit more frequent than Plato feared.”219   
 The point of mentioning Arendt’s doubts about the essential goodness of human beings is 
the relevance this has to the suggestion that habit and the two-in-one could serve as a deterrence 
against committing atrocity. These notions (of habit and the two-in-one) both seem susceptible to 
the same arguments made against relying upon a conscience being a deterrent in that only those 
who engage in self-dialogue or have developed good habits will be bothered by the warnings 
against doing harm, and (again) the number of individuals who heeded these warnings seems to 
have been very few in the case of the Third Reich. The supposition about the essential goodness 
of human beings now seems to have been reversed in that just about anyone could contribute to 
committing a great evil and it seems just about everyone did. Even with this experience in mind a 
concern for thinking and developing good habits still has its benefits for self-understanding and 
this concern for the self is what Arendt seems to celebrate as her solution to the problem of evil 
being willingly accepted, for she concludes that thinking “may indeed prevent catastrophe, at 
least for myself, in the rare moments when the chips are down.”220 This implies a concern can be 
maintained upon deterring genocide in both seeking its prevention while also developing a sense 
of a way in which to respond to situations in which acceptance of the practice of mass murder is 
the predominant understanding throughout society. 
 Arendt likens the banality of evil to a “fungus,” and as Jerome Kohn comments, it is 
unlike radical evil in that lacks a “root” (as the etymology of the term radical suggests) and 
cannot be “uprooted.”221 The reference to fungus is telling not only for conveying the sense of 
superficiality of the banality of evil, but also for recognizing the relentlessness and speed of its 
growth, which prevents it from ever being fully eradicated. This imagery suggests developing 
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ways of responding to the banal evil that is inevitably in our surroundings; a highly beneficial 
by-product of this care for the self that might “prevent catastrophe” for ourselves is that perhaps 
it would serve as an example of the type that Arendt describes when speaking of the faculty of 
judgment. This is a model of conduct that, like Achilles in the case of courage, could exemplify 
to others a refusal to accept and go along with banal forms of evil that support committing 
atrocities and would represent the type of individual who was actively against the Final Solution 
that Eichmann allegedly did not see an example of during the reign of the Third Reich.222 
“Sticking Together”: The Banality of Banal, Radical and Criminal Forms of Evil in 
Coexistence 
 Arendt is troubled by the implications that the banality of evil has for a number of 
subjects, although after focusing on the way Eichmann exemplifies its practice individually, one 
of its implications that she does not seem to consider at length is what this form of evil might 
look like when put into practice as part of a collective enterprise. Incidentally, her focus on the 
self might explain why Arendt takes up her discussion of thinking from the Human Condition in 
The Life of the Mind but does not return to the critique of modernity of this earlier work, even 
though Eichmann’s activities in the Third Reich appear to have the imprint of modern 
bureaucracy all over them.223 One of the few statements Arendt makes regarding the way that the 
banality of evil is implemented as a daily practice is suggested by her explanation of what 
mobilized the European populace under Nazi control to take part in the Final Solution. In an 
essay written after her coverage of the Eichmann trial she refers to her earlier work on 
totalitarianism and notes its arguments about the political maneuvering of the Nazi leadership 
that involved starting the war to create a state of emergency to justify taking the extreme 
measures necessary to achieve the “grand” aims of their ideological worldview. The banal form 
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of evil exemplified by Eichmann as a top Nazi official involved in the organization of the Final 
Solution suggests to Arendt that despite their support for the Nazi administration the populace 
was not overly concerned with following political developments and viewed them more as 
government affairs only of concern to professional politicians. The population “simply” went 
along with the government’s killing business and “although these mass murderers acted 
consistently with a racist or anti-Semitic, or at any rate demographic ideology, the murderers and 
their direct accomplices more often than not did not believe in these ideological justifications.”224 
The key concern for mobilizing the populace was the Nazi leadership’s control of the socially 
accepted order that now made killing the rule instead of its opposite. 
 Interestingly, when Arendt later writes about the lesser known “Frankfurt trial” that had 
as its defendants former guards and officials who served at Auschwitz, she challenges the 
understanding that the individuals who should be held most accountable for the Final Solution 
were those succumbing to a banal form of evil. The reports of the atrocities committed by these 
defendants as well as the attitude they continued to display during the trial of closing ranks 
against anyone who looked unfavourably upon their former activities were unanticipated 
developments that changed Arendt’s overall understanding of the evils committed within the 
Third Reich. She compares the figures of Eichmann and these defendants to distinguish between 
two different forms of evil in operation during the Third Reich: 
In the trial of Adolf Eichmann, desk murderer par excellence, the 
court declared that “the degree of responsibility increases as we 
draw further away from the man who uses the fatal instruments 
with his own hands.” Having followed the proceedings in 
Jerusalem, one was more than inclined to agree with this opinion. 
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The Frankfurt trial, which in many respects reads like a much-
needed supplement to the Jerusalem trial, will cause many to doubt 
what they had thought was self-evident. What stands revealed in 
these trials is not only the complicated issue of personal 
responsibility but naked criminal guilt; and the faces of those who 
did their best, or rather their worst, to obey criminal orders are still 
very different from those who within a legal criminal system did 
not so much obey orders as do with their doomed victims as they 
pleased.225 
The added responsibility she gives to “raw criminality” shows a change to her view of Nazism 
that differs from the understanding that “these deeds were not committed by outlaws, monsters, 
or raving sadists but by the most respected members of respectable society.” This was a view of 
Nazism that considered the banality of evil to be the dominant sense to the activities of its 
followers and the totalitarian fantasy world was a sideshow whose actual contents were of little 
concern to the populace. The portrayal centred around the notion of the banality of evil was one 
that had already replaced Arendt’s original view in The Origins of Totalitarianism that was built 
upon arguments concerning the near inescapable domination of the Nazis’ ideological worldview 
that through its aim to eradicate all forms of human existence represented a form of radical evil. 
The traditional conception of evil as a form of criminal conduct had been acknowledged as part 
of what went on in the Third Reich in both the account that raises the possibility of radical evil 
and in the account that centred around the notion of the banality of evil, but in each case it was 
considered to be of only marginal significance. Arendt’s concern with minimizing the 
significance of criminality in her account of Nazism was to avoid cheap explanations that would 
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attribute the rise of Nazism to aberrational behaviour. But the trial of the Auschwitz defendants 
demonstrated clearly to her that the Third Reich made a place for individuals responsible for 
criminal conduct over and above their support for a social order that made killing its law. 
 The importance of radical, banal and criminal forms of evil has shifted in each iteration 
of Arendt’s account of Nazism but the form of her argument remains unchanged in the sense that 
these “evils” are all in operation together under the umbrella of the same murderous order. But 
what, if any, connection do the different types of wrongdoing at work in this order share with one 
another? And what allows these evils to co-exist or “supplement” each other, especially 
considering the distaste that the “desk murderers” Eichmann and Himmler showed for the killing 
once they got up close and personal to it and considering the distaste for desk work that 
undoubtedly was shown by a number of the executioners who physically carried out the killings? 
Although Arendt does not suggest a commonality, her discussion of the Frankfurt trial may be 
used to argue that the notion of criminality displayed by its defendants may actually represent a 
case of banal evil. The haughty and shameless attitude of the defendants that so irked and 
dismayed Arendt reflected, in her view, the German public’s lack of appetite for putting ex-Nazis 
on trial. Importantly, public opinion took the lead in setting this attitude, since in their pretrial 
interviews a number of the defendants were willing to “admit” they had turned bad under the 
influence of the “animal-like” Galician Jews from Eastern Europe but in open session denied 
even the small share of guilt implied by this offensive and self-serving testimony. Arendt 
comments on the defendants’ decision to change their testimony by remarking “that behind them 
one can sense public opinion” and that “almost every one of them would rather admit that he is a 
liar than risk having his neighbours read in the newspapers that he does not belong among the 
Germans who ‘stick together.’”226 
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 The outlook of those who engaged in criminality during the Final Solution and relished 
the opportunity to engage in the activities it involved might initially appear to be the mirror 
opposite of the banal form of evil of those who make the claim of being an unwilling supporter 
of a policy of mass murder. In spite of this appearance, the way these forms of evil mirror one 
another seem to suggest their image of social order shares the understanding that the range of 
activity possible to engage in is determined by the conventional understanding endorsed by this 
order, which either happens to suit their tastes or not. The idea that this order is not a given set of 
constraints but can be collaborated with to develop an understanding of the matters it addresses 
is not considered in the case of either banal or criminal forms of evil. What this form of 
collaboration might entail will be a focus of the discussion for the concluding chapter of this 
writing. 
 What might be added to the considerations at this point of the inability or refusal to 
collaborate is its connection to radical evil whose principal of non-utility might appear to buck 
any form of conventional understanding and distinguish its understanding from that of either 
banal or criminal forms of evil. This is noted in Arendt’s description in the Origins of 
Totalitarianism of the Nazis’ activities, which were representative of a radical form of evil, and 
its observation that the Nazi leadership sought to manipulate the norms and conventions of 
society to push them aside and usher in a new order of their design. This is an approach that took 
the form of pursuing power in Germany through “ballots not bullets” and, once in power, 
expanding the German empire through signing and then breaking international agreements. The 
banal sense to this “bucking of convention” that the Nazis engaged in can be recognized in that 
the understanding that social order is a constraint upon the range of activity possible to engage in 
is not brought into question. In response to this sense of constraint the focus of the Nazis was 
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upon gaining control of the institutions in society charged with administrating what society 
demands of its members for the purposes of changing these demands to suit their personal tastes. 
Like criminal and banal forms of evil, radical evil recognizes the possibility for a difference 
between personal belief and what is held conventionally, and in their different ways each also 
accepts that convention imposes its understanding on personal belief. As an aside, the appeal of 
Nazi ideology to Eichmann could be recognized not just as a matter of the content of this 
ideology but also in its presentation of a worldview that has no discernible interest in 
collaboration or developing an understanding that begins but does not necessarily end with the 
way the matter is addressed by convention. 
 The inability to imagine a world beyond the opinion of one’s neighbours – or the 
compliance with social norms seemingly above all other considerations that is indicative of the 
banality of evil – once again appears as definitive for the everyday understanding of those who 
gave their support to the Third Reich. This point seems to be reinforced by Arendt in a response 
she gave to the confusion surrounding her use of the phrase banality of evil that she attempts to 
clear up by telling a story involving Ernst Junger, a well-known German soldier and war 
chronicler. Junger apparently caught sight of starving prisoners eating pigs’ food and referred to 
them as “subhuman,” but Arendt suggests that his remark was not “demonic” or inspired by a 
murderous ideology seeking to purify the world of subhuman races: it shows instead “simply the 
reluctance to imagine what the other person is experiencing.”227 Would it not be fair to suggest 
that “behind” Junger’s concern for a sense of decorum “one can sense public opinion” that 
blocks him from developing an understanding that would recognize that for those who are 
starving ignoring convention by not turning their nose up at pigs’ food represents an appropriate 
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response? (I.e. he would acknowledge that this “pigs’ food” had been converted into “much 
needed human sustenance”). 
 This idea that public opinion weighed heavily on the minds of the defendants at the 
Frankfurt trial may seem to ignore the more obvious explanation that they were facing the reality 
of being on trial and their denials were simply a case of them “clamming up” on the stand on the 
advice of their lawyers. This objection does not refute the possibility of these defendants 
foregoing what was recommended to them by legal convention and taking responsibility for their 
past atrocities. Arendt suggests that this possibility was actually exercised at the trial by the 
defendant Dr. Franz Lucas,228 a physician at Auschwitz who “had always been ‘ostracized by his 
comrades’”229 for the concern he had shown for the well-being of the inmates. According to 
Arendt his responses on the witness stand continued to set him apart from his “comrades” as he 
sought to downplay the favourable testimony he received from former inmates and the 
suggestion that this cleared him of wrongdoing. In the case of the other remaining defendants 
their denials did little to prevent Arendt from arguing convincingly that their cruelty and 
enthusiasm for killing went over and above their legal obligations to the Third Reich. What also 
may be added to Arendt’s assessment of their conduct is that to achieve the “heights” of their 
horrific infamy the former camp guards and officials stood on the shoulders of the Nazi legal 
order that in part composed the public perception of social norms during the Third Reich. 
The Orders of Evil during the Genocides in Europe, Rwanda and Cambodia 
 The importance of the legal order is also discussed by Christopher Browning in his well-
known study Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland. 
Browning touts both a multilayered portrayal of the “ordinary Germans” assembled into the 
death squad that was the focus of his study and a multi-causal explanation of what motivated 
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support for the Final Solution within the Third Reich as a whole. Browning’s description of the 
death squad members suggests that some were eager killers, some sought to avoid participating 
in the killings whenever possible, others grew more or less enthusiastic for them over time or 
oscillated between enthusiasm and reluctance and only in the case of one lone individual was 
there an outright refusal to participate in the shootings. These findings seem comparable to 
Arendt’s description of the Auschwitz guards and officials who exhibited “raw criminality”, 
changing moods and (depending on the assessment of Dr. Lucas230) those that demonstrate either 
a refusal to participate in the killings or less enthusiasm for them over time. Browning also 
identifies the group that comprised the majority of the participants within the death squad as 
those that “did not think what they were doing was wrong or immoral, because the killing was 
sanctioned by legitimate authority”231 and this description seems to echo Arendt’s 
characterization of the banal evil of the desk murderers. 
 In terms of Browning’s multi-causal explanation of motivation of the European populace 
as a whole for the Final Solution, his argument emphasizes that a variety of factors such as 
racism, the exceptional circumstances of war, conformity, the diminishing sense of personal 
responsibility within bureaucracy and the pressure exerted by the legitimizing authority of 
government all contributed to the support the Third Reich received. In his view this demonstrates 
that “modern governments that wish to commit mass murder will seldom fail in their efforts for 
being unable to induce ‘ordinary men’ to become their ‘willing executioners.’”232 Browning is 
emphasizing that mass murder can readily occur and what might also be noted from his account 
is that through the control of a legal order and of other forms of social convention the various 
“causes” that he names (and possibly others) can be triggered in a way that will fulfill a 
government’s horrendous “wishes.” 
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In their examination of the Rwandan genocide both Jean Hatzfeld and Alison Des Forges 
identify varying levels of enthusiasm among its participants that are reflective of the findings of 
Browning and Arendt. Des Forges systematically lists the different participants involved in the 
genocide in a lengthy and detailed categorization of their involvement233 while the interviews 
conducted by Hatzfeld are far less systematic as he mentions these sorts of details at different 
points throughout his interviewees’ responses. In the group of rural farmers that are the focus of 
Haztfeld’s study their account of events suggest that these individuals were either enthusiastic 
killers from the start or grew more or less enthusiastic for them over time. Individuals who were 
more reluctant participants in the killings were observed by members of the group interviewed 
by Hatzfeld but they did not claim that this type of reluctance was representative of their own 
attitude. Over the course of his interviews Hatzfeld seeks to establish the degree to which the 
members of the group welcomed the killing operations prior to their occurrence, but with his 
investigation reliant mostly on the accounts of events provided by the former killers, the issue is 
not easily determined. A number of Hatzfeld’s respondents do suggest that independent of their 
individual attitudes towards the killings these activities did not start on a genocidal scale until 
they became legally authorized: 
When the genocide came from Kigali, taking us by surprise, I never 
flinched. I thought, if the authorities opted for this choice, there’s 
no reason to sidestep the issue;234 
… 
After listing the influential people, the authorities announced the 
families should die, too, and all neighbours as well. These detailed 




The higher-ups in Kigali had planned it all behind blank faces;236 
and: 
If the organizers did not show up, it wouldn’t have occurred to the 
farmers to begin the work.237 
One of the Tutsi targeted in the killings, “Innocent,” tells the story of “a very nice councillor 
named Servilien Kambali,” a Hutu who had done much to protect the Tutsis during previous 
smaller-scale massacres that had occurred in his region. When Kambali tried to stop the 
genocidal killings in 1994 he was harshly warned by his superiors that he would not be permitted 
to stand in the way and upon hearing this quickly took a lead role in the killing operations.238 
Anti-Tutsi sentiment was very much in the air prior to the genocide and the Hutu extremist 
government mobilized members of this ethnic group, who had shown varying levels of 
enthusiasm for genocide, to serve as the perpetrators of the killings. The government’s control of 
the legal order seems to have been enough for the killing to be accepted as a social norm by a 
segment of the Rwandan populace of sufficient size for the genocide to occur.  
 By contrast the majority of the Cambodian populace prior to the country’s genocide 
reportedly had little appetite for violent conflict after the devastating impact on the country from 
years of civil war and from the war that had spread into the region from neighbouring Vietnam. 
The support that the Khmer Rouge enjoyed within Cambodia was derived in part from its stated 
goals as a communist party to work on behalf of the interests of the poor by ending corruption 
and bringing peace to the region, as well as from the endorsement it had received from the 
reigning monarch Prince Sihanouk who encouraged people to run to the “maquis” (the “forests,” 
where the Khmer Rouge’s forces were located)239 and join the fight against the American-backed 
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coup that had deposed him. From its first days in power the Khmer Rouge began killing the 
citizens of Cambodia en masse and even the involvement of the guards at S-21 who committed 
some of the regime’s worst atrocities has been explained as a matter of having been forced to 
engage in these activities. 
 This is a view supported by Cambodian scholars Meng-Try Ea and Sorya Sim who note 
in their work Victims and Perpetrators?: Testimony of Young Khmer Rouge Comrades that a 
number of these guards were children as young as 12 years old240 when they were separated from 
their families and brought to S-21. While serving at the prison they faced the very real possibility 
of being tortured and killed if they disobeyed the orders of the regime as they witnessed this very 
thing happen to a number of their colleagues.241 Van Nath, the former inmate of S-21 featured in 
Rithy Panh’s film on the prison, challenges any claims to victimhood by the guards that he meets 
with (some of whom were above the age of eighteen and clearly do not meet the legal definition 
of a child soldier) by asking them: “If you are victims then what does that make the executed 
prisoners?”242 The answer Nath receives from one guard is that they obeyed the orders out of fear 
for their lives and Nath is clearly not satisfied with this response and increasingly pushes back 
against it as the film progresses (as discussed in the previous chapter). 
 A different understanding of the activities at S-21 than those of Ea and Sim and Nath that 
may also appear to align with a focus on the banality of evil is presented by Christopher L. 
Atkinson in his article “Reflections on Administrative Evil, Belief, and Justification in Khmer 
Rouge Cambodia.” Atkinson acknowledges the influence upon the guards of being threatened 
with a cruel death and (in certain cases) being underage at the time of their assignment at S-21 
but considers the bureaucratic structure of the prison to have been the real danger that simply 
made use of these vulnerabilities. He refers to the comparison of bureaucracy to a sharp blade 
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that is simply a benign tool that can be put either to good or evil ends and counters this notion by 
suggesting that this image of bureaucracy as a sharp blade also conveys the susceptibility of this 
form of organization to providing support for large-scale, violent atrocities. This murderous 
potential has been borne out by the abysmal track record that bureaucratic organizations have in 
terms of being involved with genocidal events.243 Atkinson is troubled by the assumption that 
public administration is inherently seeking to “do good” in the world and suggests that 
bureaucratic structures either allow a concern for what is right to be suspended or they are 
conducive to justifying even the most extreme forms of evil to achieve some perceived higher 
good as an end, as the reign of the Khmer Rouge demonstrates. He considers the danger posed 
by bureaucracy to be so great that he warns that “we may become powerless to stop it”244 and 
calls for administrative officials to accept that they are not shielded from responsibility for the 
activities they take part in as part of a bureaucratic organization. Human agency is the hope he 
pits against bureaucratic power but Atkinson also suggests that this capacity could be fully 
extinguished by such power: “Systems function, machine-like, thoughtlessly and blamelessly 
oblivious to consequences with humanity crushed underneath, and society powerless to stop 
them. Then as now, do we blame our systems or ourselves?”245 
 The degree to which Atkinson is optimistic about human agency being “the hope” against 
bureaucracy seems uncertain as his skepticism about this form of organization follows from his 
survey of the various strategies that bureaucratic structures employ to nullify an individual’s 
sense of their capacity to make decisions of their own volition. His discussion of these strategies 
touches upon the minutia of bureaucratic operations without Atkinson recognizing the way in 
which this discussion is also suggestive of the possibility to counter these attempts to stifle the 
exercise of human agency. Atkinson concludes that “the principal motivating factor for most of 
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the Cambodian people was the threat of death – The need for self-preservation was generally 
sufficient to make citizens obey the commands they were given.”246 Van Nath’s dialogic 
exchange with the former guards demonstrates a way to move past this generalization about the 
connection between self-preservation and obedience by refusing to treat the guards’ claims about 
having to follow orders out of fear for their lives as a concluding statement about the available 
responses to some of the most extreme forms of pressures that bureaucracy can exert on 
individuals. Nath approaches their claims with the understanding that they represent a starting 
point for a discussion concerned with analyzing the ways in which to respond to this type of 
pressure. 
 In connection with the influence that self-preservation can exert upon compliance with 
murderous orders Atkinson also cites Eric Hoffer’s work on mass movements to send the 
warning that “it may not even be necessary for people to be ‘true believers’”247 to take part in the 
atrocities being pursued by a bureaucratic organization. This idea of paying lip service to the 
party line is also suggested by two of the guards in Rithy Panh’s film, who recite the biographies 
they were asked to write by the Khmer Rouge authorities describing their reasons for joining its 
cause, and their comments on these biographies provide an indication of the way that they could 
sustain a view that permitted them to take part in activities for the government that they did not 
necessary agree with but felt compelled to perform.248 Both guards in the film explain that even 
the “personal” information they provided in telling their life story did not reflect their true 
concerns but represented their interest in self-preservation and the need to please party 
authorities.249 A crucial concern of the double life they quite knowingly lived in the service of the 
Khmer Rouge seems to be the repeated references the guards make to the legality of their 
activities. They debate both with Nath and among themselves the extent to which their personal 
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views and desires matched with the official party line, even admitting that there were occasions 
where individuals exceeded in their cruelty what was expected of them from the authorities. The 
concern they show for the lawfulness of their activities suggests a way in which these guards 
maintained a connection to their personal understanding of the matters they faced that seems to 
prevent them from ever becoming fully disassociated from the life they lived officially. One of 
the guards, Huoy, states that “today when I think about it, it was against the law”250 and this 
suggestion that he assesses the activities he was involved with under the Khmer Rouge on the 
basis of their legality has implications for the responsibility he takes for them. He seems to 
consider himself divorced from the responsibility of performing these activities through his 
adherence to a legal order but at the same time he also preserves a sense of agency by 
participating in this order as this (supposedly) represents a “responsible” way of allowing 
himself the opportunity to pursue his personal self-interest of trying to survive. 
 The Eichmann and Frankfurt trials have shown that survival was not at issue for the 
defendants when they took part in the Final Solution. Eichmann claimed that his concern for the 
legality of his activities that compelled him to accept the Nazi government’s agenda was 
motivated by a sense of duty that he felt personally to do the “honourable thing” of maintaining 
the oath he had sworn to Hitler. The Frankfurt trials suggest that the guards at Auschwitz were 
concerned with social norms including the legality of their activities. These activities and their 
understanding of them seem to suggest that these guards happily took advantage of the 
convention to commit mass murder but only after public opinion had formed around these 
conventions in a way that allowed them to get away with pursuing their personal interest of 
engaging in a brutal form of violent criminality. In the case of private citizens who were not 
directly involved in implementing the Final Solution, examples can be cited that indicate that 
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support for the Nazi government’s activities was also not necessarily linked to a concern with 
survival. In an interview with Elizabeth Kalhammer, who worked as a maid for Adolf Hitler at 
his residence at Berghof from 1943-1945, Kalhammer was asked (at the age of 92) what she 
would tell her younger 19-year-old self about taking a job for the Fuhrer now that she knew of 
the Holocaust and other atrocities committed by the Nazi government. Kalhammer, who 
personally encountered starving prisoners after their liberation from the Mauthausen death camp 
and even helped to feed a young boy succumbing to starvation, explains that she is unsure if she 
would have done things differently: “There are two sides to that, if I am being honest. I was 
young at the time. You must understand that there was a certain pride to it. If I’m being honest.” 
She describes the special privileges she enjoyed during the Third Reich and admiration that came 
with being in the personal service of Hitler, summing up her experiences by remarking that “It 
was beautiful too ... But that doesn’t mean that I was proud about the other things”251 – the 
phrase “other things” being a gloss for these atrocities committed by the Third Reich. 
 Kalhammer claims she “knew nothing”252 of the atrocities committed by the Nazis even 
though her recollections of the war years include seeing the “horrible” things that were done to 
the “beautiful shops” on Kristallnacht. Her overall lack of interest in the political developments 
of the Nazi era seems to express an attitude towards public affairs that is of concern to Arendt in 
her critique of modernity and its discussion of the impact that the Christian notion of “good 
works” has had upon the already strained understanding of public life within this era. The 
suggestion of this notion that private citizens should not be concerned about their appearance in 
the public realm “with the result that ‘wicked rulers do as much evil as they please’” within this 
space seems relevant to consider as a forerunner to Kalhammer’s view that she is untroubled by 
her involvement with the Nazis even after being in the personal service of Adolf Hitler. 
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 The scope of Arendt’s critique would suggest that this separation of public activities from 
matters of “personal” interest that are pursued privately is representative of an understanding that 
prevails in societies that are not necessarily engaged in the practice of genocide. This 
understanding is recognized as being alive and well in postwar Germany by Elke Grenzer in her 
critique of a Holocaust education program set up for children at the beginning of the 2000s on 
the site of the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. Grenzer refers both to the various tactics the 
program uses to have the children “relive” the experiences of the inmates at the death camps and 
its attempts to balance the gravity of the subject matter it addresses against the concern of 
wanting to make a summer camp for kids still be fun. The program’s efforts at reproducing the 
past quickly morph into a simple repetition of some of its unaddressed tensions as Grenzer notes 
that its “advertised aim to ‘increase learner confidence and bring over an experience of success 
and still be enjoyable despite difficult contents’” unwittingly “joins pleasure and pain in a 
manner that is analogous to Eichmann’s disjointed discovery of an ‘inner life.’”253 Kalhammer’s 
reminiscing about the “beauty” she experienced during the Third Reich could also be considered 
an example of joining pleasure and pain in a thoughtless way when discussing the practice of 
genocide. She demonstrates this by the way she separates herself from the pain of 
acknowledging her notable involvement in the Nazi regime and treating its horrors as something 
that does not concern her since these horrors had no direct concern to her professional duties and 
were not activities with which she personally agreed. This understanding allowed her to accept 
cordoning off her personal impression of her time in the service of Hitler and derive pleasure 
from her participation in the regime. As Grenzer’s argument suggests, the same understanding 
could easily be considered to be at work with the idea of Eichmann having an “inner life” that 
rebelled against the outward performance of his duty but marks a difference and clearly a very 
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significant difference between distancing himself from duties directly involved in the killing and 
Kalhammer distancing herself form her duties in the service of this regime as a maid. 
 The understanding that personal belief can be separate from the intent of the activities 
performed out of an interest to be in compliance with the conventional order of society 
presupposes that this order can be imposed upon the members of society by some means. The 
remaining part of this chapter will examine the imposition of this order through the means of 
bureaucratic administration as a case to consider the extent to which the imposition of this order 
can occur.   
Bureaucratic Domination and its “Clash with the Variable Requirements of Practical Social 
Life” 
 Arendt’s inspiration for her much-debated assertion that Eichmann’s frame of reference 
for supporting the Final Solution was a concern for banalities and not the grand designs of an 
ideology is perhaps hinted at in a line in The Human Condition when she is discussing Max 
Weber’s famous thesis on the connection between Protestantism and capitalism. Arendt observes 
that “the greatness of Max Weber’s discovery about the origins of capitalism lay precisely in his 
demonstration that enormous, strictly mundane activity is possible without any care for or 
enjoyment of the world whatever, an activity whose deepest motivation, on the contrary, is worry 
and care about the self.”254 The care shown by Eichmann (and Kalhammer) is less for the self 
than for self-interest but the idea of a connection between mundane concerns and greatness 
seems comparable to Arendt’s proposal that unremarkable individuals were the authors of the 
monstrous deeds committed by the Third Reich. Weber’s work is also helpful in its examination 
of bureaucracy through his observation that its best practices involve striving to make the 
separation of public activity from personal interests pursued privately a routine matter of its 
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operations. “Bureaucracy develops,” Weber explains, “the more perfectly the more it is 
‘dehumanized,’ the more completely it succeeds in eliminating from official business love, 
hatred and all purely personal, irrational and emotional elements which escape calculation.”255 
 Weber leaves room in his explanation of modern bureaucracy for personal interests to 
make an appearance in the public sphere in a rebellion against the abstract rationality and rigid 
formalism that he argues is characteristic of this form of organization. A demand of the protest 
against bureaucratic domination is the need to examine on a case-by-case basis if certain matters 
require individual consideration rather than automatically being assigned standardized treatment. 
The two avenues he identifies as allowing for a consideration of personal interest are the 
remnants of traditional social institutions and the representatives of public opinion such as 
populist leaders and the press.256 An important difference between these holdouts against 
bureaucratic administration is that traditional institutions are themselves still dependent upon a 
certain amount of formalism, namely persuading its officials to be “moved by personal sympathy 
and favor, by grace and gratitude”257 in an individual case while the expression of public opinion 
(as a pure type) is unfettered by either tradition or bureaucratic forms of regulation. 
 Throughout his discussion of modern bureaucracy Weber is concerned with describing 
the tension between the domineering tendencies of bureaucratic regulation and the democratic 
impulses such as the expression of public opinion that push back against this form of domination. 
He suggests that the masses who are the targets of bureaucratic regulation are also aware of the 
material comforts that its administration affords them and this can compromise their protests 
against its influence and control.258 His observation seems applicable to Kalhammer’s 
description of the special privileges she received in Hitler’s service or the “privilege” to survive 
granted to the S-21 guards living under the rule of the Khmer Rouge. Weber is also troubled by 
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what he regards as the sham promise of bureaucratic regulation to raise the standing of the 
masses by leveling social differences and eliminating the advantages received through tradition 
or any other means besides its rational procedures. These procedures lead only to a “leveling of 
the governed”259 or a loss of status for the masses targeted by bureaucratic regulation relative to 
the position enjoyed by those in charge of its administration. Weber’s description of society 
could perhaps be likened to the image of a textured script, like braille, that once its bumps and 
groves are leveled out loses all meaning that it formerly held and returns to being nothing more 
than a blank sheet that can be inscribed upon without impediment to meeting the goals of 
bureaucratic administration. A flattening out of the social landscape into a smooth but 
indistinguishable mass seems conducive for bringing together elements that would have once 
been at odds with one another in their goals and objectives, such as office functionaries and “raw 
criminals,” and organize them into complementary parts within a genocidal enterprise, where as 
brothers-in-arms they transform into desk murderers and camp officials. Weber even makes the 
point that if through conflict a state is conquered and their former enemy takes charge of the 
bureaucratic machinery then the change in regime does not necessarily interrupt its bureaucratic 
personnel from continuing their operations in the service of the new administration. This 
suggests that the idea that moral codes can easily and even typically be exchanged like “table 
manners” also complies with Weber’s explanation of bureaucratic organizations.260 
 What seems most concerning to Weber about the protests against bureaucratic domination 
is the way that these protests have involved an appeal to notions of equality and the 
establishment of objective social institutions to express their interest in pursuing a more 
democratic society. These are notions that in his view unwittingly perpetuate the principles of 
bureaucratic rationality and further strengthen the position of those in charge of its administration 
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over its subjects.261 This idea that the grip of bureaucratic organization has become inescapable – 
Weber’s proverbial iron cage – is suggestive of a parallel to Arendt’s description of the radical 
evil of a totalitarian regime in that each of these accounts prioritizes the struggle against the 
domination of a governing power. In her coverage of the Eichmann trial, as Arendt shifted her 
focus away from totalitarian domination towards the significance of banal evil, she recognized 
that the responses of the different European countries under Nazi rule to the demand to enact the 
Final Solution varied from compliance, to partial compliance and flat-out refusal. This 
recognizes that a governing power that seeks to dominate all aspects of social life does not 
receive automatic and unavoidable compliance from its subjects and must struggle to impose the 
solutions that it is offering to matters of concern to the populace. This is a struggle observed by 
Weber’s contemporary and colleague Georg Simmel in his description of the resistance to the 
typical way bureaucracy responds to the everyday concerns of those who are the subject of its 
regulations.  
The bureaucratic body, a formal organization for exercising an 
extended administration, constitutes in itself a scheme which 
frequently clashes with the variable requirements of practical 
social life. This, on the one hand, because the departmental work 
of the bureaucratic system is not adjusted with reference to very 
individual and complicated cases, which none the less must be 
disposed of by means of the bureaucratic machinery ... In this 
respect we might compare bureaucratic with logical schematism. 
The latter bears about the same relation to knowledge of reality in 
general that the former bears to civic administration. Each is a tool 
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and a form, indispensable in connection with the content which it 
is called to order, but the whole meaning and purpose of each lie in 
this content. When logic poses, however, as independent 
knowledge, and, without reference to the real content of which it is 
a mere form, presumes to construct of itself a separate intelligence, 
it makes for itself a world which usually presents marked contrasts 
with the real universe.262 
The suggestion in Simmel’s account that the default response to Weber’s (alleged) bureaucratic 
“iron cage” is for its expectations to simply “clash” with the subjects of its administration also 
seems to parallel Arendt recognizing that the orders to commit mass murder by the Nazi 
totalitarian regime had been received differently within the different geographic regions where 
Eichmann worked to implement the Final Solution. For instance, in the Origins of 
Totalitarianism Arendt argues that even those who were aware of the absurdity of classifying all 
of society under Nazi control in terms of Aryans and non-Aryans had no choice but to accept the 
very real consequences of this designation. However, in Eichmann in Jerusalem she describes 
the way that this policy in the hands of Mussolini’s government gave the appearance of being 
treated like a “typically Italian joke.”263 Part of this “joke” included making exemptions for both 
the Jews who were members of the Fascist party and their relatives and by making this 
stipulation it in effect protected nearly all of the Jews in the country. This is not to imply in citing 
this example that the response to the rule of a bureaucratic form of administration that is enacting 
a policy of genocide always or even normally ends in defiance, let alone in triumphant forms of 
protest. Even in Italy, once the German authorities seized control over the country’s 
administration, more than half of the nation’s 50,000 Jews were put into camps within Italian 
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borders, of which 7,500 were eventually sent to Auschwitz.264 However, with incalculable 
features such as “Italian humanity” confronting the Nazi administration, the “marked contrast to 
the real universe” (Simmel) of its bureaucratic policy can potentially be exposed for the way its 
aims of countering the Jewish world conspiracy “raised a problem that fortunately did not 
exist”265 (Arendt) and this example shows that for a time the objectives of this policy could 
essentially be ignored. 
Conclusion 
 The interest in social order in this chapter considers the understanding that the 
conventions associated with this order constrain personal belief through its determination of the 
range of activities that are possible to be engaged in publicly. The argument suggests that this 
way of orienting to social order can be traced to the understanding that being passive is central to 
the way human activity has traditionally been understood. This sense of human activity has 
encouraged a withdrawal of concern from human affairs including a concern for what the notions 
of “good” and “evil” mean in the conduct of these affairs. The analysis then seeks to work out an 
understanding of what the notion of evil means in discussing the practice of genocide and 
suggests that the banality of evil involves this separation of private and public concerns in a way 
that can appear as either a radical, criminal or banal form of evil. The imposition of social order 
through bureaucratic administration was discussed as a case to examine the extent to which this 
order is possible to impose. Through the discussion of this case, which began with a 
consideration of the idea of total domination, the analysis develops the understanding that the 
concerns of everyday practice can potentially encourage the idea of collaborating with what is 
demanded by the conventions of the social order rather than seeing these demands as necessarily 
imposing constraints. The analysis also seeks to demonstrate its concern with an orientation to 
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social order that seeks to collaborate with the demands of its conventions by working out its 
understanding of convention through its discussion of these demands. This is an understanding of 
convention that recognizes that everyday concerns have the potential to suggest that what 
convention demands is not the sole determinant of the range of activities that are possible to 
perform. 
 The concluding chapter of this work will continue this focus on an orientation to social 
order that seeks to collaborate with its demands by considering the demands that Simmel’s 
observation seems to suggest everyday concerns place on this order through the “variable 
requirements of practical social life.” The response to these requirements by bureaucratic forms 
of administration in its effort to organize society in accordance with the conventions of the social 
order seems relevant to mention considering Arendt’s comments about Eichmann who, in a 
position of a bureaucratic administrator in charge of organizing the Final Solution, demonstrated 
a “remoteness from reality.” Arendt attributes his remoteness to his “lack of imagination”266 and 
what could be added to her account to further appreciate the implication of its description for the 
notion of the banality of evil is to recognize the banality of evil as a particular species of the 
more general concept of “bad faith.” This concept is discussed in the opening chapter of this 
work and makes reference to the way members in society treat as given and unchanging the 
reality that they have a hand in producing. 
 Berger’s account of this Sartrean concept discusses its implication for the way individuals 
understand themselves with respect to their capacity to act freely. The examples he cites to 
illustrate this concept include: 
The waiter who shuffles through his appointed rounds in a cafe is 
in “bad faith,” insofar as he pretends to himself that the waiter role 
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constitutes his real existence, that, if only for the hours he is hired, 
he is the waiter. The woman who lets her body be seduced step by 
step while continuing to carry on an innocent conversation is in 
“bad faith,” insofar as she pretends that what is happening to her 
body is not under her control.267 
These examples could be characterized as being representative of a “bad faith” in which impact 
is restricted to the individual who adapts the understanding that the conventions of society 
determine the range of activities possible to perform. Other examples that Berger mentions show 
the way that bad faith accepts doing harm to others: 
The terrorist who kills and excuses himself by saying that he had 
no choice because the party ordered him to kill is in “bad faith,” 
because he pretends his existence is necessarily linked with the 
party, while in fact this linkage is the consequence of his own 
choice ... Men are responsible for their actions. They are in “bad 
faith” when they attribute to iron necessity what they themselves 
are choosing to do. Even the law itself, the master fortress of “bad 
faith,” has begun to take cognizance of this fact in its dealings with 
Nazi war criminals.268 
An understanding that totalizes the expectations of the social order and lacks the imagination to 
think of possibilities beyond what is expected by its conventions seems conducive to the banal 




 One resource for understanding the way in which imagination concerns everyday practice 
is to consider the main thrust of Harold Garfinkel’s work, which seems to have a pulse on this 
problem considering the method he employs is focused upon developing a better understanding 
of everyday practice. This involves his idea of conducting breaching experiments, which he 
refers to as “aides to a sluggish imagination.”269 Once Garfinkel had described everyday practice 
in a way he considered to be adequate he remained committed to reproducing its understanding 
without attempting to further develop its notions. This aspect of Garfinkel’s approach will be 
departed from on the supposition that conventional understanding represents a starting point and 
not an end point to collaborate and form an understanding of the matters it addresses. 
 The case to be considered as a way to further appreciate the significance of imagination 
to everyday practice will be the Socratic dialogue Gorgias that was one of Arendt’s focuses in 
her writings after her coverage of the Eichmann trial. With Garfinkel’s work in mind this 
dialogue will be read as Socrates’ version of a breaching experiment that seeks to intervene into 
the everyday ways of understanding what is just. The discussion of this dialogue will also 
include Bruno Latour as an additional interlocutor and use his work to represent a response that 
has been articulated within modern sociology that, contra Arendt, disputes Socrates’ arguments 
against Gorgias and Calicles. Latour argues for an examination of social conventions that is 
unfettered by the concern for what is “good” or “bad” about them and that would focus upon 
more fully understanding and expanding their influence without this further commentary on their 
merits. The response that will be made to this argument that suggests confining understanding to 
what is conventionally held to will be to consider the writing of Alan Blum and Peter McHugh 
and its discussion of the distinction between principle and rule. This discussion will be used to 
guide the understanding of what is involved in an orientation to social order that collaborates 
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with the concerns it addresses. The final component of this discussion will be to use Arendt’s 
work to suggest the possibility to respond in this collaboration to banal forms of evil through 
each of the human faculties named within the vita activa, with particular attention upon those 























A Concern for the “Good” in the Banality of Evil 
  I forget to pray for the angels, 
and the angels forget to pray for us.270 
  – Leonard Cohen, “So Long Marianne” 
Introduction 
An underlying concern of this writing has been to consider the decision to pursue and/or 
comply with mass murder. In developing a sense of the banality of evil this decision has been 
recognized as involving a separation of what is believed privately from the activities performed 
in public. The case studies examined of the genocides in Rwanda and Cambodia and of the 
administration of modern bureaucracy have each shown, in their different ways, the problematic 
way that dividing private and public affairs can be associated with the desirability of “being 
considered one of those who stick together.” An implication of this argument has not been to 
suggest rejecting conventionality in all of its forms but to develop a sense of a way in which to 
collaborate with the demands of what is conventionally expected as part of understanding the 
“good” of an activity being performed. An understanding of what this form of collaboration 
entails is not claimed to be known in an absolute sense but an indication of what it entails might 
be recognized through the discussion of examples, from each of these case studies, of individuals 
who show a concern for matters that are significant to being human, including a concern for 
justice and the ability to think about the “good” of performing an activity. The remarks in Fujii’s 
study of Rwanda made by “Gustave” about the importance of friendship in steering people in the 
right direction through good advice suggests he recognized the impact that the notions of others 
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can have upon him while also maintaining a sense that this influence can be reflected upon and 
evaluated to consider its merits. Van Nath’s almost therapeutic intervention upon the 
understanding of the former guards at the S-21 prison in Cambodia, which Pahn’s film 
documents, involves Nath working through the guards’ understanding of their duties and through 
this consideration suggesting that thinking and showing a concern for what is just was still a 
possibility for them. This concern would have made clear alternative ways of responding to the 
expectations of their position other than taking part in mass murder and torture. In discussing the 
administration of modern bureaucracy Arendt’s notion of the umpire as someone who like “the 
quiet in the center of a storm which, though totally unlike the storm, still belongs to it” provides 
an image of the practice of judgment that involves considering the particularities of a situation to 
determine the “rightness” of the activities engaged in while also recognizing the folly of 
maintaining “that by judging a wrong I presuppose that I myself would be incapable of 
committing it.” 
 In this chapter these issues of desirability, a concern for the “good” and involvement in 
collective life will be further considered through a discussion of the notion of citizenship in 
Plato’s Gorgias as well as in the commentary on this work provided in writings by Bruno Latour 
and Jeff Kochan. This discussion will build upon the understanding suggested by Simmel and 
Garfinkel’s work that conventionality provides solutions, however imperfect, to problems that 
could be worked out endlessly and whose indeterminacy bubbles beneath the surface of the 
settled conventions associated with everyday concerns. The argument will then return its focus 
upon the method of Analysis that this writing has sought to provide a demonstration of 
throughout its discussion to consider Blum and McHugh’s distinction between rules and 
principles that (in part) provides a way to address the problematic sense in Garfinkel’s work that 
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conventionality dictates the available responses to intractable problems. The concluding section 
of this chapter will consider the affinity between the work of Arendt and Blum and McHugh but 
suggests that to more fully appreciate the way that different forms of human activity could each 
respond to the banality of evil Blum and McHugh’s work could benefit from the distinction 
Arendt makes between thinking and other forms mental life. This distinction is seen as important 
to avoid mechanically recommending that reflecting endlessly on an activity through thinking 
about its significance is the only available response to performance, though without denying that 
engaging in this form of reflection is always a possibility. This appreciation of judging the 
relevance of each of the different human faculties for responding to the performance of an 
activity is an understanding the argument will seek to demonstrate by recognizing that its own 
concern for the significance of human activity has been worked out through discussing the way 
in which this concern has been shown in each of the case studies that have been examined. The 
concluding remarks of this chapter will consider the problem developed in relation to the 
banality of evil through this discussion of the human faculty. This concerns the problem of the 
way in which to exercise judgment in relation to social order while recognizing the 
indeterminacy involved in the determinations made by this faculty. 
A Socratic Intervention upon the Acceptance of Wrongdoing as Commonplace   
The discussion of the banality of evil has suggested the importance of recognizing 
convention for understanding the widespread acceptance of mass murder during the genocides in 
Rwanda and Cambodia. In each case the support for this practice in terms of its legality and in 
terms of public opinion has encouraged those in agreement with the killings, has gained 
compliance from those who are either not overly concerned with their occurrence or may even 
object to them happening and has demonstrated the marginality of those who would not agree to 
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go along with the killings regardless of what convention dictated. A striking feature of the 
banality of evil is the contrasts it presents with the traditional understanding of evil that suggests 
that in its greatest incantations evil occurs through the dedication of remarkable but terrible 
individuals to devising elaborate and single-minded plans that either deliberately bring about 
tremendous misery and devastation or show little concern if others suffer such a fate. The 
significance of convention in the cases of genocide where millions are killed suggests many of 
its proponents have no special demonic gifts and simply shuffle their way into supporting these 
occurrences when circumstances blow them in the direction where the opportunity to take part in 
its events happens to present itself, events that represent some of the worst evils committed in 
human history. 
 For Hannah Arendt, Plato’s Gorgias is one of the reference points she uses to grapple 
with the implications of the Third Reich for understanding the banality of evil in relation to the 
way in which the notion of evil has been discussed within the Western tradition. She introduces 
the dialogue as part of her discussion of the “moral collapse of Europe” or the mainstream 
acceptance of mass murder in Nazi Germany that she identifies in her discussion of the banality 
of evil. Socrates’ well-known assertion in the Gorgias that it is better to suffer a wrong than to 
commit it is presented by Arendt as a way to challenge the claim that those who gave their 
support to the Nazi regime had no other choice than to do so. The controversy surrounding 
Arendt’s coverage of Eichmann’s trial in which strong support was given to the argument that 
others cannot make judgments about what ought to have been done without themselves having 
lived under Nazi rule271 only further amplified her concerns about the standing of morality in 
contemporary times. This controversy had also been illustrative of a difference between classical 
and modern ways of understanding “moral weakness” that is highlighted by Arendt in her 
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examination of the faculty of the will. Socrates argues that his opponents are ignorant in 
choosing a course of action that denies pursuing what they themselves consider to be “right” but 
this sense of agency is lost in the arguments made by Arendt’s opponents in the Eichmann 
controversy through the suggestion that individuals simply went along with what they were 
forced to do against their will. In spite of this difference the suggestion that doing wrong is worse 
than suffering it would still have been a provocative statement for a classical audience and it will 
be examined as a notion that potentially could interrupt the thoughtlessness of the banality of evil 
and the lack of imagination that is involved in refusing to consider other possibilities beyond 
what is dictated by convention in response to the fundamentally irresolute question of what way 
to act is “best.” 
Elenchus: The Banal as an Opener for Thinking 
 A contemporary criticism of the Gorgias that seemingly would dismiss the suggestion of 
using Socrates’ statement to intervene in a beneficial way is the challenge Bruno Latour issues in 
his article “Socrates’ and Callicles’ Settlement – or the Invention of the Impossible Body Politic” 
to the ready acceptance of the dialogue’s arguments. Latour contends that the traditional framing 
of the dialogue as a question of might versus right pays too close attention to the bickering 
between Socrates and his opponents – Protagoras, Polus and Callicles – and fails to recognize the 
deeper, highly elitist assumption they all share concerning the need of the governed to be 
managed and controlled. Their differences concern the means to accomplish this type of 
dominance, which is to occur either by the abstract theorizing of Socrates that legislates 
obedience to an all-too-pure form of morality or the use of force wielded by those in power that 
each of Socrates’ three opponents propose and is championed by Callicles to its most extreme 
conclusions. Latour argues that each of the two sides in this debate give no consideration to 
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consulting with the constituency over which the governing powers (either through persuasion or 
force) are to make their proclamations. 
 In response to Latour’s argument, Jeff Kochan contends in his article “Rescuing the 
Gorgias from Latour” that Socrates is in no way endorsing or practicing an abstract form of 
theorizing and this can be shown by examining the way in which the Socratic method of 
elenchus arrives at the understanding that it is better to suffer wrong than commit it. Latour 
argues that Socrates treats his statement as an absolute truth but Kochan suggests this is a failure 
to recognize Socrates’ understanding of friendship as consisting of the notion of “geometric 
equality.” His examination begins and ends with an opinion – that it is better to suffer wrong than 
commit it – but this opinion becomes more “thoughtful” through the practice of elenchus. This 
thoughtfulness is achieved not by Socrates exerting additional brain power in private deliberation 
but by the “friendship”272 of those he meets who are willing to engage him in conversation on the 
subjects of his concern. 273 His understanding of this examined opinion then becomes more 
multi-perspectival and is reflected in Socrates’ description of the way it (as well as the other 
opinions he considers to be true) have been “confirmed” for him: 
All I am saying is what I always say: I myself don’t know the facts 
of these matters, but I’ve never met anyone, including the people 
here today, who could disagree with what I’m saying and still 
avoid making himself ridiculous.274 
The statement that it is better to suffer wrong than commit it could be thought of as a placeholder 
that reminds Socrates of his past conversations about the subject it addresses. Kochan’s account 
of the Socratic method stands in striking opposition to Arendt’s characterization of Eichmann in 
that Eichmann’s opinions take the form of thoughtless clichés and “even when he did succeed in 
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constructing a sentence of his own, he repeated it until it became a cliché.”275 Her description 
illustrates the “method” by which Eichmann shows no ability to imagine things from the 
perspective of others as his thoughts are a series of well-repeated sayings that echo in his head 
that he has re-examined with no one, including himself. 
Latour and Garfinkel and the Integrity of Everyday Ways of Making Sense of the World 
 Kochan’s counter-criticism challenges Latour’s suggestion that the Socratic method 
involves detached theorizing that is not attentive to the particulars of the circumstances it 
addresses and also illustrates that Kochan is in agreement with Latour about the importance of 
theorizing that is attentive to a consideration of these particulars. Latour’s description of a new 
science and a new conception of the social are not discussed by Kochan but in his description of 
these subjects Latour more fully explains his alternative to Socratic theorizing. In response to his 
concerns with the concentration of power into the hands of the few Latour envisions a far more 
expansive notion of the body politic that includes non-human entities and grants to them a sense 
of agency. The suggestion is intriguing but seems as though it would benefit from the distinctions 
Arendt makes about the different capacities within the human condition, particularly with regard 
to the notion of action. Action is an activity that occurs not from necessity but is freely chosen to 
be engaged in and can be distinguished from the influence that the non-human world 
indisputably exerts on political matters through (for example) the stability that work provides by 
creating a world to conduct human affairs or the sustenance provided by the labouring activity 
that attends to the biological necessities of life so that the possibility exists to freely choose to 
take part in politics. 
In other writings Latour cites Harold Garfinkel as an important influence upon his 
work,276 especially with regard to the emphasis that Garfinkel places on analyzing the sense-
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making abilities of everyday members “without thought of correctives or irony.”277 Latour’s 
praise of ethnomethodology on this point seems to be somewhat at odds with his way of reading 
the Gorgias, if Schutz’s distinction between first and second order explanations is taken into 
consideration. Garfinkel cautions against the sense making practices of everyday members being 
accounted for by social scientists through their use of second order explanations, which is an 
explanation that fails to acknowledge the social scientist’s reliance upon their own sense making 
practices to explain the sense making practices they are analyzing in the social world. An 
example of this type of second order explanation could be a Marxist interpretation of the 
experiences of workers in a shipyard that refers to notions of class, false consciousness and 
alienation. Ethnomethodology suggests that when these terms are introduced by the social 
scientist and not the workers in the study then the analysis is overlooking the sense making 
practices that constitute the part of the social world they have chosen to direct their focus. These 
sense making practices that transpire within first order explanations are precisely what 
ethnomethodology considers to be the social sciences’ object of study. Latour’s charges of elitism 
against Socrates in the Gorgias, as well as the terminology he uses in Actor Network Theory 
(nodes, etc.) to account for phenomenon in the social world would seem to indicate that Latour is 
issuing the types of correctives offered by second order explanations that Garfinkel cautions an 
analyst against making.  
In his praise of Garfinkel Latour also mention the breaching experiments used in 
ethnomethodology for the way this method puts these sense-making practices on display by 
“transform[ing] even mundane encounters into controversies.”278 In discussing the banality of 
evil, a trouble with Garfinkel’s way of making trouble is that the aim of replicating everyday 
ways of making sense of the world “without corrective or irony” does not seem to show concern 
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for what else may be possible in the situations where adopting these sense making practices  may 
be deemed inappropriate. However, Garfinkel’s discussion of the difference between “the 
attitudes of daily life and scientific theorizing” that he bases on the account of this subject given 
by Alfred Schutz suggests his appreciation of these everyday sense making practices may 
involve more complexity than that of being in compliance with their understanding. In terms that 
sound as though they would very much win Latour’s approval Garfinkel suggests that “the vision 
of the ideal scientist” is a hindrance to understanding the everyday ways of making sense of the 
world that are organized by a different set of parameters. His argument is a challenge to the 
standard ways of conducting investigations in the social sciences and to make his case he 
highlights the disregard scientific rationality shows for the norms of social conduct that they 
purport to comprehend more fully. For instance, the differences that Garfinkel recognizes include 
the everyday attitude that objects are as they appear and the scientist’s interest in discovering 
what is behind appearances. He also mentions the everyday understanding that individuals have a 
vested interest in the events they take part in and possess an interpretive frame to appreciate their 
significance and that this attitude stands in contrast to the objectivity that scientists seek to 
maintain towards the events of concern to their investigation, which they strive to avoid judging 
in advance.279 The understanding that scientific theorizing generates is described as being 
artificial but it also may be seen as presenting an alternative to the everyday orientation to the 
world in which “a correctly used proposition is one for whose use the user specifically expects to 
be socially supported and by the use of which he furnishes evidence of his bona fide collectivity 
status.” 280  
Garfinkel’s recognition of the difference between scientific and everyday explanations 
suggests that the reflexive turn in ethnomethodology is open to appreciating the integrity of 
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different ways of making sense of the social world, especially one as neglected as the taken-for-
granted understanding of everyday members. Ethnomethodology might even record in its studies 
the sense making practices of those who have refused to go along with the practice of genocide, 
as well as those who chose to comply with its perpetration of mass killing. A difficulty with its 
approach seems to lie in its inability to discriminate between the merits of these two ways of 
making sense of the world, which seems not unlike the trouble identified by the genocide resistor 
“Gustave” in Rwanda when he mentions his need to avoid those that will encourage him to take 
up bad ways. His explanation seems to imply he had few resources of his own to resist the 
temptation posed by the influence to adopt the practices of those around him, though Gustave at 
least took care to note and emulate those he felt would steer him towards doing good.  
 As for the difference between science and everyday understanding Garfinkel’s 
explanation makes clear that he opposes the suggestion that the everyday attitude could either 
viably or ought to reorganize itself in the ways that science prescribes. In a footnote Garfinkel 
refers to the differences between scientific theorizing and the everyday attitude as being a 
manifestation of the dynamic that Weber describes in his discussion of the incompatibility of the 
formal, means-end rationality adhered to by the scientific perspective and the substantive, value-
oriented rationality that is reflective of the everyday attitude.281 A difference in these two 
accounts is that Garfinkel’s criticisms seem to suggest that the imposition of the scientific 
perspective upon the way the everyday attitude organizes itself will simply end in futility, while 
Weber’s concern is the domination of formal rationality that he likens to an iron cage against 
which resistance is increasingly becoming a futile exercise. After posing the question about what 
permits those who adopt a scientific perspective to “make substantial claims for a living upon 
those to whom the attitude is foreign and in many cases repugnant,”282 Garfinkel then concludes 
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his discussion by reiterating that any attempt to impose a model of conduct devised by scientific 
theorizing upon daily life will be met with recalcitrance and only serve to “magnify the senseless 
character of a behavioral environment and multiply the disorganized features of the systems of 
interaction.”283 
 The phrase “breaching experiments” implies that Garfinkel is not rejecting (social) 
science but is concerned with making the experimenter more consciously aware of the 
differences between their form of rationality and the everyday attitude. Experiments that (for 
example) violate the social norms associated with maintaining personal space between speakers 
in casual conversation expose not only the way that the everyday attitude constructs these norms 
but challenges the assertion that the set of norms that science ascribes to are a “more rational” 
way of organizing social life. In considering the banality of evil and the concerns its suggests 
with regards to the unthinking compliance to social norms, recognizing the integrity and 
coherence of the everyday attitude seems like an indispensable first step for appreciating the 
appeal involved in following convention. This moves past the attempts to dismiss the ideology of 
Nazism, Hutu Power or the Khmer Rouge as irrational nonsense or to explain them in terms of 
some form of abnormal psychological affliction that medicalizes their “condition.” It also adjusts 
for what is perhaps Arendt’s willingness to too readily disregard the use of clichés, a view that is 
suggested by the comments she makes about her personal language use in an interview with 
Gunter Gaus. She explains that despite being fluent in oral and written French and being able to 
write fluently in English she communicates as much as possible in her native tongue where her 
knowledge of poetic works allows her to respond to the difficulty posed by the situation “in 
language where one cliché chases another.”284 In comparison to Arendt, the sense that an analysis 
might begin with everyday usage is certainly more evident in Kochan’s description of elenchus 
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and its reference to Socrates starting his inquiries with an opinion he had repeated to many 
people, and seems to offer a potential model for addressing the thoughtless relation to convention 
indicative of the banality of evil. 
The Lack of Certainty in Avoiding Wrongdoing 
 The focus in the Gorgias upon rhetoric is distinguished from sophistry in a way that 
shows a difference both between these two subjects and between Socrates and his interlocutors. 
While each of the participants in the conversation shares a distaste for sophistry, Socrates clearly 
would not agree with the others in considering a discipline intended for a common Athenian 
audience beneath him or its focus on the “good” as a needless interference upon rhetoric’s 
professed ability to allow its students to gain power over others. The distaste Socrates describes 
having for sophistry concerns the way it engages in contradiction. He sees a difficulty in the 
sophists’ demanding of a fee to teach virtue as their students, if they have become virtuous from 
what they have learned, will insist on repaying their teachers out of gratitude for the lessons they 
have received.285 This discussion of the influence that a teacher has upon their pupils begins to 
address the main concern of the dialogue with Socrates challenging Callicles’ suggestion that 
those who ignore trying to become morally “better” are “better off” (in some ill-defined way286) 
by asking who has been made “better” by practicing rhetoric. The prominent rhetoricians that 
Callicles cites are dismissed by Socrates for either having been executed or exiled by the 
Athenian populace and as an alternative Socrates mentions Aristeides who was not a rhetorician 
but considered to be a good leader for the city of Athens. 
 Although not mentioned in the dialogue, Aristeides was (oddly enough) also forced into 
exile by the Athenians,287 but the greater irony of the discussion is that Socrates was of course 
put to death by the Athenian people. Plato seems to have Socrates offer a posthumous defence of 
176 
 
himself288 (of sorts) through his answer to Callicles’ suggestion that the only reason Socrates 
maintains those who are morally “better” are also better off when facing exile or death is that he 
never imagines he could be in this type of situation.289 In his response Socrates likens the 
rhetoricians who justify escaping the verdict of the “corrupt” political body they once led as 
statesmen to being no less absurdly hypocritical than the sophists who sue in court their 
“corrupt” former pupils that have cheated them out of the fees they owe them once they have 
already made them “virtuous.”290 He also argues that “no man fears the mere act of dying, except 
he who be utterly irrational”291 and ends the discussion by telling a fable “that he believes to be 
true”292 about the price to be paid in the afterlife for wrongdoing. 
 One problematic aspect of Socrates’ argument concerns the extent to which statesmen can 
ensure their guidance will “better” their followers. Socrates suggest that if he were called upon to 
defend himself in court that he would fare badly at winning the favour of the jury and compares 
himself to a doctor who has to explain to children why his painful remedies are more beneficial 
to them than the delicious food a cook makes for them to eat.293 This argument would seem to 
suggest that Socrates wants to have it both ways and is hard to reconcile with his earlier 
suggestion that evaluating statesmen is like evaluating a herdsman who 
would be considered a bad one ... if he took over animals that did 
not kick or butt or bite, and in the result they were found to be 
doing these things out of sheer wildness. Or do you not consider 
any keeper of any animal whatever a bad one, if he turns out the 
creature he received tame so much wilder than he found it?294 
Two objections that could be raised in defence of Socrates are that the Athenian populace was by 
no means “tame” (in the non-pejorative sense of the term suggested by his analogy) when he 
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began dialoguing with them and, also, he is a citizen of Athens and not a statesman in charge of 
ruling the city. 
 In the case of the first of these objections the argument Socrates makes involving the 
herdsmen is part of his dismissal of Callicles’ suggestion that Pericles can be named as an 
example of a great orator and leader of Athens. Socrates notes that during his tenure: 
Pericles was popular at first, and the Athenians passed no 
degrading sentences upon him so long as they were “worse”; but as 
soon as they had been made honourable and upright by him, at the 
end of our Pericles’ life they convicted him of embezzlement, and 
all but condemned him to death, clearly because they thought him 
a rogue.295 
This argument will later set up Socrates’ comparison between the hypocrisy of statesmen and 
sophists who complain about the ill-treatment they receive from their followers who they also 
claim to have made “better.” He suggests that this represents a poorly thought out effort by each 
to defend themselves against harm – to their wallet in the case of the sophists or to their wallet 
and body in the case of the statesmen – and Socrates quite nobly did not show a concern for 
either of these things when facing execution. In his defence at court Socrates cautions his fellow 
citizens of Athens that they “will not so easily find another like me”296 and explains that he is 
concerned about the harm that will be done to them if he is put to death. With this being the case 
the argument he makes against Pericles would then seem to also apply to himself. If he is 
claiming the Athenians who were “worse” grew “better” in some way from the many years of 
conversations they had with Socrates why then at the end of his life when “they had been made 
honourable and upright” would they decide to convict him of corrupting the youth and preaching 
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false gods?297 The other objection that notes that Socrates did not hold a position of leadership in 
Athens and so did not exert its accompanying level of influence is certainly true in a literal sense 
but is undercut by Socrates’ claim in the Gorgias that he considers himself to be “one of the few, 
not to say the only one, who attempts the true art of statesmanship.”298 
 The answers to these objections do not challenge Socrates’ assertion that “to suffer harm 
is better than choosing to do it” or its importance as a form of guidance to consider in response to 
wrongdoing. This guidance is not a guarantee against wrongdoing being committed, which the 
dialogue seems to acknowledge by conducting a contentious debate that works out the merits of 
its advice by making reference to both reasoned argument and the telling of a myth to further 
persuade its listeners. The stipulation to avoid “choosing” to do wrong suggests that even those 
who have been persuaded by the advice given by this phrase will experience difficulty in 
following its guidance and leaves open the possibility to recognize that knowledge of what will 
avoid wrongdoing is fundamentally uncertain and never known in an absolute sense. The case 
might even be made that Plato recognizes the perplexity involved in preventing wrong from 
being committed by presenting Socrates’ struggles with convincing Callicles and in the irony of 
having him suggest that the leaders of Athens that were sentenced to execution by the city’s 
citizens cannot claim to have been beneficial to the city. This interpretation of the Gorgias would 
take its cue from the arguments that suggest that the Republic was a satirical look at the way to 
design a state that would create another Socrates but in this case the unpredictability is associated 
with the prevention of wrongdoing. 
 A sense of fundamental uncertainty that the Socratic dialogues seem to acknowledge by 
their aporetic character is perhaps also being recognized in Garfinkel’s work through its 
reference (quoted above) to the way in which the imposition of scientific rationality on the 
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everyday attitude will “magnify the senseless character of a behavioral environment.” His 
suggestion that science is not introducing this problematic would seem to indicate that the 
senselessness had to have been present in the first place for it to be further magnified. The 
ethnomethodological approach Garfinkel pioneers concerns itself with the technical problem of 
how everyday members respond to this senselessness and “make sense” of the world. What this 
consideration of the Gorgias adds to the discussion is that a focus on avoiding wrongdoing 
provides a way in which to respond to this uncertainty that must be continually worked out as the 
Socratic method of elenchus seems to imply. This Socratic model of a citizen who dialogues with 
their fellow citizens about their sense of wrongdoing also seems to show an affinity with 
Arendt’s demand that everyone be able to think and that this thinking involves judging the 
particulars of a situation that in certain cases will involve avoiding being a part of committing a 
“catastrophe.”  
The universality of thinking is also acknowledged in Blum and McHugh’s work through 
their acceptance of Garfinkel’s collapsing of the theorist/member distinction but the difference in 
their work is that theorizing is more fully articulated and preserved as a particular perspective on 
everyday understanding, which involves reflecting upon the “good” of its practices. 
Ethnomethodology is fortunately unlike scientific explanations in that its discussion of the 
reflexivity of accounts acknowledges that everyday understanding is ordered by its own sense 
making practices. But unfortunately, unlike the Socratic notion of elenchus ethnomethodology is 
not concerned with working through the implications of these sense making practices and 
considering the merits of whether their performance should occur. In the next section Blum and 
McHugh’s work will be discussed for the way that they suggest that this concern for the “good” 
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is recognized in thinking and which is explained in their work with reference to a distinction they 
make between rules and principles. 
The Need to Theorize Distinguished from All Ways of Pursuing a Concern for the “Good” 
 In Self-Reflection in the Arts and Sciences, Alan Blum and Peter McHugh challenge the 
notion suggested by Garfinkel and others of a social actor limited by the possibilities presented 
by convention in forming a response to what cannot be known in an absolute sense. The 
argument they make centres on a distinction between rules and principles and looks reflexively at 
the theoretical inquirer to suggest that a principled theorist is not exclusively preoccupied with 
minding the rules and conventions of theoretical investigation in a competent fashion. Blum and 
McHugh argue for the need of the theorist to demonstrate a concern for the principle by which 
they elect to pursue theorizing and that this principle be recognized as necessary.299 This 
necessity is implied by the decision to theorize as opposed to doing other things but is an activity 
that is distinguished from “doing other things” in its having the potential to inquire about the 
“good” of what it does. As an illustration of where this interest has been shown to be lacking, 
Max Weber suggests in The Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism that the 
practitioners of modern capitalism curiously demonstrate a great deal of apathy towards being 
able to account for their pursuit of economic interests. Weber mentions this issue in part to 
defend the counterintuitive suggestion of his thesis that a religious ethic animates the capitalists’ 
money-making activities when for these individuals “the thought of the pious boredom of 
paradise has little appeal.”300 “If you ask them what the meaning is of their restless activity,” 
Weber proposes: 
They would perhaps give the answer, if they knew any at all: “to 
provide for my children and grandchildren.” But more often and, 
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since that motive is not peculiar to them, but was just as effective 
for the traditionalist, more correctly, simply: that business with its 
continuous activity has become a necessary part of their lives.301 
The necessity that Weber is referring to involves a thoughtless acceptance of what is 
conventional and not representative of the principle that Blum and McHugh suggest that a 
theorist is acting upon when reflecting upon the “good” of their activities. 
 Contrary to what may be implied by this example, the notion of a principled theorist is 
not restricted to those who make their profession as thinkers nor denied to other professions 
(such as those in the field of business). Blum and McHugh emphasize that the theorist begins in 
medias res, in the middle of things, and gains their “status” as a theorist not from any form of 
specialized training but by being a social actor who is accountable for the “good” of what they 
do in the world. This contrasts with the idea of making detached pronouncements about the 
current state of affairs and arguing (for instance) about the need to bring about a more perfect 
end envisioned by reason. Blum and McHugh suggest that the theorist’s concern for the “good” 
is made without a claim to knowing what the “good” is in an absolute sense: 
The great insight of theorizing is to affirm our need to live 
enjoyably with this irony: That the absolute character of the 
“ultimate truth” is denied by its dependency upon discourse and by 
the need to be grasped and expressed, and that the absolute 
character of discourse (of the speaker of the ego) is denied by its 
being en medias res.302 
Blum and McHugh further explain that as a feature of being in medias res, the theorist, by 
working out their (limited) understanding of the ultimate truth, show themselves in the 
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particularity of the circumstances in which they fashion their understanding. Their argument later 
affirms the mutual need between ultimate truth and articulation but with a greater emphasis upon 
the issue of this need: “That the ultimate truth needs discourse and is absolute points to a source 
of irony in my recognition that I am needed by the ultimate truth as much as it is needed by 
me.”303 
 To illustrate this point about the importance of recognizing the need to use language to 
express truth in a limited way Blum and McHugh take up the issue that the notion of detachment 
offers a very fitting description of an ironic theorist who sneers at the world for the ways in 
which it is lacking relative to what is “true.” They cite as an example the formula “I know that I 
do not know,”304 although their explanation argues against the suggestion that Socrates, in 
working with this understanding, is engaged in a detached form of theorizing. The charge seems 
to more aptly describes the Cynics of ancient Greece, whose most well-known proponent, 
Diogenes, Plato once referred to as “Socrates gone mad” for his flouting of convention. This 
includes the stunt he performed of carrying a lamp in the marketplace during the day claiming to 
be looking for an honest man and his description of himself as a cosmopolitan and “citizen of the 
world” (i.e. he is from everywhere so he is also from nowhere in the world). 
 Blum and McHugh contend that the theorist who is concerned with the principle that 
accounts for the “good” of theorizing experiences a sense of enjoyment from recognizing the 
irony of absolute knowledge deferring to discourse to actualize its need to be expressed when the 
notions expressed in discourse are only capable of offering partial representations of what is true. 
An illustration of what this form of enjoyment might look like in practice is suggested by Keith 
Doubt in his use of Blum and McHugh’s work to analyze the writings of nationally known 
Bosnian poet Mak Dizdar. Dizdar refers to Circe’s transformation of Odysseus’ men into swine 
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and Doubt suggests that in this condition the men, though still alive, had lost their identity as 
human by existing in silence and losing their relation to discourse.305 The contrast is with 
Odysseus who takes care not to lose his powers of speech and who, Dizdar writes, “even the 
Gods envy” for they envy “those who are most wise, and most sinful.”306 Doubt asks: “Why, 
though, would gods envy humans who are utterly wise and utterly mistaken?” He answers 
through explaining Odysseus’ understanding of the situation: 
Odysseus is grasped by the ultimate’s need to be grasped and 
expressed. The neediness of the gods grips Odysseus; it defines 
him, it affirms who he is absolutely. The irony amazes Odysseus. 
The gods are subject to the need to be grasped and expressed, and 
this knowledge makes Odysseus wise.307 
Doubt’s interpretation of Dizdar’s work is that by lifting the spell to make his men human again 
Odysseus distinguishes himself as someone who recognizes that discourse, in its flawed way, is 
needed to articulate the absolute principle about the “good” of what he is doing. 
 The closing lines of Blum and McHugh’s work further considers the issue of need and 
proposes that “if it is perfectly clear to us that the notion and our relation to it need to be 
demonstrated and made explicit, it is just as certain that the need to demonstrate this very need 
for demonstration is a necessity that stands fast for us, a conviction we inherit with (and as) the 
need to glimpse the ultimate truth as subject.”308 In Doubt’s example, Odysseus’ experience of 
the need to articulate what is ultimate “affirms who he is absolutely,” but where does his need for 
this type of affirmation arise? To respond to this concern Blum and McHugh pose a question: 
“Can we say that life makes a claim that needs to be worked out and recollected?”309 Their 
suggestion is not that this need is a naturally occurring phenomenon but that the conditions for 
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theorizing are not set by the whims of theorist electing to theorize. This need takes form as that 
which conditions theorizing and involves choice in the way in which the theorist elects to 
respond to the need to articulate the “good” of their activities (and, as previously stated, show 
themselves in their response). Blum further develops an understanding of the need of the theorist 
to demonstrate their need to theorize in his later work that moves from the terms of the ironic 
theorist concerned with the principle of theorizing to a discussion of impasse analysis.310 The 
notion of an impasse understood in its literal or etymological sense of “that which cannot be 
passed” signifies that the need to demonstrate the need for demonstration does not originate from 
a theorist’s choosing to present such a need but that a condition for theorizing is to perpetually 
work out responses to irresolute problems that are unavoidably a part of what is experienced in 
life. 
 In Arendt’s writing the need to theorize is recognized as being an ever-present possibility 
that accompanies (social) life through the capacity of theorizing to reflect upon the recourse to 
rules and conventions. She observes that: “If what you were doing consisted in applying general 
rules of conduct to particular cases as they arise in ordinary life, you will find yourself paralyzed 
because no such rules can withstand the wind of thought.”311 Her argument parallels Blum and 
McHugh’s in defending Socrates and Socratic irony against the charge of engaging in a detached 
form of theorizing that sneers at reality by her suggestion that nihilism represents a danger 
inherent to thinking and the cynicism of some Socrates’ followers only represents their decision 
to arrest the thinking process at the point where it demonstrates problematic aspects of 
convention.312 A contribution Arendt makes to understanding the need to demonstrate the need 
for demonstration is to consider this matter in terms of the human faculties, in this case the 
faculty of thought in its quest for meaning. This seems to answer some of the difficulties that 
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Blum and McHugh experience in accounting for the origin of theorizing by their looking outside 
of the capacity to theorize. They recognize that theorizing is conditioned by denying that the 
impulse to theorize lies solely upon the whim of the theorist but they also refer to these 
conditions as being in “life” – that is, something that is not inherent to but outside of the activity 
of theorizing to which the theorist responds. As Blum more explicitly suggests in his later work, 
the events of life collide with one another in such a way that its participants cannot avoid 
experiencing an impasse in their attempts to respond to fundamentally irresolute problems. In 
Arendt’s account the understanding that the meaning of things is never-ending is inherent to the 
faculty of thought and life appears in this way only when its events are viewed from the 
perspective of the thinking activity. This understanding permits her explanation to recognize the 
possible appearance of someone like Eichmann who never experiences an impasse or a concern 
for the meaning of things or what he is doing as a reflection of his inability to think. In 
recognizing the possibility to think she also seems to acknowledge the limits of this faculty by 
suggesting that endless reflection, though conceivable, is not humanly possible and to avoid the 
“paralysis” brought upon by the “wind of thought” would seem to call upon the faculty of 
judgment. Judgment in this sense maintains a concern for the “good” of an activity with the 
understanding that this concern need not necessarily be pursued through thinking and its focus 
upon reflecting on the significance of an activity. 
 Arendt’s reference to the human faculties suggests that Blum and McHugh’s explanation 
represents a faithful account of the activity of thinking as a phenomenon, but their account has 
also become a bit too faithful in its estimation of the scope of this phenomenon. If the Western 
tradition initially places too great an emphasis upon contemplation to assess the relative merit of 
the other human faculties, Blum and McHugh seem to totalize the thinking experience to suggest 
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that life is synonymous with its never-ending concern for the meaning of things and that this 
concern gets masked by convention and other considerations that do not address the irresolute 
character of working out the “good” of an activity. If the experience of an impasse is 
“fundamental” in the sense of not only being unresolvable but also unavoidable then responding 
to this experience would be no less necessary and unavoidable. These responses will include 
theorizing, or thinking, as well as exercising other human faculties and then, unless the decision 
to think is followed mechanically, responding in a way that involves exercising the other human 
faculties would not necessarily be representative of a failure to theorize. Arendt suggests that the 
thinking activity’s quest for meaning becomes humanly possible by exercising judgment and her 
argument provides an indication of the importance of the other human faculties for ensuring the 
possibility that the experience of an impasse, which is inherent to the thinking activity, is 
prevented from becoming totally “impassable” or avoids reaching the point where it becomes 
fully incapacitating. 
 Working with this understanding of thinking that considers its place among the other 
human faculties, what can be said about the thoughtless compliance with convention that is 
indicative of the banality of evil? 
The Banality of Evil as it Relates to Each of the Human Faculties and to the What of 
Theorizing 
 In comments fitting to her suggestion that morality is being treated like table manners, 
Arendt argues that little comfort should be taken from the “success” of the de-Nazification in 
post-war Germany as this was just a repeat of the process that brought about the country’s 
Nazification.313 Each instance is a case of the old system of values and customs being 
thoughtlessly exchanged for the new one currently being enforced by convention and in Nazi 
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Germany this thoughtlessness manifested itself into a banal form of evil. Perhaps another way to 
recognize the occurrence of the banality of evil as a phenomenon is to consider the reports from 
Rwanda stating that in the years afterwards visitors to the sites of major massacres carried out 
during the genocide would hear under their feet the crunch of bones from the unburied dead.314 
This imagery might bring to mind a crowd that in response to some form of excitement tramples 
on and kills its own members under the movement of its collective weight. As a rule this type of 
killing is an impersonal act committed against “anonymous” targets who are unknown even to 
those who land the fatal blows. The individuals who stop and think and refuse to go along with 
the dangerous movements of the crowd would seem to be taking personal responsibility for what 
they do, but in the event of widespread compliance to a murderous order that is representative of 
the banality of the evil, if the focus of an individual is to ensure they avoid taking part of 
wrongdoing is this really the “best” response available to them? 
 In discussing Socrates’ statement that to suffer wrongdoing is better than to commit it 
Arendt argues that this 
Moral truth ... has nothing whatsoever to do with action. Politically 
speaking – that is, from the viewpoint of the community or of the 
world we live in – it is irresponsible; its standard is the self and not 
the world, neither its improvement or change.315 
She also adds that “the political concern is not whether the act of striking somebody unjustly or 
of being struck unjustly is more disgraceful. The concern is exclusively with having a world in 
which such acts do not occur.”316 This is consistent with the view she presents in her essay 
“Thinking and Moral Considerations,” which she concludes by saying of the activity of thinking 
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that it “may prevent catastrophes, at least for myself, in the rare moments when the chips are 
down.”317 
 If thinking is lacking in worldliness, the faculty of the will and its concern with 
“beginning” presents a difficulty of its own for the aspirations to create “a world in which 
wrongdoing does not occur.” In Arendt’s account the will shrinks from its capacity to freely 
choose to begin something new, even in the case of the founders of the American Republic who 
she suggests are representative of one of the most ambitious attempts to begin a new form of 
government but ended up “ransacking the archives of antiquity” and “did not rebel against 
antiquity when they discovered ... that salvation always comes from the past, that the ancestors 
were maiores, the ‘greater ones’ by definition.”318 In relation to the apparent “un-willingness” (so 
to speak) of the will to recognize its own capacity for freedom Arendt proposes that “this 
impasse, if such it is, cannot be opened or solved except by an appeal to another mental faculty, 
no less mysterious than the faculty of beginning, the faculty of judgment, an analysis of which at 
least may tell us what is involved in our pleasures and displeasures.”319 Judgment presents the 
possibility to be freed from the weight of history in deciding the way in which to do things, a 
suggestion that Arendt recognizes in Cato’s statement that “the victorious cause pleased the 
Gods, but the defeated one pleases Cato.”320 The fatalism that judgment denies to history seems 
no less important than this faculty’s capacity to be freed from accepting that things must be done 
exclusively in the way that convention proposes. The discovery of the faculty of willing seems to 
be viewed with suspicion by Arendt, especially the suggestion of performing an activity “against 
one’s will.” This is a suggestion that seems to encourage more fully exploring the idea that what 
is believed privately excuses the public performance of activities considered to be distasteful. 
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 In examining these different human faculties for a way in which to create a world where 
wrongdoing does not occur, what seems important to acknowledge is that knowledge about what 
would avoid wrongdoing, including the form of compliance involved in the banality of evil, is 
not possible to obtain in an absolute sense for either oneself or for others. This fundamental and 
unavoidable lack of understanding was recognized when discussing the difficulties that Socrates 
seems to run into when suggesting that he is of benefit to the city but his involvement in it ended 
with their decision to execute him. The sense that absolute knowledge is not possible to attain is 
not an invitation to fatalism and accepting the understanding that if genocide occurred in history 
then this is the way things always will and must be. If absurdity lies in the suggestion that a 
world can be created that will predictably ensure that this form of killing does not occur, then 
also absurd is the suggestion that nothing can or should be done to at least attempt to create such 
a world. 
 From what has been argued this effort will call upon the exercise of the full range of 
human faculties that may include the need to perform labour and survive under the extreme 
conditions in a death camp, the need to perform work that will document the occurrence of 
genocide and suggest ways of working out a response to its happening and the need to perform 
actions that lead to a new form of collective activity that aims to go against the practice of 
genocide. It will also include the exercise of imagination that breaches convention by suggesting 
a version of a social actor who not only follows Garfinkel’s suggestion that “a correctly used 
proposition is one for whose use the user specifically expects to be socially supported and by the 
use of which he furnishes evidence of his bona fide collectivity status”321 but will possibly 
consider Socrates’ advice to Polus that he “should rather choose to have my lyre, or some chorus 
that I might provide for the public, out of tune and discordant, or to have any number of people 
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disagreeing with me and contradicting me, than that I should have internal discord and 
contradiction in my own single self.”322 It will also involve exercising the will to freely chose do 
things in ways they have not been done before if this avoids accepting the practice of genocide. 
And finally, it will involve exercising the judgment that is needed to decide on a case-by-case 
basis which of the faculties should be called upon to avoid complying with the practice of 
genocide. This is to suggest that considering the ways in which the practice of genocide relates to 
the banality of evil is part of working out a fuller sense of the possibilities made available by the 
different human faculties and perhaps may also contribute to understanding what is meant by 
referring to a collective that involves formulating a notion of humanity. These considerations 
might also help to appreciate that the recommendation about the need to theorize includes a 
recommendation about what to theorize. The banality of evil understood as thoughtlessness 
implies that it is of concern to theorizing in that thoughtlessness represents a denial of the 
possibility to exercise the judgment that is required to recognize the need to engage in the 
activity of thinking. This discussion of the banality of evil has tried to demonstrate this notion of 
judgment that recognizes the way in which the banality of evil touches upon the need to theorize 
– as any subject, if theorized, is possible to work out in the way in which it is relevant to 
theorizing – through developing in this discussion an understanding of judgment that is 
concerned with the “good” of an activity pursued either by the reflection upon the significance of 
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